



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

MAR 02 2010

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

PAGE DEFACED
BY PACKAGING.

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act request of March 29, 2001, for information pertaining to Czechoslovakia Intelligence Services, Methods 400202.

We have located records pertaining to your request of Czechoslovakia Intelligence Services, Methods ZF400202.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and 93 pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 12958, as amended. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, as amended, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Information has been sanitized from the record that is predominantly internal in nature, the disclosure of which would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations or statutes. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(2).

Since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Brigadier General Mary A. Legere, Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.


We are coordinating with other government agencies concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

We apologize for any inconvenience this delay may have caused you.

There are no assessable FOIA fees.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: INSCOM_FOIA_ServiceCenter@mi.army.mil and refer to case #1630F-10.

Sincerely,



Joanne Benear
Chief
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office

Enclosure

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. 2F 40 0282

Best Copy Available

As of 16 Aug 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

[Signature] 16 Aug 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

D. Biggs 5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

Review on
24 Jul 86

80 206 2168

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MIA
Form 315
1 Sep 72
Jan 74

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 301-10
REVIEWER A. Smith
DATE 9-20-87

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 301-10
REVIEWER [Signature]
DATE 28 Sept 86

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 301-10
REVIEWER M. McKinney
DATE 27 June 86

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 301-10
REVIEWER [Signature]
DATE 8-02-95

... affecting the national defense of the
... within the meaning of the
... Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and
... The transmission or the revelation of its
... contents in any manner to an unauthorized
... person is prohibited by law.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

5-7G
report contains unprocessed information,
and/or policies should not be evolved
or modified solely on the basis of this report.
NR-1162-72

1-KH
1-CZ
JW

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 1169 73(5004-07)
2. SUBJECT: (U) PRAGUE(5004N-1426E) (VR5049), STB Activities	9. DATE OF REPORT: 12 January 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
	11. REFERENCES: SICR: U-GEF-C0680 U-GEF-24751
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 08 October 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Nuernberg, Germany 30 November 1972	13. PREPARED BY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 COL, MI Gp Commanding
7. SOURCE: b1	

15. SUMMARY:

(c) **b1**

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527

FEB 6 9 49 AM '73
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DS-402

REPORT:

1. (c) Source

b1

NR 23-7-115-01
23-10-09108
01/11/73

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR-1 w/o encl
1-EUCOM-w/o encl-fol w/o encl
1-USAF
1-USASAE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-SF DCC (Abn) Eur
1-USASPD-w-1 encl
1-CINCPACFLT-w/o encl
1-OSI - w/o encl
1-PSY OPS-w/o encl

17. COMPARATIVE DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY **b1**
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSI-
FICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECU-
TIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT
BE DETERMINED

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:
(c) **b1**
b1

REQUEST ENCL FROM DS-4A

ENCL 1 HAS NOT BEEN
REPRODUCED

DD FORM 1396

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(Classification and Control Markings)

PORT NO. 2218 1169 72

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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3

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1 SEP 65

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2218 1169 72

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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4

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SEP 82

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REPORT NO. 2218 1169 72

PAGE 4

OF 6

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REPORT NO. 2218 1169 72
PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES
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1 SEP 62

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☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 8

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Page(s) 10-11

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.		CONFIDENTIAL		546G This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. NU-1208-72	
1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA	2. SUBJECT: (c) b1	3. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 7793 72 (5004-09)	4. DATE OF REPORT: 5 September 1972	5. NO. OF PAGES: 4	6. REFERENCES: SIGR: U-GEZ-24751 DISM: 686, 687 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
7. ISC NUMBER:	8. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1971	9. ORIGINATOR:	10. PREPARED BY: b6	11. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 COL, MI Commanding	12. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
13. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 27 July 1972	14. SOURCE: b1	15. SUMMARY: (c) b1 b1			
REPORT:					
1. (c) Source b1					
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR 1-EUCOM, w/o Incl 1-USAFE, w/o Incl 1-V Corps, w/o Incl 1-VII Corps, w/o Incl 1-EEIC, w/o Incl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl 1-SF Det (Abn) Eor, w/o Incl 1-USASPD, w/o Incl 1-CINCPACFLT, w/o Incl continued to Bloc Rr 17		17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY b1 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1) DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED 1-OSI, w/o Incl 1-PSYOPS, w/o Incl		18. ENCLOSURE DATA: 1 Encl: (c) b1	

DD FORM 1296

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REPORT NO. 2 218 7793 72 PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES ORIGINATOR 60th MI Group, APO New York 09108	
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL <small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small>
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2. (c) <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b1</div>	
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3. (c) <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b1</div>	
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REPORT NO. 2 218 7793 72
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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REPORT NO. 2 218 7793 72
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09103

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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Page(s) 16-
25

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Page(s) 27-59

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Page(s) 60-63

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

(Classification and Control Markings)

B17400 (C)

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
B174-31/72

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
2. SUBJECT: CIS Modus Operandi (U)
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 8 November 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany
14 January 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE II INFORMATION 2
7. SOURCE: See Comments
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0221 72
9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 January 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCED: DIRM: 687
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY:
14. APPROVING AUTH:

b6

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

b1

b1

REC'D OS-4C2 15 FEB 1972

242114-CZ
242346-CZ
242717-CZ
242924-CZ

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DIA
2-OSMAEUR
1-ESCOM
1-ACSI-CICD
1-66th MI Gp, ABUTHI-0A-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP - 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Inclosure (C), b1
b1
described in para 1
above, 1 page

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 65

1. Within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, dissemination or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

(Classification and Control Markings)

Plans and/or policies should not be disclosed solely on the basis of this report.

67-012-71

COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CISX)
 2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 710 0012 71
 3. SUBJECT: (U) Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS): Documentation
 4. DATE OF REPORT: 20 December 1971
 5. NO. OF PAGES: 1
 6. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687a
 7. DATE OF INFORMATION: 18 October 1971
 8. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, Stuttgart Station
 9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Stuttgart, FRG
 10 December 1971
 10. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2
 11. APPROVING: COL, MI
 12. SOURCE: 2 212 0011

b6

PT, AI

13. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information on Documentation of Agents operating in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS).

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

"EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1450's) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL."

- (U) To document an agent the CIS uses passports of West German citizens containing visas for entries and exits to various European countries. Also, International Certificates of Vaccination are issued bearing as authenticating medical authority the name and address of a Frankfurt/Main, FRG, physician.
- (U) For emergency travel to CSSR, a visa can quickly be arranged by simply handing the passport to the doorman of the RWVO FRAG factory in Frankfurt/Main, FRG.

14. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1-DIA
- 1-OSMAFUR
- 1-EDCOM, J-2
- 1-ACSI-CIA
- 1-DEFINTC-INDI
- 1-66th MI Gp, ABUTM-0A-IR

15. DOWNGRADING DATA: GROUP 3
 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
 NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

16. ENCLOSURE DATA:

CONFIDENTIAL

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
 ON NOV 24 1991
 BY CDR USAFSCOM F01/PO
 AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.18

1396

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1. Title of U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794.
2. Classification of the violation of the
statute in any matter in an unauthorized
manner is prohibited by law.

(Classification and Control Markings)

Plans and/or policies should not be
disclosed or copy on the basis of GDS
67-013-71

1. COUNTRY: Czechoslovakia (CSCZ)

2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 710 0013 71

3. SUBJECT: (U) Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (CIS): Photographic
Training

4. DATE OF REPORT: 20 December 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

5. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 637a

6. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 October 1971

12. ORIGINATOR: 64th MI Group, Stuttgart Station

7. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Stuttgart, FRG
8 December 1971

13. PREPARED BY:

8. EVALUATION: SOURCE 1 INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING A:

9. SOURCE: 2 212 0011

b6

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information on photographic training given and
equipment used by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS):

a. The camera used is a 35 mm EXA 500, with an AGFA 23mm, 20 Exposure
40 ASA film. (The camera is manufactured in East Germany)

b. A F 650 Bauer-Boesch lighting bulb is used for taking photographs.

c. The photographic paper is cut to the desired size and the non-glossy
side is placed on the document desired to be photographed. The exposure time
depends on the amount of light available. Care must be taken not to expose the
paper.

"EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480's) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT
LEAST CONFIDENTIAL."

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BY ONYUS 3-4-99
AUTH PER 1-608 DCD 5200.1R

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-OSAKUR
1-ENCOM, J-2
1-ACSI-CIA
1-STATE-DOCI
1-64th MI Gr, AEMMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
<p>NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>322A</p> <p>This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be developed or modified solely on the basis of this report.</p>	
<p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>			
1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA	2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 2073 7L	18 JUN 1971 REC'D DS-4C2	
3. SUBJECT: (U) Activities of the CSSR Counter-Intelligence Service within the 5th Border Command	4. DATE OF REPORT: 17 December 1971		
5. ISC NUMBER: 346	6. NO. OF PAGES: 3	SICR: U-SEC-60671	
	7. REFERENCES: DIRH: 607		
8. DATE OF INFORMATION: November 1971	9. ORIGINATOR: 65th MI Gp, AMO New York	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center;">b6</div>	
10. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Bamich, Germany 15 December 1971	11. PREPARED BY:		
12. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:		
14. SOURCE: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">b1</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">b1</div>		
15. SUMMARY:			
<p>(U) This report contains information on the activities of the CSSR Counter-Intelligence Service among the soldiers of the 5th BG Lde in GIBB (5004N-1221E) (U21150) and its subordinate units. The activities relate to the recruitment of informants who are supposed to work under cover and are required to sign a statement swearing never to reveal any information to unauthorized persons, only to the officers who are assigned to lead them.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULES</p>			
REPORT:			
1. (C) Source			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 20px; font-size: 48px;">b1</div>			
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:		17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	
1-DIA 1-CINCPACFLT 1-DEAFKIN 1-NSI 1-EUCOM 1-PSY OPS 1-USAFH 1-USASIR 1-V Corps 1-VII Corps 1-REIC 1-ACSI 1-65th MI Gp. 430 MI Det 1-66th MI Gp. 766th MI Det 1-SF Det (Abn) Eur 1-OSASPH		GROUP - 3 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS. NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.	
		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">68</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">CONFIDENTIAL</div> <p style="text-align: center;">(Classification and Control Markings)</p>	
DD FORM 1396		18. ENCLOSURE DATA: None	

205100-02
 331215-02
 202200-02

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 2182073 11
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th IG Cp
APO New York 09102

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b1

2. ~~for~~ Activities of the Czech Counter-Intelligence Service (Kontrarazvedka) within the 5th BG Bde.

Source: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
1 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE P

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

69

(Classification and Control Markings)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)	REPORT NO. 2 219 0072 71	PAGES 3 OF 3
		ORIGINATOR 66th III Gp APO New York 09103	
<div style="text-align: center; font-size: 48pt; font-weight: bold;">b1</div>			
DD FORM 1396c		<div style="text-align: center;">CONFIDENTIAL 70 (Classification and Control Markings)</div>	

Best Copy Available

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1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA		2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0960 71			
3. SUBJECT: CIS Modus Operandi (U)		4. DATE OF REPORT: 10 March 1971			
5. ISC NUMBER:		6. NO. OF PAGES: 1			
7. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13 February 1971		8. ORIGINATOR: 666th MI GROUP			
9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 9 March 1971		10. PREPARED BY: b6			
11. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2		12. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6			
13. SOURCE: See Comments		13. COL, MI Commanding			
14. SUMMARY: b1					
b1					
105 EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE					
15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:		16. DOWNGRADING DATA:		17. INCLOSURE DATA:	
<p>1-DIA 2-USASSUR 1-EUCOM 1-USAHER 2-ACSI-CIPC 1-OSI 1-666th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR</p>		<p>DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10</p>			
		<p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>71</p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>			

DD FORM 1396

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

6920

This report contains information and/or policies that are classified solely on the basis of the following:

692-062-71

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

2. REPORT NUMBER:

2 212 0913 71
(5102-11)

3. SUBJECT: (U) Possible Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service Activity

3. DATE OF REPORT:

4 March 1971

4. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 687a.

5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 2 February 1971

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

MUNICH, FRG

6. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 3 February 1971

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

7. EVALUATION: SOURCE P INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

7. SOURCE:

b1

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(C) It has been reported that Czechoslovakian hotel receptionists were recently instructed to report all b1 immediately to the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) who meet relatives or acquaintances from EAST GERMANY in the hotels. Such persons will then be specially watched by the CIS.

(C/NPD) The NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION was added to this report because it was specifically requested by the b1 and release of the information contained herein would tend b1 b1

COMMENT: (C/NPD) The information was furnished to the b1 by an unidentified b1 returning from a visit to CSSE.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USARSUR
1-ACSI
1-USAIRR
1-EUCOM
1-V CORPS
1-VII CORPS
1-USASAE
1-OSI
1-66TH MI GP-ABUTMI-CA-TR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

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☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 73-78

<p>Classified Information Relates to affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1</p>		<p>5286 ZB50 9957 This document contains information of a classified nature. Plans and/or policies should not be disclosed or released to the public on the basis of this report.</p>	
<p>1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA</p>		<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 ZLB 7455 70 (5004-06)</p>		<p>12. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group APO New York 09108</p>	
<p>2. SUBJECT: (C) b1</p>		<p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 22 July 1970</p>		<p>13. PREPARED BY: b6</p>	
<p>3. ISC NUMBER:</p>		<p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 1</p>		<p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: LTC, MI., Commanding</p>	
<p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Spring 1969</p>		<p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7 2250 9957</p>		<p>15. SUMMARY:</p>	
<p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Wiesbaden, Germany 1 June 1970</p>		<p>16. EVALUATION: EXC</p>		<p>17. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p>	
<p>6. SOURCE: b1</p>		<p>18. SUMMARY: 1. (C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1)</p>		<p>19. DOWNGRADING DATA:</p>	
<p>b1</p>					
<p>2. (C) This information was furnished OSI by b1. The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1 marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.</p>					
<p>1-OSI 2-OSI/ASST 1-OSI/CON, w/o incl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o incl 1-OSI/ASST, w/o incl 1-OSI/ASST, w/o incl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o incl 1-ACSI 1-7 Corps, w/o incl 1-VII Corps, w/o incl 1-OSI, w/o incl</p>		<p>GROUP-1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.</p>		<p>20. ENCLOSURE DATA: 1 Enclosure (8) b1</p>	
<p>79</p>		<p>CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1</p>		<p></p>	

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT
b1

(Classification and Control Markings)

528G

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies identified by subject are marked solely on the basis of their report. ML 1387 70

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

4. REPORT NUMBER:

2 218 4948 70 (5004-06)

2. SUBJECT: (c) b1

5. DATE OF REPORT:

17 July 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 687

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1969

12. ORIGINATOR:

18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Nains, Germany
11 May 1970

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

LTC, RL,
Commenting

7. SOURCE:

b1

15. SUMMARY:

1. (c) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT

b1

(Leave Blank)

b1

2. (U) This information was furnished OSI by b1. The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1 marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-NSA/CSS
1-NSA/CSS, w/o incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det,
w/o incl
1-NSA/CSS, w/o incl
1-CO USAF, w/o incl
1-7th Corps, w/o incl
1-ACSI
1-7 Corps, w/o incl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-1
Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification.

80

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Inclosure

(c) b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT
b1

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA		2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 5242 70 (5004-06)	
3. SURVEY: (c) b1 b1		4. DATE OF REPORT: 16 June 1970	
5. PAGE NUMBER: 1		6. REFERENCES: DIRM: 627	
7. DATE OF INFORMATION: End of 1964		8. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group	
9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Mainz, Germany 16 March 1970		10. PREPARED BY: b6	
11. EVALUATION: SOURCE: DOC INFORMATION		12. APPROVING AUTH: LTC, MI Commanding	
13. SUMMARY:		14. (c) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1	
b1			
2. (c) This information was furnished USI by b1 The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1 marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.			
15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:		16. DOWNGRADING DATA:	
1- DIA 3- NSAECUS, 2 w/o encl 1- NSACOM, w/o encl 1- 66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o encl 1- USASAP, w/o encl 1- CO USAIRK 1- ACST 1- V Corps, w/o encl		GROUP - 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification 81	
DD FORM 1396		17. ENCLOSURE DATA: (c) b1	
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1		CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1	

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

(Classification and Control Markings)

609G A-104-00

This report contains unprocessed information.

Please note: Policies should not be used.

or modified only on the basis of this report.

SLGM-120/70 O/R/R/M

1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1218 70
3. SUBJECT: b1
4. DATE OF REPORT: 26 March 1970
5. NO. OF PAGES: 3
6. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687
7. ISC NUMBER:
8. DATE OF INFORMATION: 12 January 1970
9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany
25 March 1970
10. ORIGINATOR: 766th MID, 66th MI Group
11. PREPARED BY: b6
12. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6
14. SOURCE: See Comments
15. SUMMARY: (U) b1
16. COMMENTS (U): b1
17. DETAILS AVAILABLE: b1
18. NOTE: (U) Attention is directed to the provisions of paragraph 3a(2) of AR 381-1.

19. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DIA
2-USAHEUR
1-SUCOM
1-SUSATM
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-OSI
1-66th MI Gp, AB/TML-OP-TR

20. DOWNGRADING DATA:
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
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DOD DIR 5300.10

21. ENCLOSURE DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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AND METHODS INVOLVED
(Classification and Control Markings)

FORM 1396
SEP 66

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

8120

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1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) 2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0003 70 (0404)
 3. SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) Operations; (U) 4. DATE OF REPORT: 16 March 1970
 Accommodation Address (AA) (C) 5. NO. OF PAGES: 1
 6. SEC NUMBER: 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6874
 7. DATE OF INFORMATION: February 1970 12. ORIGINATOR: Stuttgart Station
 8. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: STUTTGART (NV 1305), 13. PREPARED BY: b6
 FRG; 16 February 1970
 9. EVALUATION: SOURCE INFORMATION 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COLONEL, MI
 10. SOURCE: 22120011 (U) Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) (C) This report contains information concerning a new CIS AA assigned to a CIS Agent operating within the FRG. During a recent visit to the CSSR in February 1970, CIS instructed the Agent to send his written communications from outside the Stuttgart area, possibly in Ludwigsburg (NV 1416) or Kornwestheim (NV 1312), FRG, to the AA, Ing. (Eng). b6

"EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1396) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
 ON NOV 24 1987
 BY CDR L. J. GILFILLAN
 AUTH Para 1-6.6 DOD 5200.101

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
 2-OSAREUR
 1-OSRUCCOM, J-2
 1-OACSI, ACISI-DSC
 1-OSI-PRC
 1-66TH MI GP, AEMTHI-OP-IR
 1-V Corps
 1-OSASAB

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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 DOD DIR 5200.10

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

83

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DD FORM 1396

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 84-
86

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DECLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL MARKINGS

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546A
MI-686-69
788 22

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1. COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA		2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 8416 69 (5004-09)	
3. SUBJECT: (U) (C) JABLONEC (5036M-1452E) (V89106), Secret Police Information		3. DATE OF REPORT: 22 November 1969	
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August 1969		10. NUMBER OF PAGES: 2	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACT: Munich, Germany; 5 November 1969		11. REFERENCES: IRM: 687	
6. ORIGINATOR: SOURCE P 6		12. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI BN, 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108	
7. SOURCE: b1		13. PREPARED BY: W.W. Dranon	
		14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 LTC, ME., Commanding	

b6

b6

15. SUMMARY

REPORT:

b1

b1

b1

"See EF 1396-C, page 2, item number 15." +

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

2-III; 3-ISAAREH; 1-USEUCOM; 1-USAFFE; 1-766th MI Det, ASING-OP-IE; 1-CO USAFIR; 1-ACSI; 1-7113 MAG; 1-V CORPS; 1-VII CORPS; 1-OSI; b1 3-COFTA; b1 (G)

17. ATTACHMENT DATA

None

18. DOWNGRADING DATA

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS, NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED, DOD DIR 5200.1D

87

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CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NUMBER	2-218-8416-69
PAGE	2
ORIGINATOR	18th MI BN, 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108

Continuation of Item 15: This is rumored to be a new policy of the b6 Regime as a precaution against the possible protection and fraternization with anti-socialist elements by Agents of the Secret Police. Agents currently have the opportunity to remain for indefinite tours in a specific area, usually in one town.

Comments:

OK Source

b1

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88

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 89-99

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EXEMPT NOTICE - SENSITIVE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains sensitive and information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved, modified or approved on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: Czechoslovakia 203 2. REPORT NUMBER: 2702022565
(0219)
3. SUBJECT: (U) Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) Communications DATE OF REPORT: 11 June 1965
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 8 June 1965 12. ORIGINATOR: 513th INTC Group
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BERNHARDEN, GERMANY 13. PREPARED BY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE INFORMATION 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6
7. SOURCE: NSC1

15. SUMMARY:

USAREUR EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED
(U) An agent of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS), who is based in the German Federal Republic (GFR), was given the following Accommodation Address for communication to CIS in Czechoslovakia: b6
Coordinates of GERMANY are V00015.

100-8
IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARDING INT. 8/80

RECLASSIFIED
ON NOV 1985
BY CDR USS... F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-003 DOD 5200.1R

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 DIA (D15AG-3)
- 2 USAREUR, DCSI

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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Czechoslovakia

47

STB Activities

80/44-1-65

2212878565

16 February 1965

Four

DIRM: 6A; 6A2a; 6A2b; 6B4;
6B6a; 6B7a; 6B7c

195b - Oct 1964

Munich, Germany

2 Feb 1965

F

6

66th INTC Gp

b6

Colonel, AIS
Commanding

b1

*SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

EXCEPT: None BY AUTHORITY OF: Commanding Officer,

66th INTC Group

b6

, DATE: 16 February 1965

Colonel, AIS

(U)

(C) This report contains information on the activities of the Czech STB in placing indigenous employees in the service of consulates and diplomats in PRAHA and controlling their activities there. It includes name and address of the STB office, and 3 x alleged STB persons involved in the operation. Heavily information on the STB security measures and procedures taken in order to control travel movement of diplomats throughout CSER. The report also includes information on 2 x females suspected to be agents for the STB, operating among foreigners in bars in PRAHA.

1. (C) PRAHA, Employment Office for Diplomatic Personnel:
(DOI: 1958 - Oct 1964; b1

b1

a. Designation: SPRAVA SLUZEB DIPLOMATICKERO SBORU
(Administration for Services to Diplomatic Corps). The address of the office was: PRAHA-MALA STRANA, Vlasaka Ulice 7(?) (SOURCE was not positive of the house number).

1-DIA (DIAHQ-3)
1-USARMA (Czechoslovakia)
2-USEDCOM, J2
2-Spec Pub Det
2-10th Spec Forces Gp
2-USARMC, DCSI
4-513th INTC Gp
1-7th Army
1-OC Div, 66th INTC Gp

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

101

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2 4
66th INTC Gp
WG/LR-1-65

2212078565

b. Function: This office was the governing agency for hiring, placement, and firing of all Czech nationals who were employed as service personnel by all foreign consulates and diplomatic staff in CSSR. This pertained to service personnel of all categories, from the cleaning personnel to the highest clerical positions. The office kept a list of persons qualified for various types of jobs. The diplomats had to apply to this office when job openings required personnel changes. This office then sent one of their listed persons whom they felt was best qualified for the employment; based on their skill, language capabilities, and reliability. However, to SOURCE's knowledge, the reliability was based on the aims of the CSSR authorities, rather than on the basis of the needs of the place of employment. The diplomat had his choice to either accept or reject the particular employee. However, this choice was limited because the office frowned upon too many rejections.

c. State Security (STB) Activity: SOURCE heard from one of his girlfriends (who for short time was employed in the "Services to Diplomatic Corps" Office), the following information. All the personnel employed in the office were either direct members of the CSSR STB, or working in some capacity for the STB. Since the girl did not want to cooperate, she was only employed for a short time. The chief of the agency,

b6 was an officer of the STB. SOURCE spoke to him once and gave the following description. Age - approx 38-40; 5'7", slender build; occasionally wore glasses; very dark hair. His personal secretary, b6 was the wife of an STB officer. Another employee, b6 also was an employee of the STB. b1

b1

b1 The approaches were, however, made independently of the above employment office.

d. Additional Information: b1

b1 From conversation and observation with them, and with other persons who knew some of these people, SOURCE made a statement that he was positive that at least 80% of the Czechs working in this capacity were STB collaborators. b1

b1 probably without exception. In this manner the STB kept close tabs on all trips, stops, and other activity which took place while the diplomat was away from his office in PRAGA. b1

b1

b1 In most cases, the agency knew beforehand of a planned trip. By means of posted observers, the vehicle movement was reported and traced on a plotting board located in the central office, the same as an aircraft would be plotted for AA defense purposes. Instructions to prospective security agencies were given out beforehand to agencies in the path of the traveling

b1

102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~3
66th INTC Gp
NO/RE-1-65

2212870555

2. ~~66~~ ~~WUSA~~, suspected female agents of the STB. (DOI: 1958 - Oct 1964, b1 and made personal observation).

a. Name: IVERINOVA, Blanka

b. Description: Age 24; 5'6"; slender, full curves, very good figure; blond (bleached) hair; very well dressed, in expensive attire. Fairly intelligent; spoke fluent English, French, and German, in addition to Czech (NT). Single.

c. Activity: The woman was mostly observed in the company of Western tourists and businessmen. She patronized almost nightly, a bar in Hotel "JALTA," or a bar called "U MARKYZE," located on Nekazanka street. She always had a lot of money, including Western currency. She owned a car. SOURCE heard that she had an Aunt living in Belgium, and made several trips there to visit her. SOURCE suspected her of working for the STB for the following reasons. An average working girl would not be as well off financially as she was. It was illegal for Czechs to possess foreign currency and be obvious about it. The fact that she was always in the company of foreigners, and that the CSSE security permitted this, and did not bother her. She was not questioned by the police as to whether her income enabled her to spend money that frequently, and live so luxurious. To do so would be suspicious or a crime for any average citizen.

d. Other suspected women: Name not remembered; age approx 25; 5'4"; slender, black hair. Spoke fluent English and German. She was an employee of the "Glass Export," National enterprise (SKLO EXPORT) as a model. This woman was approx the same caliber as b6. They knew each other, and infrequently were in the same company of foreigners, or also sat alone together in a bar. They patronized the same 2 x bars. SOURCE was of the opinion that this woman also was an agent of the STB.

COMMENTS: (c) SOURCE, b1

b1

Relationship & Information: Personal observation and experience. SOURCE has not given this information to any other agency. SOURCE cooperated during interrogation, and was willing to give all information. b1

b1

b1 He claimed that he never cooperated with any CSSE security agency, even though he was approached by them for this reason. SOURCE made an impression that he was an opportunist and materialist. SOURCE also was very proud of his achievements in sports, which were his hobby.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Best Copy Available

4 4
66th INTC Op
NQ/NR-1-65

22 2078565

He held several national trophies in track and sport-weapon marksmanship. SOURCE's reliability could not be judged. For report on other information from SOURCE, see: NQ 0625.

104

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		Best Copy Available	DATE	
PREPARING OFFICE		24 Sep 64		
SUBJECT		513th INTC Group, AFM 69, US Forces		
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
RE: Payment (U)		OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:		
		COMPLETELY RELIABLE 1		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
		USUALLY RELIABLE 2		PROBABLY TRUE 2
		FAIRLY RELIABLE 3		POSSIBLY TRUE 3
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE 4		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
		UNRELIABLE 5		IMPROBABLE 5
		RELIABILITY UNKNOWN 6		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION				
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED				
(C) b1 a Source of this Station furnished the following information concerning a payment made to him by CIS b1				
b1				
b1 He was not required to sign a receipt for this money, nor was the concealment device opened to show him that it				
b1 The concealment device was given to him by his CIS agent handler, who is known to him as b6 in Prague, CSSR. He was told to open the device after he had traveled b1				
After his return b1 Source opened the concealment				
b1				
b1				
b1				
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10				
DISTRIBUTION				

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47, DA AGO) Which may be used.

(Not Classified Unless Date Entered)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 106-107

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Page(s) 108-
116

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128

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 129-
136

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CONFIDENTIAL (when filled in)

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION

EE-567298/d

Date of Report

101061

GLM

(Items 1-8 Filled in by Unit)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	SOURCE NUMBER	COUNTRY	ICD/SRI REFERENCE	DATE OF INFORMATION	DATE OF ACQUISITION	DATE OF DISPATCH
(1-2)	(3-9)	(10-14)	(15-16)		(17-22)	(23-28)	(29-34)
8	MU 1125 1	13176	23	D8A5	280861	280961	17/061

(Items 9-23 Filled in by Analysts)

9		10	11	EVALUATING FACTORS					20	
DATE RECEIVED		TIME LAPSE	DATE EVALUATED	15	16	17	18	19	REPRODUCE ON DA FORM 1048	
(35-40)		(41-42)	(43-48)	PRIORITY	USABILITY	VALIDITY	FULFILLS REQUIREMENT	REPORTED BY OTHER SOURCE		
251061		27	261061							
12	13		14	PRIORITY	USABILITY	VALIDITY	FULFILLS REQUIREMENT	REPORTED BY OTHER SOURCE	YES	NO
ANALYST CODE	ICD/SRI REFERENCE		TARGET CODE						(68)	(69)
(49-51)	(52-59)		(60-67)	(68)	(69)	(70)	(71)	(72)	(73)	(74)
36	AA 620		22 2 D8A5	3	3	3	3	3		3

21 Guidance:

Inventory of Soviet's activities, the collection of intelligence and photographic of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, and photographic throughout. The value of intelligence on Soviet is the example located under the well known Soviet is called the "Soviet's Den."

It is nevertheless an art. Based fact that Soviet also legal travelers in the past to collect intelligence in all types of peripheral targets.

22 Intel Div USAREUR Comment:

REF ID: A66117
ON
BY CD 24 1997
AUTH F-605 DOD 5200.15

Best Copy Available

137

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.15

DIST: CYS 1, 2, & 3 COLLECTORS
CY 4 CONTROL INTEL DIV

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 390-320-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (C)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 October 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

EE-567298/d

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCE & METHODS INVOLVED

(DALRIR 1-9) On 28 September 1961, Source 13,176 submitted the following information regarding a Czech tourist bus and the "suspicious" activities of the occupants:

CAPED On 28 August 196, Source's office received a report from b1 b1 residing at b1 that a Czech touring bus had been observed in the town of Scharfling, Austria. Scharfling is a small town, located on the Mondsee, where b1. On this date the touring bus stopped near b1 and all occupants, including about thirty men and three women, got off the bus. One elderly man appeared to be directing the group's actions, all of which possessed cameras, and several were supplied with maps. Upon getting off the bus, the group dispersed, and the occupants photographed the road, in both directions, the houses in the immediate vicinity, and the opposite shore of Mondsee. The photographs of the opposite shore were made by one of the men and one woman, while actually standing b1 and the camera had a telephoto lens. b1 further observed that one of the men appeared to be examining the road very carefully, and measured the width of the road by pacing it off. The group's activities was accomplished very quickly, with what appeared to be well organized efficiency, and all members boarded the bus immediately upon completion of their photographing of the area. b1 described the men as all being approximately thirty to forty years of age.

Following receipt of the initial report, further citations were reported during the latter part of September 1961. During the night of 18-19 September 1961, a touring bus, Czech license number DN 17 73, with thirty men and three women, remained overnight in St. Gilgen, Austria. It is not positively known if this was the same group as reported by b1 however, from all indications it would appear to be the same or a similar group. This group's activities was observed by investigators b1

b1 the time it was present in the jurisdictional area of Land Salzburg. On two occasions, on the road between St. Gilgen and Fuschl, Austria, the group was observed making numerous photographs of the road and surrounding area, as described by b1 above. Being convinced that this was no ordinary tourist group, b6 Deputy Director, Sicherheitsdirektion, contacted the local Staatsanwalt (Attorney General's Office) in Salzburg, for permission to search the bus and it's occupants. However, this endeavor proved fruitless, since the Staatsanwalt advised that there is no law against such activities as described, and the mere suspicion of intelligence activities was not sufficient grounds for making such a search. According to Source, one of the points or areas photographed by the group could conceivably be considered an area where tourists might stop to photograph the scenery. However, the two

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th INTC Group

138

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 220-220-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (e)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 October 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

EE-567298/d

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

other areas have nothing in the immediate vicinity that could be considered a tourist attraction, and it is the opinion of Source's office that this group is engaged in collecting topographic type information throughout Austria. Following the departure from the Salzburg area, the bus departed in the direction of Zell am See, Woergl, Innsbruck, and Bregenz, all in Austria. According to Source, the roads followed by the bus have all been either completely rebuild or improved during recent years.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

139

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th INTC Group

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

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Page(s) 140

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~~INITIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE (REAR)
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 58, US Forces

JUN. 19 1961

AEZID-SI

SUBJECT: Possible MO CIS (U)

Best Copy Available

TO: Commanding Officer
66th Military Intelligence Group
APO 154, US Forces

1. (U) Reference AE Forms 415 from this office re [b6]
and [b6] dated 31 March 1961, and "no record" reply from your
office on 13 April 1961.

2. (U) Forwarded to complete your files is supplementary information
furnished by an interested US agency.

[b6]

1 Incl (U)
Ltr dtd 8 May 61 (C)

[b6]
Colonel, GS
AC of S, G2

REMOVED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
then separated from
classified inclosures

JUN. 20 1961
IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARDED INIT.

Card-File
Ref GE 567 298 /D ② ✓
Subj CIS - MC

FM-A/I

C. P. I. CARDED INIT. []
PREPARED BY []
DOCUMENT 14 June 61
INITIALS 505

141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 27 1961

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Page(s) 142

~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154 US Forces

EL 270 9810
Rm: 36

AEVO-OCB(G)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Development of Illegal Residents (U)

Best Copy Available

TO: Commandant
Warner Intelligence, Military Police & Special
Weapons School
ATTENTION: Maj b6
APO 172, US Forces

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) Forwarded herewith for your retention and use is a copy of a case, subject as above, dated 3 April 1961.

2. *Key* This case cites current Modus Operandi of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service in setting up resident agents within the West. It is felt that the information contained might be of possible use for presentation to US citizens only, who are students in your school and might give them a better understanding of what Czech intelligence thinking is in this field.

3. (U) Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ when separated from SECRET inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

b6

Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Sgt M 6472/WLR

MR: WLR/s/21, May 61. This fwds curr info to schools for possible use in program of instr. Material was recd fm an allied intel agcy and therefore schools are directed to release only to US citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ON NOV 24 1997
BY C151/PO
AUTH Para 1-6.3 DOD 5200.1R

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DOD DIR 5200.10

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
COPY 1 OF 1 COPIES

CIC File
with
How
to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Army, Europe
All 100 The Forces

Best Copy Available

MAR. 24 1961

425-53

2000-2001

1. 0 0 0

2075 1: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service ~~in contact~~ 1/7

1. Company Name
 2. Address
 3. City
 4. State
 5. Zip

This Document Has Been
Carded
Date 1 May 1961

ICD 10

1. 1. 1. 1.

[illegible][illegible]

1. ~~SECRET~~ - This report contains information that is not
classified, and is not a source of information in the U.S. system. b1

b1

b1

3. Copy of 13,141 of Bureau file of 7-2-62, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 26

c. Report of CM shall reference this in its other.

c. Case for penitence in relation IV.

1 inci
ca

Date: 08/10/2015

b6

2d Col, 1st Art, 1st
Regt, 1st Div

144

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 27 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 390-320-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Special Intelligence Service in ~~Germany~~ (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

12 March 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

SECRETARY-1

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(Reference: Exhibit 1-9) On 12 March 1961, source 15,101 submitted the following information concerning SUBJECT:
SUBJECT WAS IN CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

b1

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th AF Group

145
6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 146-148

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HEADQUARTERS FIELD STATION IV
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 108 US Forces

Best Copy Available

AEUC-DCE
EX-567298/d-f

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service ~~(C)~~
Re: Personalities and Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th MI Group
ATTN: AEUC-DCE (G)
APO 154, US Forces

1. (C) ~~REMARKS~~
a. ICD 8a ~~(C)~~ (b).
b. DALLIS 1-9.
2. (C) FOR INFO: Agent report, Field Station IV, dated 1 March 1961, subject and file as above.
3. (C) COMMENT ON INFORMATION: Source 13,18 is evaluated B.
4. (C) REMARKS: Case is pending in Field Station IV.

1 Incl
as

Telephone: McG L 8456/PD

b6

Lt Col, AI (Arty)
Commanding

RECLASSIFIED
ON NOV 24 1997
BY CUBA
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

146
149
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Page(s) 150

51/

(8R 390-320-10)

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 March 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

EE 50, 208/d

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 27 February 1961, Source A-VI revealed the following information:

b 1

Source A-VI is identified as [REDACTED] b1

DECLASSIFIED BY 6032
DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66TH MI GROUP

154

8. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

NO FORN

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SECRET

01/008

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FACT SHEET

On CSI/CDSMC1/Exec Div/CI Br/CIAS

Captain **b6** 25%

6 January 1961

SUBJECT:

b1

JAN 12 1961

b1

910.1 Classification

15 Jan 61

Rec'd from
C.I. Br
17 Jan 61

b1

152

RECORD SECTION COPY
Counterintelligence Br

SECRET

2 p 2 L copy

2-CI/21

~~SECRET~~

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SUBJECT:

b1

b1

b6

2 Incl
as

DIATR: None

C. F. LEONARD, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Security, Mapping
and Combat Intelligence

153

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Capt

b6

/s/

73958/CIAS, CI Br, Sec Div

ACSI-SC

MEMO FOR RECORD: (6 Jan 61) ~~SECRET~~

Part Copy Available

SUBJECT:

b1

b1

STATUS: Closed.

b1

DELAY: Normal.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

RECORD SECTION MATERIAL: None.

COORDINATION: For concurrence with Eurasian Branch, Coll DI
by Captain **b6** *6 Jan 61*

b6

Action Officer Time: 6 hr
Typist Time: 3 hr

ACTION OFF

CH, CIAS

CH, CI B

Ch, Sec Div

b6

~~SECRET~~

154

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
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Page(s) 155-
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 November 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (CIS) (S) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

[b6] born [b6] in [b6] residing at [b6] a legal traveler to the CSR on 14 October 1960, described the following incident which occurred in a Czech railway car enroute from Kubicz 33UUR4571, CSR, to Pilsen 33UUR8421, CSR:

On being informed by the train conductor that recent changes in train schedules between Pilsen and Iglau necessitated an overnight stop in Pilsen, [b6] told the conductor that she would have to spend the night in the train station. [b6] then sat beside a woman described as follows:

Name:	Unknown
Age:	48 to 53 years
Height:	5'5" to 5'7"
Weight:	135 to 145 pounds
Hair:	Gray streaked
Face:	Round
Build:	Medium
Dress:	Ordinary
Speech:	Normal. Spoke German and Czech

The above-described woman engaged [b6] in conversation and offered to assist her. The woman stated that she had helped Germans in the past and would obtain a hotel room for [b6] in Pilsen. Upon arriving in Pilsen, the woman took [b6] to the "Continental," a hotel reserved for foreigners, paid forty-six Krone for a room with bath, telephone, double bed, rugs, and a bowl full of fresh fruit on a table. The woman refused to accept remuneration. She instructed the desk clerk to call [b6] in time to catch her train to Iglau in the morning. After accompanying [b6] to the room, she left without exchanging names. [b6] was required to register in the hotel to include her name, date and place of birth, and residence in the GFR. (F-6)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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RECORDED
ON NOV 24 1997
BY C...
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD E200.1H

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS FIELD STATION VI
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 696 US Forces

Mr. Bowman/hhs
Nurn Mil 6365

AEUC-OCE (G)

15 November 1960

SUBJECT: Probable CIS Letter Drop. (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
ATTN: AEUC-OCE (G)
66th MI Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Forces

Best Copy Available

NOV. 25 1960

W2.

1. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ FORWARDED:

a. Two Agent Reports, this Station subject as above, dated 30 September and 3 November 1960.

b. Summary of Information, subject: CIS, re: Modus Operandi (Communication), EE-567298/e, dated 1 October 1960.

2. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: As indicated in the attached reports.

3. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ REMARKS:

a. Forwarded as an item of interest.

b1

c. Case closed.

4. (U) Classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of the undersigned.

b6

Major

3 Incls
as

U Lt Col, AI (Arty)
Commanding

159

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 October 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

R/A Passau, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 305, US Forces

SUBJECT

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications)

EE-567298/e

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

B-3

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

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AGENT REPORT
(SR 500-320-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Probable CIS Letter Drop (U)
(S)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

3 November 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

161

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66TH MI GROUP

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 390-320-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Probable CIS Letter Drop ~~(c)~~ (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

30 September 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

162

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66TH MI GROUP

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

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CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

Best Copy Available

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Probable CIS Letter Drop (C) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

30 September 1960

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

EXCLUDED FROM GENT FOR
DECLASSIFICATION

11/6-3

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66TH MI GROUP

SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 62

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 168-
173

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02316 KP

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (C)

13002 (EE-572015)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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02316

KP

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

13002 (EE-572015)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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02310 KP

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
13002 (EE-572013)

**CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

FILE

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi (c)

(U)

13002 (EE-572015)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

EE-567296/a

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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FILE

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (U)

13002 (GE-572015)

**CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
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COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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INFORMATION

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DATE
12 August 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (e)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
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UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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C-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station XII, 66th Military Intelligence Group, APO 227

SUBJECT

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (e) (U)

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
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IMPROBABLE 5
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 19 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service Re: Modus Operandi
Communications - Other Communi-
cations (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

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IMPROBABLE 5
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAHEUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi

Informants-Recruiting (c)

(U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
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NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
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OF INFORMATION:

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IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station, VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Ref Modus Operandi
Informants-Contacting of Informants (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
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IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service Re: Modus Operandi
Informants-Payment (G) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI. 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service Re: Modus Operandi
Cover-For Agents (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
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IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAF EUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Serv. (U)

Re: Modus Operandi

Cover Occupation-For agents (e)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
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POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAFEUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi - Interrogations - Use of Coercion (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
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IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

DISTRIBUTION

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Best Copy Available

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces EE-567298/d

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service Re: Modus Operandi - In-
terrogations-Use of inducements,
promises, rewards (S) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

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MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STATE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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ROUTINE

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CLASS FILES

Classified

FROM: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY

TO: DA WASH DC

NR: SX-3382

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EXCLUSIVE FOR WILLEMS, SGB VAN NATTA

(UNCLAS) (C)

Subject: Possible Planned Approach by CIS to US Army
Member in Berlin (C)

1. (U) [b6] SSG Svc
Co, Sp Troops, USARGAR, APO 742, w/duty at Monperishable
Warehouse, QM Div, Berlin Comd, has been stationed in Berlin
since Feb curr. His wife, [b6] former
Czech nat now US citizen, resides with him. She has relatives
in CSR with whom she is said to have had no personal contact
in over 12 yrs. [b6] unmarried sister of [b6]
wife residing in Karlovy Vary, CSR, has phoned and written
[b6] wife stating she has great desire to visit [b6]
in Berlin but has been told that tvl auth may not be granted
as [b6] are only temp residents in Berlin. [b6] sug
that [b6] wife visit Czech Mil Mission in Berlin to expedite
tvl auth. This caused [b6] to rept matter to G2, Berlin.

2. (U) [b6] wife will be auth to contact Czech
Mission in Berlin to detm if possible any CIS interest or
plans.

3. (U) [b6] has no access to classified info on
curr assignment.

4. (U) Future developments will be rept under
DACICRA.

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ACTION: GEN WILLEMS (ACSI)

DA IM 9618

(18 MAY 60)

NO REPLY OR FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT
APPROVAL OF CHIEF, OPERATIONS BRANCH
COLLECTION DIVISION 189

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ON NOV 24 1992
BY CDR US 4 1992
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R
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375-2, 1 AUG 57, WHICH
MAY BE USED.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 May 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.

b1

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SOURCE: A-IV

C-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 May 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

ES-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Mosud Operandi (e) (U)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

C-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

13 April 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces (EE-567299/d)

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Communications-Courier) (S)

b1

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 March 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-5672 98/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (O) (U)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 March 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station IV, 66th MI Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)

**CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 29 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66TH MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Rer Modus Operandi
Informants - Payment (G) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

16 File
DATE
29 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U)
Communications - Use of mails (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station VI, 66TH MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi
Communications - Use of Telephone
(c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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File

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station XI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Re: Modus Operandi
Contacting of Informants -
Methods (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE
Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi
Cover Names

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

(P-6)

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
United States Army, Europe
APO 154, US Forces

FILE

AEUC-ONE (G) 274/46
EE-567298

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U)
(C)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Forces
ATTN: AEAGB-IC(SC-C)

1. (U) Forwarded herewith are the following reports:
 - a. Eight Summaries of Information, subject as above, Re: EBI and Targets, file EE-567298/a, dated 26 February 1960.
 - b. Twelve Summaries of Information, subject as above, Re: Modus Operandi, file EE-567298/d, dated 26 February 1960.
 - c. Four Summaries of Information, subject as above, Re: Personalities, file EE-567298/f, dated 26 February 1960.

b1

200

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CIC FILE 7th AEE(G) 274/46

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AEUC-OCB(0) 274/46

EE-567298

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U)

4. (U) Central Registry reveals a trace of [b6] DPOR same as in foregoing paragraph 2, who was recorded as an alleged communist and an FDJ member in October 1958. Another trace indicates that [b6] traveled to the Deutschland Treffen in East Germany in June 1954. No other pertinent information was revealed in the files of Central Registry on other personalities mentioned in the inclosed reports.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

24 Incls:

1-24. SOIs (trip)

[b6]

Major, AI (Inf)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8365
RLF/TAS/pt

MR: TAS/pt/28 Apr 60. DCSI prov 20 SOIs listing KEI asg by CIS to an illegal border crosser who divulged the info of his approach by CIS to [b1]

CLASS CONFIDENTIAL BY [b6] CAPT, AI(INF) CHIEF OCB(G), CE & COLL DIV

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32 / File

DATE
26 February 1960

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/a

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U)
Communications - Letter Drops (C)

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

[b6] born [b6] in [b6] recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) presently residing in [b6] stated that he was to use the following address to communicate with his CIS handling agent when he wanted to cross into the CSR to transmit his information:

b6

(P-6)

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23 File

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 26 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/2

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U)
Communications - Use of Mails (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 born b6 in b6
recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service),
presently residing in b6 stated that
he was to communicate with his CIS handling agent by mail, to set up a
scheduled meeting, in the following manner:

When Source wished to cross into the CSR and meet his handling
agent, he was to buy a postcard and write on it, "Dear b6 My
brother is visiting you on 10 August 1959. He is very pleased to be
able to see you again..." Ten days were to be added to whatever date
appeared on the card and that was to be the true meeting time. Source
was to send this card to: b6

b6

(F-6)

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12 File

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 26 February 1960
PREPARING OFFICE Field Station VI, 66TH MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		EE-567298/d
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U) Border Crossings - Illegal (C)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>b6 born b6 in b6 recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service), presently residing in b6 stated that he was to use the following method in crossing the CSR border illegally:</p> <p>In case Source was forced to cross the border at a non-scheduled time, he was to go over in the area of the Schirnding URO252 Customs House and Liebensteiner Road (nca) and, when stopped by the Czech Border Guards, was to tell them to call Karlovy Vary 222 (Karlsbad 33UUR4966). Source's handling agent would be at this number. Source was to give the handling agent his cover name, b6 and the handling agent would then come and pick him up.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-6)</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Fast Copy Available</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 26 February 1960
PREPARING OFFICE Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		
EE-567298/d		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi - Reports	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b6 born b6 in b6 recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service), presently residing in b6 stated that he was to use the following method in reporting his information to his handling agent: Source was to make all of his reports orally and only to his handling agent in person. He was to take as few notes as possible and destroy those as soon as he had memorized their contents. No other method of transmission was to be used. (F-6)		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 26 February 1960
PREPARING OFFICE Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		
EE-567298/4		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U) Border Crossings - Illegal (C)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION: OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>b6 born b6 in b6 recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service), presently residing in b6 stated that he was to use the following method in crossing the CSH border illegally.</p> <p>Source was to cross the border in the Schirnding UR0252 Customs House and Liebensteiner Road (nca) area. When stopped by the Czech Border Guards, Source was to give them the name b6 The guards would re- cognize this name and transport Source to Eichelberg (nca) where he would meet his handling agent. No special time of day was to be utilized in crossing but Source was told not to cross if there was snow on the ground.</p> <p>(P-6)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 February 196

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi
Transportation - Road

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
SUSPECTABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 born b6 in b6
recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service),
presently residing in b6 stated that
the following automobile was used by a CIS agent:

Source's handling agent, b6 drove a 4-door, grey colored
"Tatra", several years old. No license plate numbers were noted.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 Feb 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, USARUEB, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting) (C)

**CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 born b6 in b6
recruited as an informant by CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service),
presently residing in b6 stated that he
was recruited for the CIS in the following manner:

b1 Source, in a drunken state, crossed the CSR border
in the vicinity of Hohenberg/Eger 33UUB0253, was immediately apprehended
and imprisoned in Ostrov (nca), CSR. b1 Source was interro-
gated by four individuals. During the early part of the interrogation, the
talk was of a general nature. Source was asked how long he had resided in
Selb, what his job was, whether he was satisfied with it, and what the
general morale of the people of Selb was. The interrogator also mentioned
Source's former membership in the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) and
stated that he must, therefore, be a Socialist. Source was then told that
he could be sentenced to from one-half to one year in jail for illegally
crossing the border. The interrogator stated that if, however, Source
cooperated there was a possibility that the charges against him would be
dropped. Source refused saying that he would never work in espionage.
The interrogator denied that he wanted Source to perform espionage and
stated that the information he wanted was of a purely civilian nature.
Source was then returned to his cell, where, after deliberation, he decided
to accept the offer.

b1 Source was again interrogated and stated his ac-
ceptance. No money was paid Source at this time nor was he told that he
had to sign a statement of obligation. He was, however, made to sign
several statements that were written in Czech which he is unable to read.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
18 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces **EE-567298/0**

SUBJECT

CIS, Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)
(Informants-Recruiting)

**CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The procedure outlined below was followed by the CIS in what appears to have been assessment of a potential source preliminary to making a recruitment approach:

a. **BACKGROUND:** Source is a former CSR citizen who, because of marriage to a German national, was expelled to EG after World War II and later fled to West Germany where he is classed as a "stateless" person. His mother and sister, as well as a number of more distant relatives still reside in the CSR. Source is a waiter by profession who has a wide circle of acquaintances in the "Czech Colony" in the area of Nurnberg PV5179, GPR. His circle of acquaintances and former associates included a number of persons known (and/or believed) to have had connections with the CIS who permanently returned to the CSR during the period 1956-57. Included among these persons is **b6** a redefected employee of Radio Free Europe (who is known to have subsequently been engaged in CIS operations); **b1** and

b1; and **b1**. It is probable that these persons, among other re-defectees, were debriefed by the CIS concerning their knowledge of Source, who has the reputation of being "money-hungry" and an opportunist.

b. **PRELIMINARY STEPS:**

1. In 1958 Source was assigned to a CIS informant operating in West Germany as a target for investigation (**b1**). **b1**. The CIS informant sent a number of reports to the CIS concerning the general background of Source after becoming personally acquainted with him which included comments about the financial condition of Source, indicating that Source was in debt and that Source maintained an exchange of correspondence with his mother and sister in the CSR.

2. In January 1959, Source received a letter from the administrator of the hospital in which Source's mother is a patient inviting Source to come to the CSR to visit his mother and offering assistance in obtaining a visa should Source encounter difficulty in this connection. Later events indicate that the hospital administrator is a probable informant of the CIS.

3. When Source failed to reply to the letter from the hospital administrator and informant reports to the CIS indicated that Source was wavering in making a decision about whether to chance visiting the CSR, a letter was sent from the CSR Military Mission in Berlin advising Source that

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he had been granted a visa and requesting him to complete application forms and to forward his passport for entry of the visa. When no reply was sent to this letter, the CSR Military Mission sent a follow-up letter to which Source replied, eventually received a visa and undertook a trip to the CSR in late July 1959.

4. During the course of his trip to the CSR, Source learned that the CIS had conducted an investigation of him in the CSR and that inquiries had been made of some of his relatives, friends and former schoolmates prior to the time of his visit.

c. EVENTS DURING VISIT TO CSR:

1. Following arrival at a hospital in the CSR where his mother is a patient, Source was introduced to two men who, although introduced as representatives of the CSR Ministry of Health, were, judging from later events, actually members of the CIS.

2. Source was offered transportation by the alleged representatives of the Health Ministry, from Libmie 33UVQ6730, CSR, to Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, Krasny Jez (nca), CSR, (where he visited his sister and her family) and returned to Libnic via Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. During the course of the trips, Source was, in effect, debriefed concerning his background, his circle of acquaintances, his activities in Germany and generally about conditions in Germany and in refugee camps. An attempt was made to learn his opinions of the present regime in the CSR and to learn if Source had future intentions or a desire to return to the CSR to live, with offers of "good" employment being made if Source should desire to return. During these conversations, it was made clear to Source that the "Czechs knew all about" Source and his recent activities and financial condition, even to the point of having recent photographs of him, his car and the restaurant operated by him. Although one member of the party was inclined to speak openly with Source, the other kept restraining him with such comments as "We still have a lot of time." The travel ended with no direct approach being made to Source; however, an appointment was made for a later date which was prior to the date Source was expected to return to Germany, with a closing offer being made at the time to assist Source financially should he be in need of such assistance.

3. In view of the circumstances surrounding his receipt of an entry visa for the CSR, the obvious knowledge about Source of the persons contacting him and the interest shown in him as an individual, Source, fearing arrest and/or "involvement" in something undefined, decided to cut his visit to the CSR short and left on the fifth day of a projected 14-day trip to return to his home. Prior to his departure, Source advised his mother and the hospital administrator that he might return for another visit about Christmas 1959. Source encountered no difficulty in returning to Germany.

d. EVENTS AFTER RETURN FROM CSR: Since his return from the CSR, Source has received correspondence from the hospital administrator attempting to determine if Source does intend to return for another visit to the CSR and offering to make arrangements for quarters and take other necessary action to enable Source to visit with his mother. No mention of the events of the previous visit was made in the letters.

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210

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22

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Page 3

COMMENTS: The circumstances surrounding the CIS interest in Source seems to indicate that he has been under consideration for recruitment as an informant in Germany and, despite his evasion of recruitment by unexpected departure from the CSR, may be the object of a future recruitment approach.

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23

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m&f

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces **EE-567298/c**

SUBJECT

CIS, Re: Modus Operandi ^(U)_(C)
(Transportation-Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of a trip to the CSR, Source was transported in a blue-colored automobile of Soviet manufacture (further details and license number unknown) while being debriefed concerning his background, friends and other matters in what appeared to be a preparatory step for an eventual recruitment approach. Source traveled from Libnic 33UVQ6730, CSR, to Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, Krasny Jez (mca), CSR, and Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, before returning to Libnic. The vehicle was operated by two men who, although claiming to have been representatives of the CS^A Ministry of Health, were probably members of the CIS, these men conducting the debriefing of Source. During the return trip from Prague to Libnic, the car was operated by a chauffeur. Virtually all conversations of intelligence significance held with Source during his visit to the CSR were conducted in the car.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-3)

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229

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
2 February 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Mail Censorship)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Evidence of the continuing interception and censorship of mails in the CSR is contained in the fact that a distant relative of Source, a resident of Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, was summoned to an StB installation after having received Czech money through the mails from outside the CSR. A friend residing in West Germany, as a gesture of helpfulness, mailed a 100 Czech Crown banknote to the woman in question in mid 1959. Shortly after the arrival of the letter in the CSR, the woman was summoned to an StB installation, interrogated about the letter, the money and the sender, following which the 100 Czech Crown note was confiscated and a fine of an additional 50 Czech Crowns was imposed. Source was not certain if the letter was delivered to the addressee through the mails or if the woman was questioned prior to delivery of the letter.

SOURCE: A-VI

(P-6)

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228

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HEADQUARTERS
FIELD STATION VI, 66TH MI GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

file
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AEUC-OCZ (c) 274/46

13 January 1960

SUBJECT:

b1

b1

(u)(c)

TO:

Commanding Officer
66th MI Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OCZ (c) (U)

EE 567298/d

1. (U) REFERENCE: Letter, this Station, subject and file as above, dated 5 January 1960.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Two (2) Agent Reports, this Station, subject as above, dated 2 November and 15 December 1959.
3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-VI is identified as X-4-N, evaluated B.
4. (U) REMARKS:
 - a. Further reports will be forwarded as they are received.
 - b. Case open.
5. (U) Classified CONFIDENTIAL by authority of the undersigned.

b6

Incl

2 AR's re SUBJ
dtd 2 Nov & 15
Dec 59

b6

Major AI (MPC)
Commanding

OTE/hhs/Nurn Mil 6365

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214

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224/MR 19 Jan 60

*case closed
per 19 Jan 60*

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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1) and (b)(6)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 215-216

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JOINT MESSAGE JRM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS <i>file</i>	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <i>124</i> JUN 20 4 11 PM 1960 <i>21 / 07102</i> </div>					
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTI <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL DA	
ACTION		ORIG OR REFERS TO		CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
INFO					
FROM: CO 66TH MI GP BAD CANNSTATT GER					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO: CO FIELD STA VI NUERNBERG GER					
UNCLAS 0221 Opr for AEUC-OCZ(C) from AEUC-OCZ(C-5)					
1. SUBJ is sv and b1 2. Per auth Gp D/Opm, your Field Sta advised to close case effective immed.					
MR: GIM/BAK/pt/19 Jan 60. Effective 18 Jan 60 Lt Col b6 advised Field Sta VI b1 <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px; font-size: 2em;"> <i>EE 567298/d</i> </div>					
Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R					
SYMBOL AEUC-OCZ(C)		SIGNATURE b6		DATE 20	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) b6 CAPT, AI (INF)		TYPED NAME b6 MAJ, ARTY, CHIEF		TIME 1035Z	
PHONE 8365		PAGE NO. 1		YEAR 1960	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		NO. OF PAGES 1		CE & COLL DIV	
<i>225</i>		217			

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

6 January 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
- Use of Mails) (c) (U)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The StB (Statni Bezpecnosti - Czech State Security) continues to transmit instructions to Sources in West Germany through messages in secret writing contained in apparently innocent personal letters sent through ordinary international postal channels. The last letter was sent to Source under his true name at his home address.

Source: A-VI

F-2

2. Source has been requested by the StB to acknowledge the receipt of instructions, payments, and EEI by means of a postcard sent to a pre-assigned convenience address in Prague 330VR6048, CSR.

Source: A-VI

F-2

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263

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219

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 January 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th Military Intelligence Group, APO 965, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants-
Payment) (+) (U) b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Source: A-VI

F-2

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219

270

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218

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 January 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/a

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
- Use of Dead Letter Drops
(Mobile)) (c) (U) b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB (Statni Bezpecnosti - Czech State Security) has recently informed Source that the previously assigned mobile dead-letter drop, located on board the Paris-Prague Express, would not longer be utilized either by the StB or by Source except in exceptional cases when it was necessary to transmit particularly long reports, photographs, or similar documents. The use of the mobile dead-letter drop was discontinued due to difficulties encountered by Source in servicing it. Source was instructed to inform the StB by a secret writing message prior to using the mobile drop and the StB would do the same if they planned to use it.

Source: A-VI

F-2

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216

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 January 1960

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Field Station VI, 66th MI Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
- Use of Dead Letter Drops) (U)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB (Statni Bezpecnost - Czech State Security) has made use of a dead-letter drop to transmit instructions, KEI, and payments to an informant operating in Germany. The material was enclosed in a small, metal container and found buried three to four inches behind the right rear edge of a kilometer stone at a depth of approximately four inches. The drop was at Kilometer Stone 1.9, located in a wooded curve on the road from Lauf PV6586, GFR, to Neuhoef (nca), GFR, at approximately PV64618968. Source received prior instructions, by secret writing, indicating the location of the dead-letter drop and was requested to acknowledge receipt of the material by a postcard mailed to an assigned convenience address in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR.

Source: A-VI

F-2

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268

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HEADQUARTERS
FIELD STATION VI, 66TH MI GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

AEUC-OCZ 274/46

5 January 1960

SUBJECT:

b1

b1

(U)(C)

TO:

Commanding Officer
66th MI Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OCZ

EE 567298/d

1. (U) REFERENCE: Letter, this Field Station, subject as above, dated 2 November 1959.

2. (U) FORWARDED: Three (3) Agent Reports, subject as above, dated 9 November and 7 December 1959.

3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-VI is identified as X-4-N, evaluated B.

4. (C) REMARKS:

b1

b. Case remains open.

5. (U) Classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of the undersigned.

b6

Incl

3 ARs re subj
dtd 9 Nov &
7 Dec 59

b6

Major AI (MPC)
Commanding

OTK/hhs/Nurn Mil 6365

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222

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*me 8 Jan 60
2/1*

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 223-224

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
21 December 1959

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/b

(U)
Administration (C)
Recruitment of Personnel

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

b2

During general conversation with a number of university students at Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966 and Prague 33UUR6048, CSR, Source learned that StB, among other CSR government agencies, finds a large percentage of recruits among university students following general courses of study leading to Doctor of Philosophy degrees. This was brought forth during a discussion relative to the large number of students in a field which is considered, by communist standards, as being "non-productive" and of little value except in specified specialties. During this discussion it was brought out by a number of students that many persons in this category were sought by StB for recruitment and that unspecified numbers of them have been sent to Moscow (MOS), USSR for specialized intelligence training. The program has allegedly been in effect over a period of time. The recruitment appeal to this type of person, usually already a convinced communist, is based upon high material and financial reward, future privilege, and, to a large extent, interesting and varied work which is to be considered as a type of "sport" in which a certain amount of danger is present and in which an "enemy" must be outwitted, the entire matter being presented as more or less of an "intellectual game of Chess" with a spicing of danger.

COMMENT: Reports over a period of years have indicated an increase in the number of young, well-educated, competent and aggressive members of the StB who are dedicated to their work and appear to have replaced the old-line communists who are being transferred to sinecures.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-3)

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20

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 16 December 1959															
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces																	
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Transportation-Road)		EE-567299/d															
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6															
b2																	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																	
<p>The StB in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, makes use of various series of automotive license plates for both overt and covert vehicles. Overt vehicles make use of license plates with the prefix letter "B" which represents Bezpečnost (Security), using this prefix letter in common with other police and security agencies. No information is presently available to indicate whether particular blocks of numbers are assigned to StB as opposed to normal police agencies or whether StB numbers are simply assigned as required from a given series. Covert vehicles make use of the normal civilian license plate series for Karlovy Vary and Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. Known prefixes are:</p> <table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Prefix</th><th>City</th><th>Type Vehicle</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NH</td><td>Karlovy Vary</td><td>Trucks</td></tr><tr><td>OO</td><td>Karlovy Vary</td><td>Passenger</td></tr><tr><td>LZ</td><td>Karlovy Vary</td><td>Motorcycles</td></tr><tr><td>OF</td><td>Prague</td><td>Passenger.</td></tr></tbody></table>			Prefix	City	Type Vehicle	NH	Karlovy Vary	Trucks	OO	Karlovy Vary	Passenger	LZ	Karlovy Vary	Motorcycles	OF	Prague	Passenger.
Prefix	City	Type Vehicle															
NH	Karlovy Vary	Trucks															
OO	Karlovy Vary	Passenger															
LZ	Karlovy Vary	Motorcycles															
OF	Prague	Passenger.															
SOURCE: A-VI		(F-6)															
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> <p>BEST COPY AVAILABLE</p>																	
DISTRIBUTION																	
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246

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/8

SUBJECT

(U)
StB, Re: Modus Operandi (C)
(Communications-Censorship
of Mails)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EXPRESSION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, is known to maintain at least partial coverage of international mails. A known, self-admitted StB informant is engaged in the translation of photocopies of letters originating in or addressed to places outside the CSR. The informant translates from the German and English languages into the Czech language and has been engaged in this activity, allegedly without pay, since about 1954. The letters in question are normally personal in nature and have been described by the informant as being mostly letters to and from relatives and friends, especially from persons in the West who were expelled from the CSR following WW II.

SOURCE: A-VI

(P-6)

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205

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 16 December 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (C) (Communications-Security Practices) b2		EE-567299/d
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The StB in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, maintains (or has the use of) a van-type truck containing mobile radio direction finding and monitoring equipment. The truck has the outward appearance of a CSR Army vehicle with the exception of added antennas and is painted in the same drab color as normal army vehicles. The vehicle bears a CSR license plate with the prefix "B", meaning Bezpečnost (Security), the prefix used on overt vehicles of the CSR police and security agencies. Source has seen b6 the alleged Chief of the Communications Section of the StB, Karlovy Vary, riding as a passenger in this vehicle on at least two occasions. Further information concerning the vehicle is not presently available.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-6)</p>		
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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-5672974

SUBJECT

(U)

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (G)
(Reports-Types Required of
Informants)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Some StB informants in Karlovy Vary 33UVR4966, CSR, are required to prepare written reports for their handling agents while others are verbally debriefed concerning their activities on behalf of the StB. One informant known to Source prepares his reports in the form of written translations of photocopies of letters which are the result of mail interception. A second informant known to Source told Source's mother that she is questioned by the StB relative to the results of the missions given her. In the case of a third known informant, a well-educated man, written reports are required. On one occasion, Source unexpectedly entered the office of this informant and interrupted him while the informant was typing. During this visit, while the informant was out of the office for a short period, Source was able to glance at the paper and noted that it was headed "Visit with.....". On the next line, at the left edge of the paper was written "Pramen Hlasu" (Source Report:), followed by a narrative text giving the results of the visit of the informant to the person in question. This third informant later admitted his activities to Source and told him that at first only oral reports had been required but later, as he gained experience, he was required to prepare all reports in written form.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 16 Dec 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
REF-567299/d		
SUBJECT (U) StB, Re: Modus Operandi (c) (Communications-Security Practices) b2	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>It has been reported that persons calling individuals assigned to the StB in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSB, are not connected with the person called unless the caller asks for a specific extension number rather than a person by name. The StB is reached, by the general public, through the main police switchboard (telephone number 3526) and connection is made only to overt police officers and administrative personnel if the request is made by name. Source once attempted to telephone a business acquaintance at the StB Headquarters in Karlovy Vary but was refused a connection by the operator because Source did not know the extension, being told that connections were not permitted unless the number was known.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-6)</p>		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/5

SUBJECT

(U)

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (e)
(Transportation-Road)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The vehicles listed and described below have been identified as probably being StB vehicles in Karlovy Vary 3300RH966, CSR. Source bases his identification on having seen the listed vehicles on at least five occasions under one or more of the following circumstances: Parked at an StB installation; seen entering or departing from an StB installation, and/or; seen with a known StB personality as a passenger or driver.

<u>License Number</u>	<u>Type Vehicle</u>	<u>Make/Model</u>	<u>Color</u>
B-55180	Jeep		White with blue stripes
B-42284	Carry-all	Skoda 1201	White with blue stripes
NH-1700	Truck (3 to 5 ton)	Skoda RND	Olive green
00-13-00	Sedan	Tudor 1101	Black
0F-01-98	Sedan	Tatraplan	Black
00-26-25	Sedan	Skoda 1201	Gray
00-26-12	Sedan	Skoda 1201	Pea green
00-23-19	Sedan	Tudor 1101	Gunmetal blue

Source: A-VI

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-56728/e

SUBJECT

(U)

StB, Re: Installations (C)
(Telephone Service)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The telephone service for the StB in Karlovy Vary 33UVR4966, CSR, at least for calls from the general public, is maintained through the use of the main police telephone switchboard (telephone number 3526). A known extension serviced by this switchboard, number 306, has been identified as the office telephone of b6 Chief of the Communications section of the StB, Karlovy Vary, located in the Karlovy Vary StB Headquarters, on Rooseveltova ulice.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-6)

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HEADQUARTERS, REGION XI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 800 US FORCES

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AEUC-OPCE: 274/48

~~EE-573046~~

EE-567298/d

File

DEC 10 1959

SUBJECT: b1 (U) (C)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE (CIS)

1. (U) REFERENCE: Headquarters Operational Memorandum 4/55 and Headquarters Dossier, same file and subject.

2. (U) FORWARDED: One Summary of Information.

3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source A-W is b1

b. All other elements of Control of Information are contained in attached report.

4. (U) REMARKS: Inclosed Summary of Information (SOI) reflects modus operandi of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) in their dealings with SUBJECT. This information has previously been reported in numerous Agent Reports and electrical messages and is consolidated in inclosed SOI in accordance with referenced Operational Memorandum.

b6

b6

Major, AI (CmlC)
Commanding

1 Incl
SOI, dtd 7 Dec 59

RPM/ak/Wurz Mil River 833

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b6

D-567298/a

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
HQ REGION XI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 800, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (CIS)
RE: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period from 18 March 1959 to 18 October 1959, Source A-W was interviewed at prearranged locations at Aschaffenburg NA1037, Frankfurt MA7719, and Markthausenfeld NA1037, all in West Germany, and revealed the following information concerning Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) Modus Operandi:

a. Informants:

(1) Selection Standards: In February 1958, Source A-W wrote to the Czechoslovakian Military Mission in Berlin requesting a travel permit to visit the CSR. By May 1958, Source A-W had not received a reply to his requests and wrote another letter to the Czechoslovakian Military Mission. In June 1958, Source A-W wrote still another letter to the Military Mission and also wrote to his former fiancée, a resident of Pilsen, CSR, advising her of his actions. Shortly thereafter he received a reply from his former fiancée in which she told him that such requests required considerable time for processing. In October 1958, Source A-W wrote to his former fiancée, mentioned that he was employed as a chemist in West Germany, and requested her to contact the proper authorities in the CSR in an effort to secure the travel permit for him. Within a few days he received a reply from his former fiancée in which she said that she had contacted the necessary officials in Pilsen and that he would receive the required travel documents shortly. In November 1958, Source A-W received a letter from the Czechoslovakian Military Mission advising him that his request for travel to the CSR had been approved and requesting him to forward his Reisepass (Passport) for processing. On approximately [b1] he received the travel permit and passport. The travel permit authorized him to visit the CSR from 25 December 1958 to 7 January 1959. Source left Aschaffenburg on [b1] and arrived in Pilsen, CSR, on the same date. On [b1] he reported to the Foreign Tourist Control Office in Pilsen where he was required to show his identity and travel documents. At this time, his travel permit was stamped, allowing him to remain in the CSR for an unlimited period of time.

(2) Recruiting:

[b1] while at the residence of his former fiancée, Source was visited by a male individual who introduced himself as a researcher employed at the Pilsen Historical Archives Division. This individual gave no name but stated that he was making the visit on behalf of a friend who was ill and could not make the visit himself. Source was asked the purpose of his visit to the CSR, whether or not he had any relatives residing in the CSR, and his occupation in West Germany. Source was asked if he had any special interests, and he replied that he would like to attend the theatre while visiting the CSR.

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D-567298/d

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi

7 December 1959

After a short conversation, Source was invited to travel to Prague, CSR, the following day to attend the theatre.

[b1] Source, accompanied by his former fiancée, departed from Pilsen by train for Prague where they were met at the railroad station by the individual who had visited Source the previous evening. The individual instructed Source and his former fiancée to take a short sight-seeing tour while he obtained tickets for the theatre and said that he would meet them at 1100 hours at the Hotel Slavon, located in the vicinity of Wenzelplatz in Prague.

At approximately 1130 hours, the individual appeared at the lobby of the hotel accompanied by a male individual, a Czech national, whom he introduced as his friend. No names were mentioned. Source and his former fiancée were invited to lunch at the hotel which was paid by the Czech national. After lunch, the individual who had met Source initially, made his apologies and departed. Source and his former fiancée were then invited to take a sight-seeing tour of Prague in the Czech national's vehicle. They were taken to dinner, dancing, and the theatre that evening, and all expenses were paid by the Czech national. During the intermission at the theatre, the Czech national attempted to query Source concerning his employment in West Germany, but was informed by Source that he could not discuss his employment as such information would be a violation of the West German Trade Laws. After the theatre, Source and his former fiancée were invited for refreshments, and later were driven to the Hotel Slavon where a room had been reserved for them. Upon departing, the unidentified Czech national informed Source that he desired to meet him again on [b1]. All expenses incurred on [b1] including meals, theatre tickets and hotel room, were paid by the Czech national.

[b1] the individual who had previously introduced himself as an employee of the Pilsen Historical Archives Division, visited Source and said that his friend wanted to meet him. Source accompanied the individual to the Foreign Tourist Control Office where he was met by the unidentified Czech national and escorted to the office of the chief of the Control Office. The unidentified Czech national began the conversation by stating that he desired to discuss certain matters with Source openly. He stated that he was extremely interested in obtaining all information pertaining to the West German chemical industry, especially the nylon industry in which Source had experience. In addition, he stated that he wanted to establish the acquaintance of an electrical engineer who specialized in electrical transistors. Source was told that should he favorably consider the offer, a bank account would be established for him in the CSR. Source replied that he was interested in financial gain, and was told that a bank account could be established for his former fiancée which would allow her to obtain a nice apartment and other luxuries. To this proposal, Source stated that he would like to consider the offer prior to making a definite decision. Source was told that if he decided to accept the proposal, he should

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235

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D-567298/a

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi

7 December 1959

travel to Leipzig US1790, East Germany, [b1] as a visitor to the Leipzig Fair. Source was instructed to visit the Czechoslovakian Exhibit at the Fair and attempt to locate him. In the event that Source was unable to locate him, he should proceed to the Hotel International in Leipzig where he would be contacted. In the event that he could not travel to Leipzig [b1]

[b1] Source was instructed to appear at the Hotel Neva in Berlin UU9220, where he could be contacted on the second Saturday of each month. Source was required to sign a pledge, in content approximately as follows: "I solemnly pledge myself not to discuss with anyone the conversation engaged in by me at Pilsen on [b1] Source signed the pledge with his true name.

[b1] Source received a letter from his former fiancée informing him that the individual he had met in Prague would be traveling to Berlin either [b1] Source's former fiancée said that she would be allowed to travel to Berlin at that time and requested that Source advise her, no later than ten days in advance, concerning his plans regarding Berlin. Source did not travel to East Berlin [b1] as planned. [b1] he received a telephone call at his place of employment from Prague, CSR. The telephone call was placed by his former fiancée who said that she would be in Berlin [b1] and that she would meet Source in front of the opera house in East Berlin at 1000 hours that date.

[b1] Source met with the unidentified individual whom he had met in Prague, CSR, in January 1959. The individual questioned Source about his educational background, military experience, [b1] [b1] present employment, marital status, and financial status. Source was assured that if he cooperated, he would be allowed to travel to visit his former fiancée in Czechoslovakia and that a bank account would be established for him in the CSR. [b1]

[b1] It was explained to Source by the Czech national, in a conversation concerning a future meeting [b1] [b1] that it was possible, due to the international situation over Berlin, that Source would not be able to travel to Berlin during July 1959. Therefore, if such should be the case, Source should proceed to Vienna, Austria, and meet the Czech national [b1] in front of the State Opera House. Source was instructed that in either case, he should travel by air.

Source did not travel to East Berlin [b1] as planned. On [b1] he received a long distance telephone call at his place of employment which was placed from Berlin by his former fiancée. Source had previously asked a co-worker to inform anyone that called him that he was on vacation, and the co-worker complied with Source's instructions.

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567298/a

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi

7 December 1959

b1 Source was notified by the German telephone company that an unidentified individual was attempting to contact him from Pilsen, CSR. b1 Source placed a long distance call from Frankfurt, West Germany, to his former fiancée in Pilsen, CSR, but was unable to contact her. b1 Source placed a long distance call to his former fiancée, and during the conversation, she said that the unidentified Czech national had been in Pilsen and had assured her that she and Source would be able to meet in Berlin during the month of October 1959.

b1 Source furnished a letter that he had received from his former fiancée in which she said that she would be in Berlin b1 b1 She requested Source to notify her by telegram b1 b1 whether or not he would be able to travel to Berlin on that date.

b1 Source sent a telegram to his former fiancée advising her that he would be in Berlin b1

b1 Source traveled to East Berlin where he met with the Czech national who later identified himself as b6 During the meeting, Source was required to furnish b6 with an explanation as to why he had failed to keep appointments in Berlin and had not obtained the information that he was to obtain in West Germany.

b1 Source was required to sign a pledge in his own handwriting which read substantially as follows:

b1

I am a co-worker of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service. I will carry out all assignments given to me in a most satisfactory manner. My name is b6 The signal will be "Herr.... did you work for Mr. b6 My answer will be, "No, I worked for Mr. b6 Source signed the pledge in his true name.

Source was given 300 DMW and was instructed to meet b6 in East Berlin b1 Source was told by b6 that if he desired to travel to Czechoslovakia during the Christmas holidays of 1959, he should be in East Berlin b1 at which time he would be furnished transportation to Czechoslovakia.

(3) Training:

(a) b1 Source was assigned the mission of developing the acquaintance of an electrical engineer who specializes in electrical transistors, and to attempt to determine the possibility of having this individual accompany Source on a subsequent visit.

b1

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Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi

7 December 1959

b1

(d) [b1] Source was told that he would be contacted, date and place not specified, by an individual who would give him instructions and training in intelligence matters.

b1

(5) Transfer, Disengagement and Disposition of Informants:

[b1] Source was informed by his CIS handling agent that their meeting scheduled for [b1] would be their last, and that following that meeting, Source's activities would be directed by an individual in West Germany.

(6) Communications:

(a) Use of telephones:

[b1] Source received a telephone call at his place of employment in Frankfurt, placed from Pilsen, CSR, by his former fiancée. She advised that she would be in Berlin [b1] and that she would meet Source in front of the Opera House in East Berlin [b1]
[b1]

5

238

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION		DATE 2 December 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (C) (Informants-Utilization)		EE-567298/d
b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>The StB in Karlovy Vary 33UVR4966, CSR, uses informants to report on persons who have traveled outside the CSR. Source, after returning to his home from a trip to the West during 1957, was contacted by four persons known or believed to be StB informants. One of these four persons may not have contacted SUBJECT on behalf of the StB but merely as the result of the personal acquaintanceship between Source and the informant. Of the others, one openly admitted having been "sent" by the StB and another intimated but did not state that she had been "sent". According to the informant who told Source that he made the visit on behalf of the StB, the StB appeared to be primarily interested, not in what a traveler had seen outside the CSR, but rather in determining to what extent the visitor had been impressed by political and economic differences; the manner in which comparisons to the conditions within and outside the CSR were made; and whether the comments of the traveler were of such a nature that they were "harmful" to the CSR or would lower the prestige of the communist regime in the CSR. The StB also has an interest in learning who the traveler may have been in contact with during his trip, especially if any of those persons had fled the CSR after the communist coup or any of them were well known and/or had been politically active in the CSR or are prominent in refugee groups of a political nature. This informant also mentioned to Source that he had had other similar assignments at various times.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-6)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 2 December 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Informants-Utilization)		EE-567298/d
b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The StB in Karlevy Vary 33UHR4966, CSR, recruited an informant in 1954 who, since that time has been engaged, on a part-time basis, in the translation of photographs of letters from the English and German languages into the Czech language. The letters are personal in nature and originate in or are addressed to places outside the CSR and, according to the informant, appear to be the product of mail censorship. The informant, who is fluent in six languages, is allegedly not paid for his work in this connection.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (P-6)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
2 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Det, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Source A-IV

(C-3)

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241

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/1

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants-Recruiting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Partial information concerning the manner of recruitment of Dr. b6 an admitted StB informant in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, indicates that precautions were taken by the StB to insure that b6 b6 would not be missed at his home or place of employment during the period of time required to accomplish the recruitment. On the day prior to that on which the actual recruitment took place (in 1955), b6 received a telegram stating that his presence was required in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, on the following day on a matter of business. The telegram was received in sufficient time for b6 to inform his superiors at his place of employment, however, the time limits specified in the telegram forced b6 b6 to depart from his home at 0300 hours to travel to Prague. As b6 b6 departed from his home, he was intercepted by two members of the StB in civilian clothing, placed into a car and driven to the StB District Headquarters on Rooseveltta ulice, Karlovy Vary. There he was interrogated for several hours concerning correspondence he had been receiving from friends and acquaintances in western countries. After the interrogation, the tone changed and b6 was offered the opportunity of "saving himself further trouble" by serving as an informant. The approach was made in such a manner that b6 allegedly had no way in which to refuse and he therefore reluctantly agreed to cooperate.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 December 1977

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces,

EE-567299 d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants-Recruiting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Fragmentary information concerning the recruitment of one b6
b6 an admitted StB informant in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, indicates that b6 was summoned to the Karlovy Vary police headquarters under the pretense of being required to clarify some minor irregularity in the operation of the house in which she is the janitor. After arrival at the police headquarters, pretense was dropped and b6 was taken to the StB headquarters by car. There she was questioned for a short period and then told that she would be required to work for the StB as an informant, and later claimed that she was given no choice as to whether or not she would act as an informant. The topics of questioning and the basis for the recruitment are not known.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE *file*
1 December 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Partial information received concerning the recruitment of b6
b6 an admitted StB informant in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, indicates that his recruitment was effected by simply summoning him to the StB headquarters in Karlovy Vary, after which he was informed that he "must" work for the StB. When he attempted to evade such service on the basis of his age (being then about 60 years of age), his protests were disregarded; however, his later assignments have consisted of being required to translate photocopies of letters from the German and English languages to Czech. b6 claims to have been given no choice in whether he would act as an StB informant and claims not to receive any compensation for his efforts.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-6)

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REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US FORCES

25 NOV 1959

AEUC-OPCE 274/10

EE-567298/E

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi and Sources (C)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55.
2. (U) FORWARDED: SOIs dated 25 NOV 1959, subject and file as above.

3. (C) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
[b1] formerly residing at [b1] a refugee,
residing at the time of interview in refugee channels, BERLIN, Germany.

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact.

d. Date Source obtained information: 1958 - 12 October 1959.

e. Date agent received information: 20-21 October 1959.

(U)
4. (C) REMARKS:

a. Source was allocated to Region VIII, SMSD and USACUE, respectively, at a meeting of the Non-German Refugee Panel on 20 October 1959.

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190

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25 NOV 1959

AEUC-OPCE 274/10

EE-567298//E

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi and Sources (C)

- b. Source was referred to SMSD on 21 October 1959.
- c. Region VIII File Examination on Source: Negative.

b6

3 Incl

- 1-2 SOIs dtd 25 NOV 1959 (C) Lt Col, AI (Arty)
- 3 Photos of Source (in trip) (U) Commanding
w/negatives (U)

BERLIN 6887 b6 /AVM/CCK/bb

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b1

b1

189

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245

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 25 NOV 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Section; EE-567298/d

RWB/bb

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (e) (U)

**CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE ASSESSMENT 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM CHIEF *own*

OPNS OFF

1. Attempted Recruitment of Source by Czech Intelligence in PRAGUE, CSR:
b1 Source was visited at his home in PRAGUE, CSR, by Pmu LNU, male, who requested to speak with Source. He showed Source some type of credential, a small red booklet, with a photo of the bearer, his name, and a red stripe across the inside of the booklet. Source believes that it identified the man as an agent of the StB (Statni Bezpecnost-Sta Security), but is not positive. He first interrogated Source concerning his personal background; POB, DOB, education, friends, relatives, etc. He then explained that, since Source worked in the b1 he could be of use. Source was asked to supply information on tourists and other foreign visitors b1 b1 with whom they associated, what they do, how they behave, etc. Source, who had no desire to have any contact with the StB, evaded the request for information by explaining that he was only a waiter, did not know any of the customers by name, had no way of supplying information, etc. LNU told him to "think it over" and promised to return at a later date. Source was not promised any money for these services, did not sign a statement of obligation, and was not assigned a cover name. LNU did not return before Source managed to reach West BERLIN and enter refugee channels.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII File Examination: Negative.

Document Has Been

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

AEUC-OPCE (CIS): 274/46

25 November 1959

SUBJECT: b6 (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

1. (U) REFERENCE: Message this region D-455.
2. (U) (C) FORWARDED:
 - a. Three (3) Agent Reports, this region, subject as above, dated 1 and 8 October and 19 November 1959, with three (3) Exhibits.
 - b. Fourteen (14) Summaries of Information, this region, subject: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi, file: EE-567298/d, dated 1 October 1959.
 - c. Two (2) Summaries of Information, this region, subject: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Personalities, file: EE-567298/f, dated 1 October 1959.
 - d. Two (2) Summaries of Information, this region, subject: StB (Statni Bezpecnost - State Security Service), Re: Installations, file: EE-567299/a, dated 1 October 1959.
 - e. Summary of Information, this region, subject: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: EEI and Targets (C), file: EE-567298/c, dated 1 October 1959.
3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. As indicated in the attached reports.
 - b. Preparing agent for the inclosed Summaries of Information is Special Agent b6 this region.

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AEUC-OPCE (CIS): 274/46

Ltr to: CO, 66th CIC Group, APO 154, US Forces, attn: AEUC-OPCE

Subj: b6 (U), 25 November 1959, contd:

4. ^(U)
(c) REMARKS:

a. SUBJECT was transferred from the Tirschenreuth Jail to the jail in Munich-Stadelheim on 12 October 1959, by order of the District Attorney, Muernberg, GFR.

b. A check will be made with the Bavarian State Court in Muernberg to determine the disposition of SUBJECT's case.

c. Case open.

d. Classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by authority of the undersigned.

2 Incl

1. 3 ARs re SUBJ (U)
dtd 1 & 8 Oct & 19
Nov 59 (c)w/3 Exhs
2. 19 SOIs subj as std (U)
in par's 2b,c,d & e (c)
dtd 1 Oct 59 (c) (U)

b6

Major, AI (MPC)
Commanding

CWB/pjs/Hbg Mil 6365

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248

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185

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 1 Oct 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

RE: Modus Operandi (U)
(Letter Drop) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1
a suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last
residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth
GROB28, GFR, identified the following address as a means of contact
with the CIS in the CSR:

House #65, Stupno 33UUR9820, CSR

(F-6)

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b1

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184

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 October 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66th CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

LE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)
(C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, furnished the following information concerning a letter he received from the District Trade Council (Okresni Odborova Rada) Jachymov:

In the latter part of August 1959, Source received a letter from the District Trade Council (Okresni Odborova Rada) in Jachymov through his employers. The letter stated that Source was to spend a 14 day leave in Marienbad 33UUR3638, CSH in September 1959. Source understood this letter to refer to his planned espionage mission in GFR since the letter did not include a train schedule as was the normal custom and in the conclusion of the letter it was stated that Source would be met by private automobile at the House of Culture in Jachymov.

(P-6)

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183
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1 JUN 47 568

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

EE-567298/a

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Documentation) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, furnished the following information concerning documentation supplied him by his CIS handling agent:

On 12 September 1959, Source was given a West German Personal Identification card b1 bearing the name b1 by his CIS handling agent. This identification card was to be used to substantiate Source's story.

(P-6)

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251

b1

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192

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

EE-567298/d

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (C)
(Communications - Use of Mails)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth UR0828, GFR, related the following concerning the use of mails to communicate with the CIS:

Source was instructed to return to the CSR b1 and upon arrival in Weiden TR9506 GFR he was told to mail a postcard containing the text "Best wishes from my vacation, b1 In the event that Source believed that he was under surveillance, he was to add a girl's name to the postcard.

(F-6)

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b1

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181

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

LE-567298/d

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi
(Recruiting-- Selection)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, furnished the following information concerning his recruitment by CIS:

In the latter part of May 1959, Source was re-approached by two CIS agents and invited for a ride from his place of employment to his home. During the course of the ride, it was evident to Source that the two CIS agents were completely knowledgeable of his background to include family, relatives, and financial status.

(F-6)

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253

b1

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1 JUN 47

180

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

EE-567298/d

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (S) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Recruiting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

CSR, suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, related the following concerning HIS recruitment into the CIS:

At the end of March 1959, Source, while under the influence of alcohol, made several critical remarks in the Beseta Inn in Jachymov concerning the restrictions placed on travel to West Germany from the CSR. In the middle of April 1959, Source was approached by an individual who introduced himself as b6 and asked Source if he would be interested in traveling to West Germany to see Source's aunt who resides in Wuerzburg MA6716, GFR. Source answered in the affirmative and was told that he would be contacted again.

Source was contacted again in May 1959 and July 1959. In the latter meeting, b1

b1

(F-6)

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254

b1

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179

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service - Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation - Road) (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO826, GFR, furnished the following information concerning an automobile utilized by the CIS:

In the latter part of May 1959, Source was met by a CIS agent in a Skoda, two-door, passenger car, license plate unknown and driven from his (Source's) place of employment to his home.

(F-6)

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b1

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178

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIG Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567242/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence

Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Transportation)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was instructed to use the following means of transportation on his mission from the CIS in the GFR:

b1 after crossing the GFR-CSR border illegally near Entenbushl URI215, GFR, Source was to walk to Flossenbuerg URO912, GFR. From here, he was to take a train to Weiden TR9507, GFR. At Weiden, Source was to change trains and travel to Bayreuth PA8435, GFR, where he would again change trains and travel to his destination of Bamberg PA3629, GFR. Upon completion of his mission, Source was to return to the GFR - CSR border where he had originally crossed, using the same route.

(P-6)

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256

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

EE-56729B/d

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Informants Training) (U) (e)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

[redacted] suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in [redacted] b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth UN9828, GFR, related the following information concerning the training he received by CIS:

Source was given the following training in order to accomplish his mission for CIS in the GFR:

a. Instructed in the various customs and manners of the German people in the GFR.

b. Source was given maps of the GFR/CSR border to study and was instructed in the geography of GFR to include a study of the various states, state capitals, mountains, rivers and plains.

c. Source was given instruction in bridge construction which consisted of determining length, width, type of construction, purpose of the bridge, carrying capacity and methods of photographing bridges. Source was driven to Mies 33UUR4847, CSR, for the purpose of practical instruction in bridge photography.

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

EE-567298/d

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 56TH CIG GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(U)
(e)
(Border Crossings - Illegal)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth UR0828, GFR, related the following concerning his crossing the GFR/CSR border illegally:

b1

Source was driven by motorcycle via Tachau 33UUQ5079, CSR, to a wooded area near Goldbach (Czech - Zlaty Potok) 33UUR3048, CSR. From there Source and his handling agent drove a short distance further and then proceeded on foot for approximately two kilometers. Source was then left alone for approximately 10 minutes. Upon the return of his handling agent, they proceeded in the direction of the border. Upon arriving at the fence, Source's handling agent unlocked the door to an underground tunnel and they crossed under the fence. On the other side of the fence, Source and his handling agent hid in the bushes for a few minutes and Source then crossed into the GFR.

(P-6)

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258

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		1 October 1959
HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES		EE-567298/d
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U) Re: Modus Operandi (C) (Informants - Payment)	OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1	
	USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2	
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
	UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5	
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
[redacted] b1		
b1 [redacted] suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service), informant, last residing in [redacted] b1 [redacted] presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth UR0828, GFR, stated that he received the following payments from the CIS:		
[redacted] b1		
(P-6)		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 October 1959

EE-567298/a

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Informants & Security)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service).
informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned
in Tirschenreuth UR0828, GFR, stated that he was given the following security
instructions prior to being sent on a mission by the CIS:

b1

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 October 1959
EE-567298/d

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (G)
(Recruiting - Oaths Signed)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth DR0828, GFR, furnished the following information concerning his signing an oath in connection with his recruitment for CIS:

In July 1959, Source agreed to travel to GFR to perform a mission for CIS, and he was made to sign the following oath of allegiance: "I, b1 bind myself to work together with the Information Service under the guidance of an informant. I shall keep this a secret to all other persons. If I do not keep this solemn promise, I will be subject to severe punishment and will also lose my citizen rights."

(F-6)

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b1

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122

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 October 1959
PREPARING OFFICE HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES		EE-567298/d
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (C) (U) Re: Modus Operandi (Recruiting - Involuntary)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
[redacted] b1		
b1 [redacted] suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant, last residing in [redacted] b1 presently imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, furnished the following information concerning his recruitment by CIS:		
<p>In July 1959, Source was met by a CIS agent and was told that if Source did not agree to travel to GFR on an espionage mission, Source could expect to encounter serious difficulties to both himself and his children.</p>		
(F-6)		
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262		
[redacted] b1		

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REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US FORCES

AEUC-OPCE 274/10
EE-567298/d/e

24 NOV 1959

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi and Installations (S)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55.
2. (U) FORWARDED: SOIs dated 24 NOV 1959, subject and file as above.

3. (S) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
formerly residing in [b1] a refugee, residing at
the time of this interview in refugee channels, BERLIN, Germany.

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact,
observation, and experience.

d. Date Source obtained information: 1957 - February 1959.

e. Date agent received information: 28 October 1959.

4. (U)
(S) REMARKS:

a. Source was allocated to Region VIII and SMSD, respectively,
on 28 October 1959 at a meeting of the Non-German Refugee Panel.

b. Source was referred to SMSD on 28 October 1959.

c. Regional File Examination on Source: Negative.

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24 NOV 1959

AEUC-OPCE 274/10

EE-567298/d/e

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi and Installations (U)
(C)

d. During Source's debriefing, Source mentioned that the official title of the SNB (Sbor Narodni Bezpecnosti - National Security Corps) was changed in late 1958 or early 1959. It is now known as the VB (Verejna Bezpecnost - Public Security). Although this information does not come under our Summary of Information reporting requirements, it was deemed useful for any debriefing that occurs throughout Group, so is forwarded here for your information and dissemination as deemed necessary.

e. Photos of Source are being forwarded as an inclosure to Summaries of Information on StB, File: EE-567299/d/e/g.

b6

2 Incl

1 SOI dtd 24 NOV 1959

2 SOI dtd 24 NOV 1959

w/Exh "I" (in quad)

(e) (U) Lt Col, AI (Arty)

(U) (C) (e) Commanding

(e) *filed separately*

BERLIN 6887/ b6 /AVM/CGE/db

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-IR

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108

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 26 NOV 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Section; EE-567298/d/a

RWB/bb

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service,
Re: Modus Operandi (C)- (U)

CODE FOR USE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFUL TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

OPNS OFF

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. CIS Recruiting Lead; In 1957, Source was arrested in BILINA, CSR, for intoxication. During the course of his interrogation by local police, he admitted making pro-Western remarks and repeated them for his interrogators. Source signed a statement with his real name admitting these statements. Then, police obtained the name of his uncle, b6 born 1919-1923, an engineer, residing in b6 Source does not know what, if any, use was made by CIS with this lead. After signing this statement and supplying this name, Source was released and no further action was taken against him by Czech authorities.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII File Examination: Negative

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12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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18

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
18 November 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

FE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (c)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 267

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

file

EE-567298/d

AEUC-OPCE 274/46

2 November 1959

SUBJECT:

b1

b1

(U)(C)

TO:

Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USARV
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

EE 567298/H

NOT CONFIDENTIAL

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55.
2. (U) FORWARDED: Agent Report, this Region, subject as above, dated 19 October 1959.
3. (U) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-VI is identified as X-4-N, evaluated B.
4. (C) REMARKS:

a. Counter Espionage investigations in this Region have indicated

b1

b1

c. It is anticipated that a female assistant will be recruited by X-4-N

b1

d. Further reports will be forwarded as they are received.

5. (U) Classified **CONFIDENTIAL** by authority of the undersigned.

b6

b6

Major AI (MPC)
Commanding

Incl
1 AR re subj
dtd 19 Oct 59

268

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Page(s) *269*

JOINT MESSAGE FORM				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	
SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER					
<div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">4</div>		<div style="font-size: 1.2em;">OCT 30 1 22 PM 1959</div>		<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">TOP 30 / B 1319</div> <div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">D 14057</div>	
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE		TYPE MSG (Check) BOOK <input type="checkbox"/> MULTI <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		ACCOUNTING SYMBOL DA	
ACTION INFO		ORIG. OR REFERS TO D-509		CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE	
FROM: CO 66th CIC GP BAD CANNSTATT GER				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: CO CIC REGION VI NUERNBERG GER INFO COPY : REGION IV				<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">EE-567298/d</div>	
CONFIDENTIAL Oper for AEUC-OPCE from AEUC-OPCE(CIS) Your D-509 <i>7.6175</i>				<div style="font-size: 0.8em;">AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-Physically RE-MOVE ALL INTERNAL MARKS, ETC. DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO 1. LA. REFERENCE NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.</div>	
1. (C) Ref para 4, ur msg, desire you take no action at					
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SYMBOL AEUC-OPCE		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">b6</div>			
TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) b6		TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE b6			
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FROM:

CO 66th CIC GP RAD CANNSTATT GER

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Page(s) 272-282

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(Date)

included in this file conforms with
DA policies currently in effect.

D. Biggs 16 Aug 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

D. Biggs 5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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UP AR 381-10
REVIEWER M. McInerney

Reviewed on
24 Jul 86
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REVIEWER D. Borchert 28 Sept 86

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Page(s) 284-299

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/A

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Payment)(C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE E	DISPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected

GIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tifachenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was offered the following payment from the CIS:

In June 1959, Source was recruited by the CIS for a courier mission to the GFR. Source's handling agent agreed to pay Source, upon completion of his mission, enough money to purchase a small motorcycle, the price of which would be between 2,000 and 3,000 Czech Kroner, the exact sum not having been determined.

(F-6)

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158

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

DATE
24 Sep 59

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi
(Border Crossings - Illegal)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 suspected
CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in
Tirschenreuth UROB28, GFR, stated that he illegally crossed from the CSR
to the GFR in the following manner:

b1 Source was transported from
Mariansky Lazne 330UR3638, CSR, to the GFR-CSR border in a Czech jeep,
accompanied by his handling agent and two PS (Pohranicni Straz - Border
Guards) Lieutenants, all three being dressed in PS uniforms. They arrived
at the border in the immediate vicinity of Silberhuetten UR1215, GFR, at
which point Source concealed himself in some bushes until instructed to
proceed. His handling agent left him for several minutes to see if the
way was clear, and returned to give Source last minute directions as to
finding his way on the GFR side. They parted after a handshake and the
handling agent having determined that no one could observe Source as he
crossed into the GFR. Source successfully entered the GFR, but was apprehended
shortly thereafter b1

b1

(P-6)

301

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

DATE
2 Sep 59

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Border Crossings - Illegal) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Pirchenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was to communicate with his CIS handling agent by mail in the following manner:

To show that he had successfully crossed the GFR-CSR border illegally, Source was to buy a picture post card upon arriving in Nuernberg PV5079, GFR. He was to write: b6 sends greetings from Nuernberg", and address the card to: b6
No other communication of any kind was planned to be used.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Communications - Letter Drops) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS WITH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
SUSPECTED 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was to act as a live letter drop in the following manner:

Source crossed illegally from the CSR into the GFR b1
b1 He was to travel by road and rail to Frankfurt MA7749, GFR, arriving there on the same day. Source was supposed to go to the main railroad station in Frankfurt b1 and situate himself under the large clock there b1 on that date. He was to check his watch at this time and pretend to look for something in the pocket of his sportsjacket. Source was to wait b1 within which time an individual should approach him and inquire if he were b6 from Selb". Source would then answer in the affirmative, at which point the man would take Source to a secluded spot nearby and give him a letter or small package. Source was then to give the man DM 300.00 and depart with the package. If this man did not appear b1 Source would reappear each night until the person should appear but not after b1 Source was to travel back the same route to the GFR-CSR border and re-cross illegally into the CSR between b1 His handling agent, to whom he would deliver the package, would be waiting for him.

(P-6)

303

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Communications - Letter Drops) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OPEN INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1
suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth JRO828, GFR, stated that he was to use the following address to communicate with his CIS handling agent after Source arrived in the GFR from the CSR:

b6

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 4 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FOR

SS-567298/d

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service
Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Contacting Informants) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E UNPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 suspected
CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Firschen-
reuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was to contact another CIS informant in the
following manner:

Source was to be under the large clock in the main railroad station
in Frankfurt MA7749, GFR, b1 He was to
check his watch at this time and pretend to look for something in the pocket
of his sportjacket. Source was to wait b1 within which time
an individual should approach him and inquire if he were b6 from Selb".
Source would then answer in the affirmative, at which point the man would take
Source to a secluded spot nearby and give him a letter or small package.
Source was to give the man DM 300.00 in return for the item, and to depart for
the CSR. If this man should not appear b1 Source should
reappear each night until the person should appear, but not after b1
b1 Source was to return the way he came, with or without
the package.

F-6

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153

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

DATE

EE-567-3/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Contacting Informants)(G)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE ...
USUALLY RELIABLE ...
FAIRLY RELIABLE ...
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE ...
UNRELIABLE ...
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN ...

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE ... 2
POSSIBLY TRUE ... 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE ... 4
SUSPECTABLE ... 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ... 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was contacted by agents of the CIS in the following manner:

In September 1959, while Source was on military maneuvers in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, he was called in to his Commanding Officer. There was an unknown civilian present in the room, who showed Source a statement that he had previously signed for his other CIS handling agent. This paper identified the man to Source as his future CIS contact, and Source immediately departed the military installation, with permission of the Commanding Officer, in the company of this person.

(F-6)

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152

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service
Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Security Briefing)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected

CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was instructed to use the following security measures by the CIS:

While Source was being briefed for a courier mission to the GFR, he was warned against speaking too loudly in certain hotels where he would be going and to change hotels every two nights. He was also instructed not to buy a through ticket from the border to his destination, but to buy new tickets along the way so as to minimize the chance of being remembered.

F-6

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151

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 24 September 1959
PREPARING OFFICE HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service Re: Modus Operandi (Documentation)(6) (U)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b1 [redacted] suspected GIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschen- reuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was given the following documentation for use on his courier mission to the GFR: One GFR personal identity card number B7 b6 [redacted] valid from 9 January 1958, under the name of b6 [redacted] born b6 [redacted] in b6 [redacted] b6 [redacted] German nationality, 168 centimeters tall, brown eyes, no dis- tinguishing marks, picture included and stamped with an official stamp from Selb TR9562, GFR, residence b6 [redacted] card valid until 9 January 1963 and dated 4 November 1957, stamped with the official Selb seal and signed by b6 [redacted]		
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7-6

308

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150

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Cover for Informants) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 suspected
CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tischen-
reuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was instructed to use the following cover
story while on his courier mission in the GFR:

Source had documentation which described him as being born in b6
b6 and living in b6 Source familiarized himself
with these cities from maps and also was given the name and address: the
widow b6 in whose house he was
allegedly residing. He was also allegedly employed by the b6
b6 Source was to use this cover story only when abso-
lutely necessary. If stopped by the GFR police near the point where he was
to cross the GFR/CSR border, he was to explain that he came from Baernau
UR1521, GFR, to see the spring of the River Naab, in the vicinity of the bor-
der. Source was given no other cover information as he was not supposed to
come into contact with anyone during his stay in the GFR.

F-6

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149

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/8

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Payment)(C) (U)

**CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	DISPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Respected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GPR, stated that he was to pay another CIS informant in the following manner:

b1

Source was to be in the main railroad station, Frankfurt MA7749, GPR, where he was to meet another CIS informant. After pre-arranged countersigns, the other individual was to give Source a letter or small package in return for DM 300.00, which Source had been given by his CIS handling agent. Source was to return to the CSR with the letter or package or, if the meeting did not take place as scheduled, with the money.

(P-6)

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148

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 24 Sep 59
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (Cover for Informants) (C) (U)		
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		GRAPH EVALUATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E		IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
b1 suspected		
ted CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was recruited and trained for a mission for the CIS and given the following cover:		
<p>In August 1959, Source was ordered away from his civilian job to perform thirty-five days of military training in the vicinity of Karlövy Vary 33UUR4966, CSR, even though he was already past the age limit for compulsory military service. Source joined an infantry training unit (no designation), together with approximately 100 men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. Source trained with this unit for approximately one month, at which time he was called in to the commanding officer and turned over to an individual who identified himself by showing Source a statement Source had previously signed for another CIS agent. From this point on, Source had no further military duty, but was trained for and dispatched on his mission to the GFR.</p>		
(P-6)		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 24 Sep 59
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Payment)(C) (U)		EE-567298/d
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		GRAPH EVALUATION OF INFORMATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E		IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
b1 [redacted] suspected		
ted CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirochenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he received the following payment from the CIS:		
<p>In September 1959, Source was quartered for five days in a CIS operational apartment in Mariansky Lazne 33UUR3638, CSR, while being trained for a mission to the GFR. During this period, he was required to obtain his own meals on the local economy, and was paid a sum of 500 Czech Kroner for this purpose by his handling agent.</p>		
(F-6)		
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46

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Selection)(c)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
PROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected

CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was selected for the CIS in the following manner:

Source had been

b1

b1 continuously since 1951, when he was called away from his job and interviewed by an unknown individual. This person asked Source detailed questions concerning his personal history, especially his time with the German Army in World War II, his familiarity with the German language, and his knowledge of the GFR. Source's income, his wife's income, and similar information was also requested. During the conversation, which lasted approximately one-half hour, Source was never told for what reason he was being interviewed and was instructed not to mention this meeting to anyone whatsoever. Subsequently, he was recruited for a mission for the CIS. Source felt that his acquaintance with the German language and the GFR were the main criteria for his selection by the CIS, although his desire for more money was also a factor.

(P-6)

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145

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

RR-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation)-(C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE E	DISPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Source c-

ted CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was to use the following means of transportation while on a courier mission for the CIS in the GFR:

b1

after crossing the CSR-GFR border illegally near Silberhuetten UR1215, GFR, Source was to walk to Floss URO311, GFR, and from there take a bus to Weiden TR9507, GFR. From Weiden he was to take a train to Nuernberg PV5079, GFR. Here, Source was to purchase a new ticket to his destination of Frankfurt MA7749, GFR, and travel to that city, arriving b1

Source was to follow the same route back to Weiden, where he would remain until the morning b1 At this time he would return by bus and foot to the point on the border at which he had previously crossed, where he would be met by his handling agent.

(P-6)

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144

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

FF-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCE	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1
[redacted] rec-
ted CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in
Tirschenreuth URO828, GFR, stated that he was recruited for the CIS in
the following manner:

Source had been

b1

b1 continuously since 1951, when he was recruited by
the CIS in May 1959 for work as a courier to the GFR. Source was called
from his work to be interviewed by a man who Source suspected to be from
the SNB (Sbor Narodni Bezpecnosti - National Security Police) but who
did not clearly identify himself. The first interview consisted of ques-
tions as to Source's personal history and familiarity with the GFR and
German language. No reasons were given for the interview, but Source
was told he would be contacted again.

Approximately one month later, Source was again interviewed by this
agent, and on that occasion was asked if he were willing to travel to the
GFR to pick up an item. Source was told that all papers and traveling
expenses would be taken care of and that he would be generously reimbursed
for his efforts. An agreement was reached to pay Source enough money to
purchase a motorcycle which he had wanted, amounting to approximately
3,000 Czech kroner. At the end of this meeting, Source was required to
sign a short statement, which had previously been prepared, to the effect
that he would discuss with no one anything which had happened between the
two men. With the assurance of a future contact, the agent left Source,
who still was not informed what he was to do in the GFR, however this
statement was shown to Source as identification at a later date by another
person who contacted him.

(P-6)

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143

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation - Road) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Pitschenreuth UROS28, GFR, stated that he was transported by the CIS in the following vehicle:

In June 1959, Source was picked up from his job by a CIS agent and driven to a nearby secluded area in the vicinity of Kamenicky-Senov 33UYS6325, CSR, so that they could talk undisturbed. The car was a Skoda sedan, model "Spartak" 440, dark blue in color, license number b6 (last digit unknown). Source was in the car approximately one hour and never saw the vehicle subsequent to this occasion.

(P-6)

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142

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 Sep 59

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Transportation - Road) (S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

suspected CIS (Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service) informant imprisoned in Tirschenreuth JED828, GPR, stated that he was transported by the CIS in the following vehicle:

In September 1959, Source was transported from Karlovy Vary 33UUR-4966, GSR, to Mariánský Lázeň 33UUR3638, CSR, by a CIS agent in a Skoda automobile, model "Oktavia-Super", dark blue in color, license number 00 (further digits unknown). This was the only occasion on which Source saw this vehicle.

(F-6)

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Ref

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Communications--Use of the
Mails)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was instructed, in the event of arrest as the result of activities on behalf of the StB, to send a personal letter to a friend at a pre-designated address in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. Although prison censorship regulations would prevent Source from indicating the cause of arrest or the charges preferred, enclosure of a list of personal articles, such as underwear, toilet articles, etc., enclosed with the letter, such a list being permissible, would constitute notification that Source had been arrested as the result of espionage activity. In this event, legal and monetary assistance was promised.

Source: A-VI

(P-2)

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318

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140

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

ER-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (CIS) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (c)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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139 Page 1 of 1 pages
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

8 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications--Use of
Mails) (c) (U)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to contact informants operating in Germany, giving instructions and EEI through the use of covert messages, in secret writing, transmitted through ordinary international postal channels in an apparently innocent letter. Source recently received a letter addressed to him under his own name and at his home address which contained such a message. The letter was mailed in Austria and was signed by a person known to Source. The home of this person, a known StB informant, is an assigned convenience address for the use of Source in transmitting reports to the CIS by mail.

Source: A-VI

Evaluation: (F-2)

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12 January 2010

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138

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

8 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EX-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications--Dead-letter
drops (Mobile)) (c) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The CIS continues to communicate with a Source in Germany by means of a mobile dead-letter drop located on an international train. In a secret writing message recently received from the CIS, Source was given additional instructions relative to the use of this dead-letter drop. Because there was no West German car having Prague as its end destination, Source was instructed to place the message container on the West German car destined for Warsaw (wca) Poland through Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. Source was instructed to send his next dispatch on 7 September 1959 and thereafter on the 7th of each 2nd month. The CIS will return the container on 27 October 1959 and then every 2nd month on the same day.

Source: A-VI

(F-2)

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137

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SECRET

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 September 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XII, 66th Counterintelligence Corps Group, APO 227, US Forces

SUBJECT

CIS (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (C)
567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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1. Informants.

a. Recruiting.

(1) Source is presently unemployed and has a mother and other relatives whom she hasn't seen for fifteen years residing in Czechoslovakia (CSR). These two factors became the two main avenues of approach used by b6 an agent of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS), in recruiting Source. b6 used an indirect method of approach. Her first step was a visit to Source's apartment during the evening b1. She gained a hearing by saying that she was bringing a message from Source's mother in the CSR. She related a very disjointed and dubious story of having met Source's mother by chance while on a trip to the CSR, and intimated that she could be instrumental in arranging a reunion between Source and her mother. As proof of these contentions, b6 displayed part of one page of a letter Source had recently written to her mother. On the reverse side of the page Source's mother had penciled a note for b6 to deliver to Source. Without filling in the important details of her sketchy tale, b6 brought her visit to an abrupt conclusion telling Source to meet her the following day for the complete story.

(2) At a loss to understand this whole incident, Source met b6 b1 in an effort to obtain further information. However, b6 took Source on a day-long excursion to Wiesbaden MA4548, West Germany, during which trip she continually questioned Source concerning every phase of Source's personal history. Posing as an employee of a business firm in Nuernburg PV5079, West Germany, b6 offered Source the opportunity to become b6 co-worker and earn extra money. b6 would reveal nothing regarding the nature of the work except that it was purely business, not concerned with politics, and good-paying. Source became suspicious and asked b6 point-blank if she were an agent. After recovering from her surprise at this question, b6 laughed it off by saying that Source herself had the outward appearance of an agent. Finally, the conversation came back to Source's mother and the possibility of a reunion between mother and daughter. b6 asked if Source would be missed should she make a trip to the CSR or Austria. She stated that perhaps Source could travel with her to Nuernburg and then later to the CSR. Source explained that her relatives, except for her mother, were very hostile toward her because of Source's former marriage to a German soldier. Upon hearing this and other hindrances to Source's return to the CSR, b6 stated in a desperate manner that she had not expected so many difficulties and that "they" had told her it would be so easy. Then b6 calmed herself and suggested that she and Source could travel to East Berlin, thence to Austria, and then to Prague where they could call Source's mother and have her come to Prague. b6 insisted that the sooner they went to the CSR, the better. Each time Source mentioned her lack of the necessary papers for crossing international borders, b6 became more angry in her insistence that no papers were necessary.

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322

81
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31 August 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

(U)

Re: Redstone Operations (C)

D-567298/d

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(3) At approximately [b1] [b6] and Source arrived back in Mainz. [b6] mentioned that she had to catch a train back to Nuernburg to have a conference with her boss. She stated that she would return to Mainz [b1] at which time Source should have a final answer as to whether or not she would work with [b6]. At Source's request and just prior to their parting, [b6] identified herself as [b6] asked Source not to tell anyone of their meeting. If anyone should become inquisitive, Source was to say only that [b6] had brought a message from a girlfriend in Hamburg. [b6] pleaded with Source not to think of her as an agent. Finally, Source got on a streetcar and left [b6] standing in front of the Railroad Station in Mainz.

(4) [b1] Source met [b6] as instructed and agreed to work with her. [b6] expressed great relief and stated that she had feared that Source might report her to the police. [b6] did not require Source to sign any statement of obligation. [b6] stated that she trusted Source and would never require her to sign for anything.

b. Training.

(1) As soon as Source had agreed to work for CIS, [b6] admitted that she was a trained agent and would, in-turn, train Source to be an agent. Source received numerous EEI which [b6] said would be regarded as a test mission. [b6] also explained that as another test of Source's loyalty, Source would be required to perform a test mission consisting of taking messages from Mainz to Nuernburg NA6716, West Germany. At a later date, Source was to be taught how to recognize and receive messages through newscasts over Radio Prague. [b6] advised Source that she should be more disposed to working on the side of her "blood brothers" than for the Americans or Germans. In addition to normal reporting to a handling agent, Source was instructed in the use of two special reporting procedures. The first one consisted of a post card mailed at the beginning of each month to a cover address in the CBR. By the use of certain key words, Source will be able to indicate either that all is going well or that she desires to see her handling agent. The second procedure consisted of a letter, using a predetermined, harmless-appearing text, sent to the same cover address in the CBR. The purpose of such a letter would be to give immediate notification of any movement of rockets or the arrival of "refills" for the Redstone Missiles.

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2 323

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88
Page 2 of 8 pages
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134

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3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
D-567298/d (C)

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c. Contacting of Informants.

(1) [b1] Source was required to memorize and practice a precise method by which contact would be established between Source and [b6] or [b6] representative. [b6] told Source that she was to use a "Kontrollgang" (control route). This route would provide security before meetings with SUBJECT and [b6] or another agent. Starting at the Mainzerhof Hotel located at the corner of Rhineallee and Kaiserstrasse, proceed in a southerly direction towards the next street corner. At the city library, Source is to stop and pretend to look in the show windows of the library. At this point she is to look behind her and check to be sure that she is not being followed and to look for [b6]. If there is no danger, she is to proceed along the street to the corner and observe once again. Source is then to cross the street and walk back in a northerly direction towards an arch through which she will come onto the Rhinepromenade. Before entering the arch, Source is to observe once again to see if she is being followed. If there is danger, Subject is to wipe her nose with a very white handkerchief and leave the area. If there is no danger, she is to go through the arch and turn right and walk along the river until she comes to a newsstand. At the stand if there is no danger, she is to buy a package of cigarettes and proceed to a bench located a little farther along and sit down. If there is danger, she is to pass by the newsstand and leave the area. After sitting on the bench, Source will be approached by either [b6] or another person. The person will greet Source in the following manner. "Entschuldigen Sie bitte, koennen Sie mir sagen, wo ich das Gutenberger Museum finde?" (Excuse me, could you tell me where I find the Gutenberg Museum)? Source is to answer in the following manner. "Es tut mir leid. Ick kenne das Gutenberger-Museum nicht. Aber ich kenne die Gutenberg Universitaet. Wenn Sie wunchen, ich begleide sie dort hin." (I'm sorry, I don't know the Gutenberger Museum, but I know the Gutenberg university. If you would like, I will take you there). The key words in the greeting are museum and university. If the person does not insist on seeing the museum, the person was not the contact. If the greeting was proper, Source was to accompany the person and at this time she will receive instructions and/or money.

(2) Source is to perform this control route only when the following conditions are met. In front of the Club Lafayette located on Kapellenstrasse in Mainz is a statue. In the vicinity of this statue is a bus schedule enclosed in a frame. Source is to check every Saturday morning, starting on the Saturday following her [b1] trip to Berlin, and look for a small, wavy, penciled line on the right side of the frame. If the sign is there, Source is to perform the control route

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324

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133

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3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (G)
D-567298/d

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explained above starting at [b1] At first, [b6] instructions were for Source to execute the control route on the day following appearance of the sign, but she changed this stating that she didn't want to make Source work on Sunday inasmuch as Source has a boy friend, and so forth. Source was told that this would be their normal means of communication and that it would always remain constant so as not to confuse Source since she is a beginner. [b6] bought Source a gaudy bracelet to be worn whenever Source performs the control route. In case [b6] cannot be present, the person who does appear will recognize Source by the bracelet, which is to be worn on the left wrist and is not to be displayed if [b6] herself appears. [b6] stated that she would, in the near future, provide Source with a large handbag with Source's initials affixed thereto as a further aid to identification.

d. Security Factors. [b6] never revealed her true name to Source. She assigned the cover name [b6] to Source explaining that cover names were provided for their mutual protection. As another precaution, [b6] explained the control route would be changed after being used two or three times.

e. Payments. [b1] Source was [b1]
[b1] [b6] assured Source that she would receive an
[b1] on the following day and that in the
future she would receive plenty of money. [b1] [b6]
gave Source [b1] Source was instructed to
save all her receipts and vouchers covering expenses incurred in the
course of fulfilling missions so that she could be reimbursed. For the
rest, her payments would be in amounts proportionate to the value of the
information she reported.

2. Communications.

a. Use of Radio. Source was told that in the future she would be taught how to recognize and receive messages through newscasts over Radio Prague.

b. Use of Mails. At the beginning of each month, Source is to mail a post card to a cover address as follows: [b6]
[b6] The purpose of this post card is to indicate by a predetermined text either that things are going well for Source or that she wishes to contact her handling agent. A letter is to be sent to the same cover address to report, by use of a predetermined code-text, any movement of rockets or the arrival of "refills" for rockets. After servicing the letter drop shown to her in Wuerzburg, Source is to go to

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325

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Page 4 of 8 pages
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78

132

SECRET

3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
D-567298/d

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the Bahnhof and send a post card with an innocent text to the CSR cover address. The post card should have a picture of a building such as the railroad station in Wuersburg. The purpose of this is to provide a familiar landmark for any person who might have to come to Wuersburg in [b6] place. Source received the impression that [b6] uses the same cover address in the CSR as was given Source. [b1]

b1

c. Use of Codes. Source was given two harmless texts to use on her post card report at the beginning of each month. The text must always be written in High German. In case Source is in trouble or wants to meet [b6] the text will be as follows: "Schoene Gruesse von meinem Urlaub. Ich habe [b6] getroffen und Sie hat geheiratet und die kommt mich bald besuchen." (Greetings from my vacation. I met [b6] and she has gotten married and she will come to visit soon.) The key words are "Urlaub" and "besuchen". If the same text is written, but the word "besuchen" is omitted, this will indicate that all is well. Source was also given a code for reporting by letter information concerning rockets. An example message indicating that a new rocket is coming from the states or that the rockets will be moved in two weeks and giving the number of rockets coming or being moved would be as follows:

Lieber [b6]

Viele schoene Gruesse von hier. Es ist alles in Ordnung. Nur eine Neuheit. Rudi wird sich in zwei Wochen eine neue Einrichtung kaufen, aber er muss sich leider 300 DM dazu leihen.

[b6]

Dear [b6]

Hello from here. Everything is okay. Only one thing new. [b6] (code word for Rocket) will buy new furnishings in two weeks, but unfortunately he has to borrow 300 DM for that.

The phrase "in zwei wochen (in two weeks) and the use of the future tense of this verb means that the rockets are coming in two weeks from the states, and the phrase "300 DM" means that 3 (three) rockets or refills are in the shipment. If the rocket was moved three weeks ago or a new shipment was delivered three weeks ago and the number concerned was 3 (three) rockets the letter would read as follows:

326

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Page 5 of 8 pages
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131

SECRET

3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
D-567298/d

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b6 hat sich vor drei Wochen eine neue Einrichtung gekauft, aber der arme Mann hat noch nicht so viel Ersparnisse und der muss sich dazu 300 DM leihen.

(Three weeks ago b6 bought new furnishings, but the poor fellow doesn't have that much money saved and he has to borrow 300 DM).

The use of the past tense of the verb "kaufen" in the letter indicated that the movement has already taken place. The rest of the code is identical with the first example.

d. Letter Drops.

(1) Two letter drops, one located in Mainz and the other in Wuersburg, were shown to Source and she was told that part of her job would be to carry messages from one to the other. The Mainz letter drop is located in the Rosengarten (Mainz City Park - Rose Gardens). From the intersection of Weisenauer Strasse, Rhein Strasse, and Auf der Steig, near the Rose Gardens, one walks in a southerly direction along Abtsgasse Strasse. Park benches are situated along this street. From the above mentioned intersection, one proceeds to the third bench. Directly across the street from this bench a pigeon house may be seen. Between the third and fourth stones in the seat of the bench, counting from the extreme right side, is a small hole. This is the letter drop. Source was required to practice reaching into the hole so as to become familiar with the procedure of picking up messages deposited in the hole. Source is to service this drop only when she receives a signal to do so according to the following scheme. In front of the Lafayette Club, located on Kapellenstrasse in Mainz, is a statue. In the vicinity of the statue is a framed bus schedule fastened to a metal pole in the manner usual at all bust stops. Every Saturday morning, starting on the Saturday following her trip to Berlin, Source is to go to this bus schedule and look at the right side of the frame. If a small penciled square is drawn on the frame, Source is to go immediately to the letter drop and pick up the material there. This done, she is to return to the bus schedule and mark an "X" through the square. After this, if the material so instructs, Source will take the train to Wuersburg, check there for a go-ahead signal, described below, and then proceed to the letter drop in Wuersburg and deposit the material.

(2) The Wuersburg letter drop is located on the grounds of Marienburg Castle. It may be found by proceeding along the following route: Go over the "Alte Main Bruecke" which crosses the Main River in

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76

130

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3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
D-567298/d

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Wuerzburg and leads to the approach to Marienburg Castle. After crossing the bridge, walk on the right-hand side of the street going toward the castle. Eventually, one passes a vegetable stand located diagonally across the street from the museum. At this corner, make a slight right turn and proceed toward the castle on a small street which is in a poor state of repair. As one walks on this street, on the right side going toward the castle, one sees a souvenir shop located across the street. At this point, the street curves to the right and then straightens out. A short distance beyond the curve are steps leading up to the castle. Go up the steps to the first landing where a path leads off to the right. Following this path for a bout 30 or 40 yards, one passes an arch which leads to the castle. Not entering the arch, but proceeding about 40 yards further, one comes to a bench built into the wall. In the left corner of the wall behind the bench, as one faces the bench, is located the letter drop at a height of approximately three feet above the ground. The drop consists of a hole between two large stones in the wall. [b6] stated that a small stone will be placed in the hole after material is placed inside. Source was instructed always to have the material to be deposited in the drop wrapped in tin foil and ready for insertion into the hole. [b6] suggested that Source buy two identical candy bars, using the wrapper of one bar to enclose the message and the other as a decoy in case someone should approach while the drop is being serviced. Source was required to practice the procedure several times for familiarization with the exact location of the drop. When Source has material to deliver from Mainz, her first step, upon arrival in Wuerzburg, is to check for a signal in a phone booth. As one comes out of the main railroad station in Wuerzburg, there is a large fountain directly ahead. To the right of the fountain is a long line of newsstands, vegetable stands, and the like. At the end of the line of stands, one makes a right turn and immediately to the front is a public telephone booth. Inside the booth on the shelf on which lies a telephone directory, a signal will be placed by [b6]. The signal will be placed on the upper right-hand corner of the shelf as one faces the telephone. [b6] will draw a small circle on the shelf before Source arrives in Wuerzburg. Source will check for the circle as soon as she arrives in the city. After delivering the material to the Wuerzburg letter drop, Source is to proceed to the Bahnhof and send a post card with an innocuous text to cover address in CSR. After mailing the card, Source is to return to the telephone booth and mark a cross through the circle. Then she is to return to Mainz. Source was given no instructions to cover the possibility that she might find no circle in the booth.

(3) After revealing these two letter drops [b1] [b1] [b6] told Source that she had planned to take her to another letter drop in Amberg, near Nuernberg, West Germany, but since Source was so exhausted from climbing to the castle, they would go there after Source's trip to Berlin.

328

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Page 7 of 8 pages
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129

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3 September 1959

SUBJECT:

CIS

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
D-567298/d

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e. Communications Security. [b6] remarked to Source that each letter drop would be used only a few times and then new ones would be put into operation. Regarding post cards and letters sent to the CSR cover address, Source was instructed to travel to cities other than Mainz if necessary in order to preclude all such communications being processed by the same mailing point. As an additional security measure, Grete told Source to alter her handwriting in a different way for each card or letter.

3. Transportation. In their several meetings, [b6] and Source made free use of public transportation including trains, buses, trolleys and taxis. Source was given no instructions as to policies or restrictions of any kind with regard to travel. For her trip to Berlin, Source was told to go to the best travel agency in town and make flight reservations.

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8

329

Page 2 of 8 pages
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74

128

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
30 August 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/a

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Medna Operandi (U)
(Operational Liaison) (O)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The CIS continues to maintain a Liaison Officer in East Berlin 33WU9220, EC, in the person of a man known to Source as b6 On b1 while in East Berlin attempting to establish contact with her StB handling agent, Source observed b6 driving a vehicle bearing normal EC civilian license plates with the registration number: b6 The car appeared to be the same as a car previously reported, that is an old model green-colored, four-door sedan of BMW manufacture, but bearing license plates not previously seen by Source. During the course of the subsequent operational meeting with her StB handling agent, the handling agent offered to obtain false documentation, presumably East German, through the services of b6 which would permit Source to travel to Prague from East Berlin for a future operational meeting. b6 in such a case, would also act as Source's escort for the trip to Prague from East Berlin.

Source: A-VI

(P-2)

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360

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 August 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

ER-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

C-3

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12 AUG 1959

REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 106 US FORCES

AEUC-OPCE (CIS): 274/46
D-567298/d

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Legation in Rome, Italy (U)
Modus Operandi - Transportation (C)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

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1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 6/56, your Headquarters, dated 30 April 1956.

2. (U) FORWARDED: Summary of Information, Region IV, subject and file as above, dated 4 August 1959.

3. (C) CONTROL OF INFORMATION: a. Source A-IV is identified as X-8-M, evaluated B, who obtained the information from b1

b. Preparing agent is Special Agent b6 Region IV.

4. (S) REMARKS: a. A Mercedes 220 automobile bearing Austrian license b6 is registered as belonging to b6 of the United States Embassy, Vienna, Austria, since 29 August 1957. b1 believes that the license number may have been misread by the reporting b1

b. Case is pending.

5. (U) Regraded Confidential 11 August 1962.

1 Incl:
(S) SOI, dtd 12 Aug 59 (1 pg)

b6 /ja/McG M 8345

OUT LOG Nr.

0592/59

b6

b6

Major, AI (Sig C)
Commanding

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332

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126

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Page(s) 333

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

3 August 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communi-
cations-Use of Dead-letter Drops
(Mobile))(G) (U)

b2

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A source in Germany continues to communicate with the CIS by means of a mobile dead-letter drop located on an international train. In a secret writing message recently received from the CIS, Source was given new instructions for the use of this dead-letter drop. Because the Czech car was to be removed from the train [b1] Source was instructed to place the message container on the West German car marked "DR" and bearing the destination shield "Paris-Stuttgart-Munich-Prague." Source was instructed to next send his dispatch [b1] and thereafter on the 7th of each second month. The CIS would return the container [b1] and then every second month on the same day. Source was instructed to place the container in essentially the same position.

Source: C-VI

(F-2)

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334

4-V

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1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

AEUC-OPCE (CAS): EE-567298/d

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (U) (e)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-OPCE

AUG 11 1959

1. (U) REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55.
2. (U) (e) FORWARDED: Two (2) Summaries of Information, subject: "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (Investigations) and Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings," file EE-567298/d, dated 31 July 1959.

3. (e) CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source A-VI is identified b1

b1

b. Preparing Agent for the inclosed Summaries of Information is Special Agent b6

4. (U) REMARKS: Forwarded for your information.

b6

b6

Major, AI (MPC)
Commanding

- 1 Incl
2 SOIs subj as
stated in par
2 above (e) dtd
31 Jul 59

OTK/pjs/Nbg Mil 6421

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335

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124

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE
31 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Border Crossings) EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

So-called "Street Committees" are responsible for granting permission to travel from Czechoslovakia to West Germany. These "Street Committees" are composed of men who are chosen to perform political work in a certain number of streets in a city.

Source: "A-VI"

(F-6)

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123

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE
31 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAHEUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
ServiceRe: *Mokus Operandi* (Investigations)

ID# 567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Czech agents attempt to determine what Czech travelers reveal when they are in West Germany. Czech railway employees at the railway station in Furth in Wald 33UUQ4364, Germany, are also assigned to watch over Czech travelers.

Source: "A-VI"

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 30 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces		
DD-567298/d		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service Re: Modus Operandi (U)(C)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<h1>b1</h1>		
SOURCE: A-IV		(C-3)
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
21 July 1959

SIGNALING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Border Crossings) (e)

REF 67299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source continues to travel to East Berlin 33UUU9220, EG from the GFR using her normal West German documentation, traveling as a German citizen enroute to West Berlin through the EG. After arrival in West Berlin, she enters the East sector of the city without EG documentation and is quartered in that city, without papers, under the auspices of the StB. Source has encountered no difficulty in her numerous transits of the East/West sector border in Berlin.

Source: B-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
21 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Reports-Types required of
Informants) (e)u
PP-567299/2 b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source continues to be required to render only verbal reports of her investigative activities on behalf of the StB. Her reports are rendered during the course of periodic operational meetings with one or more handling agents in East Berlin 33UUU9220, EG. Following her oral report of activities, she undergoes an informal oral debriefing with the handling agent questioning her on various phases of the report and noting the information gained. Source has never yet been required to prepare a written report and has been given no means of transmitting information to the StB except during the course of personal meetings.

Source: B-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 21 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Transportation-Air) (e)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F
OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
RE-567299/d b2		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>Source, when accompanying his StB handling agent from Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, to East Berlin 33UUU9220, BG, to meet an StB source operating in the GFR, was told at the time of departure that travel would be by commercial aircraft. Upon arrival at the airport and inquiry at the ticket office, it was learned that no space was available on the desired flight. The handling agent made no attempt to use influence to obtain tickets and immediately returned to Prague, proceeded to the railroad station, accompanied by Source and purchased railroad tickets for Berlin. The tickets were purchased for cash and travel was by ordinary train.</p> <p>Source: C-VI (F-6)</p>		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> <p>341</p>		
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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 342-343

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 20 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66th GIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
EE-567299/d		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service StB Re: Modus Operandi (Opinions expressed concerning the course of a future war) (C) (I)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source revealed that the following opinions were expressed by members of the StB (Statni Bezpecnost - Czechoslovakian State Security Service) during the period of his recruitment and training:</p> <p>According to the StB, war at this time would be disadvantageous to the East. The East, of course, has actual superiority in numbers of military forces and would be capable of driving the Western Armies back to the sea in a few days. They also think that the Eastern Armies would be able to occupy all of Europe, since the standing armies of the West, to include the German Army, are not as yet adequately prepared.</p> <p>The disadvantage to the East, presently, is the unreliability of Satellite Armies. These StB agents expressed the view that the existent Czechoslovakian Army is not presently capable of orderly battle because it has not as yet been fully indoctrinated politically.</p> <p>Also, the, as yet, politically unreliable Satellite States would pose a major problem, since they are in a position to disrupt supply lines which are so indispensable to the Eastern Armies during any advance.</p> <p>The advantage to the East, at present, is the aversion of the West to war; the inability of the West to unify the anti-Communist block; and the opposition of the Western civilian populace to preparations for war with the resultant reduction in living standards.</p> <p>The StB maintained that in ten years the political unrest as it exists presently will subside; that the people will be sufficiently re-educated and that the anti-Communist class in Satellite countries will diminish. Additionally, the reliability of their own troops will be enhanced by a rising of the standard of living in the East. Time, they claim, will work for the East, inasmuch as during this time they will not only be able to perfect their combat techniques, but also improve the political consciousness of their citizenry.</p> <p>The StB does not believe there will be a war in the near future.</p> <p>Source: A-VI</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299A

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
StBRe: Modus Operandi (Opinions
expressed by the StB concerning (U)
Western Intelligence Service) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source revealed that the following opinions were expressed by members of the StB (Stati Bespečenosti - Czechoslovakian State Security Police) during the period of his recruitment and training:

Members of the StB rate the various intelligence agencies in the following order:

1. Russian
2. English
3. Japanese
4. French
5. American
6. German

The StB rate themselves between the Japanese and the French.

b1

b1

The criticism of the Germans is that they are too inflexible. They are unable to adapt themselves to independent action and this makes it easy for the StB to detect their agents. German intelligence services concentrate primarily on photography. The StB uses the Germans, above all others, to transmit false data to Western intelligence, which is designed to direct their attention away from important targets.

Members of the intelligence sections of the StB are able to give an excellent estimate of the capabilities of the individual services, since they have lived in these countries for a period of time and consequently are capable of evaluating the mentalities and personalities of these people.

Source: A-VI

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source related the following details of his recruitment by the StB (Statni Bezpecnost - Czechoslovakian State Security Police) while a forced laborer in the

b1

After being sentenced to fifteen years forced labor as an espionage agent, Source was assigned to work in the b1 in spite of the fact that he was a minor. In b1

b1 he was contacted by the camp political worker, (fnu) Novotny, in an attempt to get Source's cooperation as an informer in the camp. Novotny claimed that he would like to make it possible for Source to attend a trade school so that Source would have an opportunity to learn some sort of trade. Source refused at this time and suffered no ill consequences.

Later, during the summer, he was contacted by two members of the Pilsen branch of the StB, b6 and b6 whom Source had met during a previous interrogation. b6 led the conversation. He claimed that the StB had no interest in persecuting Source; that it would like to get him on the road to a better life, since he was still young. A few months later, b6 and his colleague again contacted Source. At this time, Source was promised that his work with the StB would not be of the informant type, but rather that he could be developed with an entirely different purpose in mind, that is, intelligence work that could be accepted as a sort of sport. They promised that Source would not be required to serve his entire sentence in the labor camp and that he would be allowed to attend a trade school as an incentive.

Source: A-VI

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 20 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation-Rail)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F
OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source, while accompanying his StB handling agent from Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, to East Berlin 33UVR6048, BG, to meet an StB Source who operates in the GFR, traveled by normal commercial railway after being unable to obtain reservations for commercial aircraft flight between the two cities. Source, at the completion of the operational meeting with the Source from the GFR, was scheduled to return to Prague by rail unaccompanied. One-way tickets were purchased for cash at normal railway ticket offices.</p> <p>Source: C-VI (F-3)</p>		
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
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 20 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Transportation-Road) (C)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F
EX-567299/d		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>The StB, while meeting Source in East Berlin 33UUH9220, EG, continues to use a vehicle bearing the EG license plates b6 This car, a four-door sedan, green in color, has been identified as an old model "BMW" automobile; however, it is not known if the vehicle in question is of East or West German manufacture since, for a period of time following World War II, the cars were made in both areas of Germany. Source, during the period 10-12 July 1959, was transported around the city of East Berlin in this vehicle, driven at times by her handling agent, and at times by a person known to her as an StB Liaison Officer in East Berlin. Source's paramour, whom she met in East Berlin and who accompanied her during the course of the operational meeting, informed Source of the make of the vehicle.</p> <p>Source: B-VI (F-3)</p>		
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SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, 5th, Re: Organization (Invasion Section of Offensive Intelligence) (c) (U)			

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EXHIBIT TAB

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Ref

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Operational Liaison) (S)

EE-567299/c

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with her StB handling agent in East Berlin 330009220, RG, [b1] Source learned that the CIS Liaison Officer stationed in East Berlin, formerly known to her as [b6] is known under the name [b6] (phonetic). Source gained this information during the course of a dispute with the hotel management concerning the room occupied by her at the Hotel Weitzel, Prenzlauerstrasse 51/52, East Berlin, a room reserved and paid for by [b6]. In addition to other duties, the Liaison Officer appears to have the function of providing operational funds to handling agents meeting sources in East Berlin. [b6] provided funds, in East German Marks, for the expenses which would be encountered during the course of the meeting and also provided a sum of money, later converted to West German Marks by the handling agent, which was paid to Source as reimbursement for travel expenses.

Source: B-VI

(F-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants-Payment) (C)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

KE-567299/d

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Source: B-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications-Use of Mails)
(C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

07567209/A
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b2

The StB continues to communicate with Source in the GFR through the use of ordinary international mails when attempting to arrange operational meetings and seeking confirmation of the arrangements for such meetings. The letters in this case take the form of personal correspondence between two persons well acquainted with each other, but the letters originating in the CSR are written under the control of a member of the CIS. Overt double-meaning text is used as well as predetermined key words with other than their obvious meaning. Recently, for the first time in connection with the operation involving Source, Source was given EEI in such correspondence, the EEI being given in double-meaning overt text in the form of a query concerning an acquaintance. The next letter received by Source cancelled the EEI.

Source: B-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications--Use of the
Mail)(C) (U)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB is continuing to contact informants operating in Germany, giving instructions and EEI through the use of covert messages transmitted through ordinary international postal channels in an apparently innocent letter. Source received letters addressed to him under his own name and at his home address which contained such messages. The letters were mailed in Austria and were signed by a person known to Source. The home of this person, a known StB informant, is an assigned convenience address for the use of Source in transmitting reports to the CIS by mail.

Source: C-VI

Evaluation: P-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications,
use of dead letter drop) (C) (U)

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:		
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was instructed to return to his former neighborhood near [b1] and locate two border-stones on the German side of the Czech-German border where a letter drop can be established. Source was told to select an area in which he can go without arousing the suspicions of the German border guards or inhabitants. After finding a suitable area, Source is to write an ordinary letter to his handling agent, c/o [b6] stating that he was considering buying a piece of property, a certain dimension by another dimension. The numbers (dimensions) would indicate two border-stone numbers. Source is to receive approval of the location prior to its being used in a similar message through ordinary mail.

Source is to wrap the collected intelligence material in cellophane paper for waterproofing, wrap it with ordinary paper and write a note on the outside that the package is to be opened by the handling agent only. Source is then to inform the handling agent, in an innocuous manner, through ordinary mail, three days prior to throwing the package over the CSR-GFR border in the selected area. Source was told the three day notice would give the Czech agent time to notify the border guards to expect delivery and preclude interference with Source's movement by the Czech border guards.

Source: A-WI

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

Evaluation: C-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 July 1959

b2

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Transportation-Road) (C)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Source, when accompanying a CIS agent to Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, for an operational meeting with an informant operating in the GFR, traveled by commercial aircraft from Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. Upon arrival in Berlin, the party was met by a CIS Liaison Officer who provided automotive transportation to a hotel where the party was quartered and subsequently provided necessary transportation for the duration of the meeting. The vehicle used was an old model four door sedan painted a dark green color. The make of the vehicle is unknown, however, it bore a trademark plate with the words "Tempo 3400" on the dash board and the East German license plates: b6 Source claims to have been informed that this vehicle is one of those assigned to the StB Liaison Officer attached to the MfS in Berlin.

Source E-VI

(F-3)

2. During the course of an operational meeting with her CIS handling Agent in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, b1 Source was transported in a vehicle allegedly assigned to the StB Liaison Officer stationed in East Berlin. The vehicle was an old model four door sedan, green in color, which bore the EG license plates: b6 The make of the vehicle is unknown however, it bore the trademark plate "Tempo 3400" on the dash board.

Source D-VI

(F-3)

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 July 1959
b2

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Transportation-Road) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

An StB vehicle normally used in Prague by b6 an agent of the StB involved in operations in the GFR, bears the Czech license plates: b6 A description of the vehicle is not presently available.

Source E-VI

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 2 July 1959 b2 567299/a
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation-Rail) (c) (U)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION Following an operational meeting in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, during the period 23-24 May 1959, on which occasion Source accompanied a member of the StB to meet a CIS informant who operates in the GFR, Source returned to Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, by commercial rail transportation, purchasing his own ticket from funds supplied by the StB agent. The trip from Prague to Berlin had been made by scheduled commercial aircraft. Source E-VI (F-2)		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 July 1959

b2

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

EE-567299/a

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Transportation-Air) (S)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source, accompanying an agent of the CIS, traveled from Prague 3XUVR6048, CSR, to East Berlin 3XUUV9220, EG, claims to have used normal scheduled commercial aircraft for the trip. The trip was made for the purpose of contacting a CIS informant operating in the GFR in order to conduct an operational meeting. The party was met in Berlin by a CIS Liaison Officer and transported by a locally licensed covert vehicle to a Berlin hotel where they were quartered. Following the operational meeting, Source was instructed to return to Prague unaccompanied using rail transportation.

Source E-VI

(F-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

1 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Medus Operandi (Reports-
Types Required of Informants)
(e) (U)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source during the course of an operational meeting in East Berlin 33WFO9220, East Germany on 23 and 24 May 1959, rendered informal, oral reports concerning the EEI previously assigned to her. The StB handling agent took notes in the Czech language on small sheets of plain paper. Source was specifically questioned on each of her EEI following her oral report on each of them; the additional information provided being noted by the handling agent. Source was not required to render any form of written report nor was she subjected to a formal type of debriefing.

SOURCE: D-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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109

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10

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		b2 EX-56729478
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Operational Liaison) (c)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>The StB maintains one or more Liaison Officers in East Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, who are accredited to the EGIS. Source was informed that, among other things, these officers have the responsibility for making necessary arrangements in preparation for operational meetings between CIS sources and handling agents, furnishing transportation for such meetings, providing hotel and other necessary accommodations, substituting for regular handling agents if a source arrives unexpectedly, conducting emergency source meetings and conducting general liaison with EG agencies. One of the present Liaison Officers was referred to in the presence of Source as b6 The principal handling agent of Source, b6 a member of the StB stationed in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, alleged to Source that he had been stationed in East Berlin in a Liaison capacity during the period about 1955 to 1957.</p> <p>Source D-VI (P-3)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Medus Operandi (Operational liaison)(G) (U)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F
EE-567299/e	b2	OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source when fleeing from Germany in March of 1956 following his apprehension at the EG/GFR border while returning to Germany from East Berlin with false documentation, returned to East Berlin using commercial transportation. Upon his arrival in East Berlin, he reported to the Headquarters of the MfS on Friedrichstrasse and was detained there for a short period pending the arrival of an StB liaison officer accredited to the MfS who was stationed in Berlin. Although Source was detained at the MfS Headquarters for a period of about three days prior to his return to the CSR, he was placed under the control and jurisdiction of the StB liaison officer. This liaison officer conducted a series of interrogations and debriefings of Source and then after receiving orders from Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, provided Source with an escort to accompany him to Prague.</p>		
SOURCE: E-VI		Evaluation: F-6
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USARETH, APO 696, US Forces

b2

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants+Payment) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

Source D-VI

(P-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings) (C) (U)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
EE-567299/d	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>Source during the course of her contacts with the StB continues to travel from the GFR to West Berlin 33UUU9220, Germany, through East Germany legally, using her normal West German documentation. After her arrival in Berlin, she makes use of public transportation and enters the East sector of the city without East German documentation and remains in the East sector of the city for the duration of the operational meeting--housing being arranged for her by the CIS. Her entries and departures to and from the East sector of the city have been made without any difficulty and Source has not as yet been subjected to a document check.</p> <p>SOURCE: D-6 Evaluation: F-3</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOLPA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Carrying Arms during Source-Contacts) (C) (U) EE-567299/d b2	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION Although b6 the principal handling agent of Source, was known to have been armed during previous contacts in East Berlin 33UUU9220, East Germany, on the occasion of an operational meeting during the period 23-24 May 1959, he had no weapon on his person and carried no briefcase or container which could have concealed weapon while in contact with Source. Source: D-6 Evaluation: F-2		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT Std, Re: Modus Operandi (Commu- nications--Use of Mails)(C) (U)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPOSSIBLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
EE-567299/4	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The GIB continues to communicate with sources in the GPR through the use of ordinary international mails when attempting to arrange operational meetings and seeking confirmation of the arrangements for such meetings. The letters in this case take the form of personal correspondence between two persons well acquainted with each other, but the letters originating in the CSR are written under the control of a member of the GIB. Overl double-meaning text is used as well as predetermined key words with other than their obvious meanings.</p> <p>SOURCE: B-VI</p> <p>Evaluation: F-2</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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97

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 July 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Medusa Operandi (Informants--Briefing Methods) (c) (U)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E DISPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
EX-567299/d	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source when being briefed by her StB handling agent during the course of an operational meeting on 23-24 May 1959, was given verbal instructions concerning her new KRI in an informal manner. The handling agent had in his possession a sheet of legal-size onion skin paper on which the KRI and what appeared to be notes for the handling agent were typed. The typed material was in the Czech language. The handling agent, as he covered each of the points, checked off the item in ink. According to source, the handling agent did not appear to be fully familiar with the contents of the typed sheet and referred to it constantly while conducting the briefing. Source had the impression that the material contained in the briefing originated with some person or office other than the actual handling agent.</p>		
SOURCE: D-VI		Evaluation: F-3
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOIPA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Carrying Arms during
Source Contacts) (c) (U)
KS-567299/d b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Although b6 the principal handling agent of Source, was known to have been armed during previous contacts in East Berlin 33UUU9220, East Germany, on the occasion of an operational meeting during the period 23-24 May 1959, he had no weapon on his person and carried no briefcase or container which could have concealed weapon while in contact with Source.

Source: D-6

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 July 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Administration (U)
(Identification Documents) (e)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

ER567299/b

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB handling agent of Source has been provided with a Czech passport of the type issued to state employees traveling on official business in the interests of the state. This type of passport known as a "Special Passport" does not entitle the bearer to any special privileges or immunities, but does identify him as being on official business for the CSR government and is of the type usually issued to personnel employed by trade missions and purchasing delegations.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
21 June 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Medus Operandi (C) (U)
(Informants-Payment)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: (F-2)

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94

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 11 June 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (S) (U) (Communications-Use of Dead Letter Drops (Mobile)) EE-567299/a b2	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The StB continues to utilize a specially-made container with a built-in permanent type magnet device concealed aboard a regularly scheduled railroad train to transmit instructions, EEI, payment, and reports to and from an informant operating in Germany. The container is concealed in a specific place aboard the Czech car of the "Paris-Prague Express" on specific dates. There is an assigned date followed by two (consecutive) alternate dates. Although in the past, Source has had difficulty locating the container, recently the StB has given a more detailed description of the location of the container and Source has found it without difficulty.</p> <p>SOURCE: B-VI Evaluation: (P-2)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 1 June 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/a

SUBJECT
Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (c) (U) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (c)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 June 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Border Crossings - Illegal)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to require Source to illegally cross the GFR/CSR border to attend operational meetings with his handling agents. A date, time and place for the entry into the CSR is specified in advance through correspondence with an acknowledgment being sent by telegram from Source to a designated cover address in the CSR. Alternate dates are sometimes provided. After entering the CSR, Source is met by his handling agents who are clothed in the uniforms of Czech Border Guards and is then escorted through the border area fences to the headquarters of a Border Guard unit from where he is then taken by car to an operational house. During the return trip, Source is escorted to the GFR/CSR border by his handling agents, who either personally make a check for the presence of German patrols or cause such a check to be made by actual members of the Czech Border Guard. Source continues to cross the GFR/CSR border at coordinates 33UUR13141564, Germany, at about 1200 hours of the specified date.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: (C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 June 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Medus Operandi (U) (Transportation--Road) 567299/a b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION During the course of a recent operational meeting with his CIS handling agent, Source was transported from the Headquarters of a Czech Border Guard unit to an operational house in a Skoda automobile which was of an old but undetermined model and was light-blue in color. The license number of this vehicle was b6. The license plates being described as having black numerals on a white background. This vehicle was used by the members of the CIS who escorted Source to and from the operational house. SOURCE: B-VI Evaluation: (C-3)		
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37

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 June 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)
(Interrogations)

EE567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of a recent operational meeting, the debriefing of Source by his CIS handling agents took the form of a semi-formal interrogation in which his replies to questions were typed in statement form in four copies during the course of questioning. The debriefing was done in phases with separate statements being typed for each topic of discussion. The statements were sometimes typed by the interrogator personally and sometimes typed by another agent who assisted the interrogator. In the latter case, the actual interrogator formulated the text of the material to be typed and dictated it to the person typing it. These statements were prepared in the Czech language.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: (C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 May 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Operational Liaison)(C) (U)

EE-567299/4

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to enjoy apparently good relations with members of the CSR Border Guard units, effecting illegal border crossings of informants between the GFR and CSR with the cooperation of such units. For a recent operational meeting between Source and his StB Handling Agents, Source was again required to enter and leave the CSR illegally. On this occasion, all normal Czech Border Guard patrols were withdrawn from the immediate area of the selected border crossing point and two members of the StB, clothed in borrowed Border Guard uniforms, entered the area between the border fence and the actual GFR/CSR border to meet Source and escort him through the fence. On the return trip, the same StB members, again wearing borrowed uniforms and accompanied by the Commanding Officer of the local Border Guard company, escorted Source through the fence and, after ascertaining that no German border or customs officials were in the immediate area, guided him to the actual border.

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: (C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 14 May 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Medus Operandi (Communications - Use of the Mail) (U) EE-567299/d b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION The StB continues to use ordinary mail for communications to and from informants operating in Germany which transmit KEI and reports, but also use such communications to inform the StB of safe arrival after effecting illegal border crossings. Source, after his return to Germany from a recent operational meeting in the CSR, used a postcard addressed to a predesignated cover address in Prague 33UYR6048, CSR with the simple text: "Greetings from Nurnberg. Ervin.", to indicate that he had crossed the border without difficulty. Source also received modified instructions on the transmission of reports in secret writing by mail in that, in the future, he is to write his covert reports in either "Hobby" or "Das Beste" magazine which will then be sent to a cover address. SOURCE: B-VI Evaluation: (C-2)		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 May 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Medus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Payment) (G)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

EE-567299/a

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: B-VI

EVALUATION: (C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 May 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APC 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communica-
tions - Use of Telegraph)(U)(C)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Sources of the StB operating in Germany continue to use ordinary international telegrams addressed to predesignated cover addresses in the CSR to indicate their ability or inability to attend scheduled operational meetings with the StB. Source, in indicating his concurrence with a proposed meeting date, sent a telegram to his cover address with the "Auntie will arrive on the 24th. b6
an indication that he would attend the planned meeting b1

b1

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: (C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 May 1959

PREPARING OFFICE
Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EX-567298/d

SUBJECT
CSR Intelligence Service-(c) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-2)

2. On 2 May 1959, in Innsbruck, Austria, Source received a new accommodation address to which he will be able to send mail. Source is to write to the following:

b6

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 May 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

CSR Intelligence Service (S) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-2)

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1 - CE Rgn IV

1 - ICO Rgn IV

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 10 May 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications--Use of the Mails)(c) (U) KE-567299/3 b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The StB is continuing to contact informants operating in Germany, giving instructions and EEI through the use of covert messages transmitted through ordinary international postal channels in an apparently innocent letter. Source received a letter, addressed to him under his own name and at his home address which contained such a message. The letter was mailed in the CSR and bore the return address of a person known to Source, this person being a known StB informant and a designated cover address for the use of Source in transmitting reports to the OIS by mail.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI Evaluation: (F-2)</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>Best Copy Available</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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REF 367299/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

22 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

RE: Modus Operandi

(Informants-Recruiting) (U)

(C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (presumably the StB), has made a number of attempts to recruit Source on their behalf using the following methods:

b1

b. Initial Recruitment Approach: The initial approach to Source was made in Vienna (nca), Austria by his father-in-law on the occasion of their first meeting. The father-in-law had been dispatched to make the approach after preliminary correspondence had indicated that the father-in-law was traveling to Austria and would like to become acquainted with Source and would like to discuss Source's marital problems with him.

c. Follow-up to Initial Approach: At the time of the initial approach, Source has requested a period of time in which to consider the matter. Following this, there was an exchange of correspondence for a period of about three months during which Source was pressed for a reply. During this period, Source wrote a letter which, it was later learned, left considerable doubt in the mind of Czech authorities as to its actual meaning.

d. Second Approach: During February 1958, an informant was dispatched to Germany from the CSR to contact Source and finalize his recruitment and, at the same time, to recruit the wife of Source as a courier. This informant was apprehended and later sentenced to a term of imprisonment in Germany, following which he returned to the CSR.

e. Third Approach: During April 1959, Source received a letter from the CIS which was an open approach to him to work on behalf of the CIS and recalled his alleged earlier agreement to work for the CIS, made to the informant who conducted the second approach to Source. The letter indicated that the CIS was still interested in Source and expressed the thought that his action in "sacrificing" the apprehended informant had been understandable and necessary. Source was given instructions in secret writing and a means of verifying the identity of any future contact. Source, to date, has made no reply to the renewed approach.

f. Incentives Offered: A number of incentives were offered and an attempt was

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SUBJECT: StB Re: Modus Operandi (Informants-Recruiting)^(U)~~(S)~~

made to exploit unfavorable incidents in the past of the Source as well as to indirectly threaten the mother of Source who still resides in the CSR. The rewards offered to Source included monetary and material gain, promises of support and medical treatment for his mother, Czech citizenship and a permanent home and suitable job in the CSR if Source and his wife should decide to return to that country. Threats were made that the CIS would make public, if Source refused to cooperate, unfavorable incidents in his life which would cause him to lose his position and means of support. In addition, it was intimated that should Source refuse to cooperate, necessary medical treatment would not be provided for his mother. Source's wife was told, both personally by her father and in a letter from her father, that should Source not agree to work for the CIS, "things would be difficult" for all concerned in the CSR.

g. Oaths Signed: An attempt was made to have Source reduce his agreement to cooperate with the CIS to writing for transmittal to the CIS; however, Source successfully deferred writing such a statement until after the apprehension of the informant who had demanded the statement.

SOURCE: A-VI

(B-2)

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REF ID: A67299/1 (CONFIDENTIAL)		SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 22 April 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces				
SUBJECT StB Re: Modus Operandi (U) (Informants-Contacting) (e)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION Source was provided, by mail, with a cut-out portion of a letter written by himself, to prove the authenticity of a letter making a recruitment approach to him and to provide a means of identifying, at some future but unspecified date, any person contacting him on behalf of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service. The contact sent to Source is to be provided with the matching remaining portion of the cut-out. SOURCE: A-VI (B-2)				
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EE-567299/8
(DE 348649)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

22 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi

(Communications-Use of the Mails)
(UNCL)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source received a renewed recruitment approach, by mail, through the use of a letter dispatched from the CSR by registered special delivery letter to an accommodation address used by Source when communicating with relatives in the CSR. The letter contained a renewed overt approach to Source to induce his agreement to work on behalf of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service and held instructions for the preparation of a covert reply to the offer as well as a cut-out portion of a letter written by Source to provide a means of identification in the event of a future personal contact. Source was instructed to reply by means of a covert message contained in an ordinary personal letter to be sent to a predesignated address in the CSR with the presence of a covert message being indicated by the use of a wavy line under the name of the city and the house number of the addressee.

SOURCE: A-VI

(B-2)

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567299/a
(DE 242502)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

RE: Modus Operandi

(Communications-Letter Drops-
Alive) (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was instructed to the effect that, when corresponding with the CIS
(Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service), b1

b1 underlining the name
of the city and the address if the letter contained a message in secret writing.
From the tone of the instructions to Source, a letter so marked will reach the CIS,
however it is not known if the letter will be intercepted prior to delivery to the
addressee or turned over to the CIS by the addressee.

SOURCE: A-VI

(B-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (C) (CIS) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following description of an automobile used by Source's Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) handling agent, b6 and another CIS member known as b6 was provided by Source, who accompanied b6 and b6 in the vehicle on a trip to a forested area located about 12 kilometers north in Innsbruck 32TPT83, Austria, b1

Maker: Opel Rekord

Year: 1956

Color: Green

Type: Sedan

License Number: Austrian License Number b6

Remarks: Attached to rear license plate was metal tag bearing the initials "C C" (Consular Corps).

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 16 Apr 11 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of
Telegraph) (C) (U)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was instructed to send a telegram to his CIS handling agents, in care of a previously designated cover address in the CSH, indicating his agreement or disagreement to a proposed operational meeting. The text of the telegram is to be apparently innocent in nature, simply announcing the expected arrival of a fictitious person for a visit and is to be signed with any name of Source's choice.

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: C-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 15 April 1959														
PREPARING OFFICE HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces																
EE-567299/d																
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION															
StB (Statni Bespecnost - Czechoslovakian State Security Service) Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment) (G)	<table border="1"><thead><tr><th>OF SOURCE:</th><th>OF INFORMATION:</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td><td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td></tr><tr><td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td><td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td></tr><tr><td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td><td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td></tr><tr><td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td><td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td></tr><tr><td>UNRELIABLE E</td><td>IMPROBABLE 5</td></tr><tr><td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td><td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td></tr></tbody></table>		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6															
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																
<p>The following information pertains to the modus operandi used by the StB (Statni Bespecnost - Czechoslovakian State Security Service) in Karlovy Vary 330UR-4567, CSR, in recruiting informants.</p> <p>Early in 1956, a man received a summons to appear at the office of the StB on Rooseveltova, number unknown, Karlovy Vary. He was taken into a room on the ground floor and interrogated by two officials of the StB, b6 and b6. The two StB men proceeded to interrogate the man concerning a former acquaintance of the man. At the conclusion of the interview, b6 stated that the man could be helpful to the StB. Upon the enquiry as to how, b6 stated that they would talk about it later and made an appointment with the man to meet him several days later at the Russian church in Karlovy Vary. The man assumed that some attempt might be made to recruit him as an informant and did not keep the appointment.</p> <p>In July 1956, b6 left a letter at the man's home in which he asked the man to meet him at the Karlovy Vary post office or to call him at telephone number 5326, extension 235. He reminded the man about the earlier interview and indicated that he wanted to talk about it. He also referred to the earlier appointment, which the man had not kept, and stated that he did not wish to contact the man at his place of employment and had chosen this method of contact. b6 indicated that it would be important for the man to comply with this requested meeting as it would be helpful in the man's desire to rejoin his family. The man had applied for legal repatriation to West Germany shortly after his release from prison, and this fact was known to the StB.</p> <p>The man met b6 as instructed. b6 said the man could be of assistance and that it would not be dangerous. b6 then gave the man a mission to accomplish. The man accomplished the mission and returned to Karlovy Vary, called b6 and was given an appointment for a meeting. b6 appeared at the meeting with another man from the StB, whom he introduced as b6. The man related the results of his mission to Hosa. No further appointment with the man was made by the StB at this time.</p> <p>Early in 1957, the man's home was visited by b6 who left a letter stating the time and place for a meeting with the StB. The man kept this appointment and was given another mission by the StB. The man was given approximately seven (7) missions by the StB during the period of July 1956 to December 1958. The man is of the opinion that these were a series of tests given to him by the StB in order for them to test his loyalty before permitting him to leave the CSR, and to set him up for a recruitment approach in the GFR. The man also believes that he will be contacted in the GFR by someone who will appear in Ludwigstadt 32UPA6995, GFR, while allegedly on a trip to visit their relatives in the GFR.</p>																
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
StB (Statni Bezpecnost -
Czechoslovakian State Security Service)
Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment) (G) (U)
KE-567299/d

15 April 1959

The StB at no time offered the man any payment for work performed, nor was he required to sign any form of commitment. The man stated that he carried out the requests of the StB in order not to jeopardize his chances of legal repatriation. Since none of his assignments proved to be dangerous to any individual, he did not feel that he was selfishly endangering innocent persons or persons on the side of the West.

Source: A-VI

(P-6)



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314 In cl # 2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
15 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

KE-567299/d

SUBJECT

StB (Statni Bezpecnost -
Czechoslovakian State Security Service)
Re: Modus Operandi (Test Missions) - (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following information pertains to test missions given an informant by the StB (Czechoslovakian State Security Service) in Karlovy Vary 33UUR4867, CSR:

The informant met [b6] a member of the StB, on an appointed day, and they walked to a park where they sat on a bench. [b6] instructed the informant to visit [b6] in Dalovice 33UUR5068, CSR, and introduce himself with the name [b6] [b6] Wendeck (nca), CSR, presently residing in Munich 32UPU9135, GFR. The informant, [b6] was to tell [b6] that he was visiting in CSR and that Herr [b6] a former teacher from Dalovice, had asked him to visit [b6]. The informant was to say that [b6] requested [b6] to send information for the Heimatsbrief (Homeland Letter), which appears in the GFR, and, if possible, to also send photos. [b6] was to send the information "as before".

The informant traveled to Dalovice and followed the instructions given him by [b6]. The informant returned to Karlovy Vary and called [b6] who made an appointment for a meeting. [b6] appeared at the meeting with another StB man, whom he introduced as [b6]. The informant then told [b6] the results of the visit to [b6]. The StB made no further appointment with the informant at this time.

Early in 1957, [b6] and [b6] made an appointment for another meeting with the informant. At this time they instructed the informant to visit a [b6] from [b6]. The informant was to find out why [b6] wanted to go to the GFR. The informant reported the results of this visit to [b6] and [b6]. He was then instructed to contact a Frau [b6] sister-in-law, and to see why she thought that [b6] would not return to the CSR once he got over the border into the GFR. The informant followed these instructions and reported the information attained to [b6] and [b6]. The informant was given no further mission by the StB at this time.

In 1957, the informant's daughter was visited by a man who introduced himself as an official of the German Red Cross and wanted to talk to the informant. The informant was not at home at the time. Several weeks later, an innkeeper from Pernink 33UUR9282, CSR, visited the informant and requested assistance from him in applying for repatriation to GFR. The informant sent the man to a [b6] German national. The man returned to the informant and said that he did not trust [b6] and again asked the informant to help him. The informant refused to do so and later checked with [b6] concerning the man's visit. The informant concluded that the entire affair was a deliberate StB provocation and decided to report it to them to keep himself in the clear. He called [b6] and made an appointment, which was kept by [b6]. The informant was required to write out the story and sign a statement. Following

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StB (Statni Bezpecnost -
Czechoslovakian State Security Service)
Re: Modus Operandi (Test Missions) (C) (U)
EE-567299/d

15 April 1959

this there was no further contact with the StB for some time.

Sometime in 1957, the StB requested that the informant write to the German Red Cross in the GFR and request from them the addresses of several old acquaintances of his who were now in the GFR. These acquaintances were a Doctor b6 b6 and b6. The informant wrote the letter as requested. The StB instructed the informant that if he had not heard from the Red Cross within a month, he was to write to his sister, who lives in b6 telling her to write to the German Suchdienst (Locator Service) to determine the addresses and to pass them on to him. He was further instructed not to mail the letter from the CSR, but to carry it to b6 to a b6 an employee of the Czech State Railroad. He was told, upon meeting b6 to refer to b6 friend, Engineer b6 Firm Zemelski, Karlovy Vary. The informant followed these instructions and heard nothing further about the affair.

In July 1958, the informant was visited by b6 who showed the informant a photo of a man and asked if the informant knew him. The informant accompanied b6 to a car in which b6 was sitting. The informant was told that the man in the photo was a Western espionage agent and the informant was then instructed to contact this man and see if an attempt at recruitment for the West would be made. The informant made contact and was approached by the man for espionage material. He later met b6 and b6 and reported everything which had occurred. He was convinced that the man was a provocation agent and that a test was being made by the StB. b6 promised Spielmaterial (play material) for transmission to the man. b6 actually gave the informant material, which the informant delivered to the alleged agent.

Shortly before Christmas 1958, the informant was visited by a man who introduced himself as a West German businessman. The informant's daughter informed him that this was the same man who had earlier claimed to be from the German Red Cross. This man told the informant that he was from an intelligence service of the Federal Republic and asked the informant to assist him in procuring espionage material from the CSR. The informant felt that he was again being subjected to deliberate StB provocation. The alleged approach was reported b6 who again prepared Spielmaterial. The informant turned this material over to the man.

In December 1958, the informant received an assignment from the StB to make contact with a man and become friends with him. Through establishing friendship with this man, the informant was to find out if the man would attempt to recruit the informant to carry intelligence material out of the CSR when the informant was repatriated to the GFR. The informant met this man and reported the substance of their conversation to b6. The informant saw this man shortly before being repatriated in February 1959, when the latter helped the informant clear with the city authorities.

Also in December 1958, the informant was instructed to contact a man in Karlovy Vary and to find out if this man had any treasonous contacts with relatives

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StB (Statni Bespehoost -
Czechoslovakian State Security Service)
Re: ~~Mosius~~ Operandi (Test Missions) (C) (U)
EE-567299/d

15 April 1959

in the GFR. The informant did this successfully and reported to b6

The missions in December 1958 were the last assignments given to the informant by the StB. The informant now thinks that the series of tests by the StB served a dual purpose: first, to enable them to test the informant's loyalty prior to letting him out of the CSR, and, second, to set him up for a recruitment approach in GFR.

The StB at no time offered the informant any payment for work performed, nor was he required to sign any form of commitment. The informant stated that he carried out the requests of the StB in order not to jeopardize his chances of legal repatriation. Since none of the assignments proved to be dangerous to any individual, he did not feel that he was selfishly endangering innocent persons or persons on the side of the West.

Source: A-VI

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

(S) (U)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to use ordinary mails for the transmission of EEI and other instructions to informants operating in Germany. Source received an apparently innocent letter addressed to him at his home which had been mailed from Vienna (nca), Austria. The letter itself was of no apparent intelligence significance; however, a covert message in secret writing was found on the inner surface of the front flap of the envelope. The covert message, when developed, contained additional EEI assignments for Source.

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: C-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Contacting) (e)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source, after recruitment by the StB, was instructed to the effect that future contacts, at which she would render reports and be given instructions, would be personal meetings in either Berlin 33UUU9220, EG or in the CSR. No arrangements were made for any other type of contact except for the mail communication necessary to arrange the personal meeting. Since the cooperation of Source is based on the premise that she will be permitted to visit her paramour whenever she wishes provided she brings the required information, no other arrangements were deemed necessary.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

(U)(c)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The only provision made for communication between Source and the StB, other than personal contact, is through ordinary mail communication between Source and her paramour residing in the CSR, the intelligence significance of any such communication to be limited to an indication that a personal meeting is desired and to making arrangements for such a meeting. Source regularly exchanges correspondence with her paramour and the simple insertion of a sentence indicating that she is to spend a given weekend in Berlin 33UUU9220, Germany will be sufficient indication that she desires to meet in East Berlin on the date indicated. She may also indicate her desire to take part in a tour group visiting the CSR or may apply for an individual visa for a trip to the CSR, indicating her desire as a portion of her normal letter to her paramour.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 5 April 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings) (e) (U) <u>EE-567299/d</u> b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source, during the course of her contacts with the StB, has crossed borders on at least six occasions. These border crossings were both legal and illegal, depending upon the circumstances.</p> <p>a. <u>Legal</u>: On the occasion of three trips to the CSR and three trips to Berlin 33UUU9220, Germany, Source used legal travel documentation and her own passport for the trips. On two of the trips to the CSR she traveled on an individual visa applied for and obtained through normal channels. For the third trip Source traveled as a part of a tour group sponsored by a German Travel Agency and obtained her visa through that organization. For her trips to Berlin, Source traveled on her own German documentation, passing through EG as a German citizen destined for West Berlin.</p> <p>b. <u>Illegal</u>: On the occasions of her visits to East Berlin, Source traveled legally to West Berlin on her normal West German documentation, passing through EG without difficulty. After arrival in West Berlin, Source illegally entered the East Sector of the city using public transportation for the purpose. Source entered and departed from the East Sector illegally without difficulty.</p> <p>SOURCE: B-VI Evaluation: P-2</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting) (C)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following procedure has been used by the StB in the recruitment of an informant for operations in Germany:

b1

b. Approaches: The initial introductions to the CIS representatives were made by Source's paramour, with first indications of their desires being indirect. All contacts were made in pleasant surroundings, that is, cafes, hotels or private housing. All contacts were informal in nature with no display of force or threat, and most conversations being on a friendly basis.

c. Motives Exploited: The appeals to Source were based primarily upon her personal relationship to her paramour and her desire to be with him and to eventually marry him, a desire which he allegedly shares but which is allegedly not known to the CIS. Secondary motives exploited were appeals to Source's patriotism and the alleged desire of the CSR for lasting peace in Europe which necessitated active work against the US and US Forces in Europe to hasten the removal of US influence on European affairs.

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5 April 1959

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting) (C)

EE-567299/d

b2

d. Incentives Offered: Source was offered the opportunity of meeting with her paramour at any time she wished in either the CSR or Berlin but was given no other offer of reward or repayment of expenses except eventual asylum in the CSR should she be endangered in Germany.

e. Oaths Signed: No request for any formal oath was made and nothing was asked in this connection other than that Source give her verbal promise to cooperate.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

5 April 1959

5 April 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Reports Required of Informants)

(C) (U)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of several contacts with representatives of the StB which have led to her recruitment, Source has not been required or asked to prepare any type of formal report. All information supplied to date, which has apparently been of no importance or is virtually meaningless, has been supplied during the course of informal oral debriefing with the agents involved making no written notes during the course of the conversations.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 March 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Payment) (c)

RE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 March 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Payment)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

EE-567299/s

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A communication from the StB to an informant operating in Germany transmitting a payment to him indicated that future payments to him would be based upon the amount and quality of the information furnished by him.

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 March 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)
(Communications - Use of Dead
Letter Drops (Mobile))

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Comments contained in a set of instructions delivered to a source in Germany by means of a container concealed aboard a railroad train, referring to the failure of Source to find the container on a previous occasion, revealed that the container previously sent by this means had made a total of three trips from the CSR into Germany and back to the CSR before being recovered by the StB. The container was allegedly concealed aboard the railroad car for 19 days and was undisturbed when found, leading to the conclusion that this method of communication could be considered a safe and secure system.

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 29 March 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U) (Communications - Use of Dead Letter Drops (Mobile)) <u>EE-567299/d</u> b2		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The StB continues to utilize a specially-made container with a built-in permanent type magnet concealed aboard a regularly scheduled railroad train to transmit instructions, EEI, reports and payments to and from an informant operating in Germany. The container is concealed in a specified place aboard the Czech car of the "Paris-Prague Express" on specified dates. Due to the failure of the source to find the container on the occasion of the last previous delivery, Source was notified by a letter mailed through ordinary international mail channels that the container could be expected on the first of the scheduled dates. The container was found on this occasion in the expected place.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI Evaluation: F-2</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>Best Copy Available</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 29 March 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Medus Operandi (U) (Communications - Use of Mails)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
EE-567299/a	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>The StB continues to notify sources operating in Germany of arrival of material for their use in dead letter drops through the use of ordinary international mails. A source received a letter addressed to him at his home address which told him in effect that further instructions and payment would arrive at a predetermined location on a specified date. The letter, although prepared by the StB and written in the Czech language, was mailed in Austria; however, the date and place of mailing are not known since the postmark was not legible. No return address appeared on the communication.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI</p> <p>Evaluation: F-2</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>Best Copy Available</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
22 Feb 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Dead
Letter Drops (Mobile)) (c) (U)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB has provided Source with a special container for use in transmitting documents, reports or other items to the StB, and, according to plan, instructions and money to Source. The container is a metal box 2" x 2" x 1/2" in size. The lid of the container was constructed of a light weight brass, while the body of the container was made of a white metal, probably aluminum. Built into the main part of the container was a permanent type magnet about 1-7/8" x 5/8" x 1/2" in size. The interior of the cover had a light weight strip of metal which is attracted by magnetism built into it to secure the cover in place during transmission. The inner surfaces of both the lid and the body of the container were painted blue. The sides and top of the outside surfaces were painted black, while the bottom (outside) of the container was painted brown. The significance of the color combination, if any, is unknown. The container was sent to Source by means of a dead letter drop located at a kilometer stone on a German Federal Highway in the vicinity of Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. The container was returned to the CIS, with a report of intelligence investigations, by being concealed aboard the Czech car of a railroad train bound from Nurnberg to Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. In concealing the container, it is placed in a specified position aboard the car, in this case under the cover of the aisle radiator, and is held in place by the built-in magnet. Photographs of the container are attached as EXHIBITS IV, V, VI, VII & VIII.

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12 January 2010
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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		18 DATE 17 February 1959
PREPARING OFFICE Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (c) (CIS) (U) Re: Modus Operandi		
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 100px; margin: 100px 0;">b1</div>		
SOURCE: A-IV (C-3)		
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		
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54

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☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 410-411

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

3 February 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Medus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

EE-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to use ordinary international mails to notify Source as to when and where he is to service dead letter drops. On 29 January 1959 Source received a letter bearing the return address of an assigned cover address in Prague 338VR6848, CSR, which had been written in the familiar form of the German language and which had been postmarked in Prague on 15 January 1959. A reference to the number "91" in the body of the letter was an indication to Source that he was to service a dead letter drop at kilometer stone 91 on a pre-designated highway.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

The use of postcards simply transmitting greetings to an assigned cover address as acknowledgment of the receipt of covert communications continues. On 30 January 1959 Source dispatched such a postcard to indicate the receipt of materials received by him in a dead letter drop.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
2 February 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Dead
Letter Drops)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB continues to use dead letter drops located at kilometer stones on numbered highways for the transmittal of information to sources operating in Germany. On 29 January 1959 Source received a letter advising him to service a dead letter drop at kilometer stone 91 on German Federal Highway No. 8, between Nurnberg 32UPV5178 and Regensburg 33UTQ8733, Germany. Source found a container buried to a depth of about 4", approximately 3" behind the right rear corner of the kilometer stone when facing it from the highway.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 30 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Dead
Letter Drops) - (C) (U)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

In accordance with instructions given him by his CIS Handling Agents, Source has established several dead letter drops in the city of Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. Two of the dead letter drops which have been established and tested for a period of time are located in the St. Lorenz Kirche. The dead letter drops take the form of a container taped under specified sets of pews within the church. A sketch with the exact locations of the drops established by Source is attached as

EXHIBIT Y.

SOURCE: C-VI

Evaluation: C-2

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EXHIBIT NO. V	66TH CIC GROUP Region VI	FILE NO. EE-567299/d	DATE 2 Feb 59
SUBJECT: StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Use of Dead Letter Drops)			
Drawing of St Lorenz Kirche			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX </div>			
WB FORM 264 (L) 20 Nov 56			EXHIBIT TAB

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
297

415

89 IV

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DIAGRAM OF THE INTERIOR OF THE "ST LAURENCE" CHURCH,
MURNBERG 32UPV5178, GERMANY, SHOWING LOCATION
OF TEST LETTER DROPS ESTABLISHED BY SUBJ



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298

83-14

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☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 417

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

18

DATE

22 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (C) (U)

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

2. On 17 January 1959, in Innsbruck, Austria, Source received the below-listed address from his CIS handling agent to be used by Source to dispatch a postcard about fourteen (14) days prior to a scheduled meeting. The postcard would inform the CIS whether or not Source would be able to attend a scheduled meeting:

b6

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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29 April 4

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the assignment of EEI by his StB Handling Agents on

b1

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Informants - Recruiting) (C)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source was initially recruited by the CIS, presumably StB, during June 1958 while he was in prison in Pilsen 33UUR8412, CSR. Source was interrogated by two men who announced themselves as representatives of the CSR Ministry of the Interior, who had come to talk to Source and review his case and his application to remain in the CSR. Source was required to complete a personal history statement, after which he was asked if he would work with the CSR government in recruiting legal travelers from Germany while these travelers were visiting the CSR. Source agreed and was required to sign a statement to this effect. During November 1958 he was again approached by two men who stated that they were representatives of the CSR Ministry of the Interior, and who again asked him if he would work for CIS.

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

Evaluation: F-6

Re: b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
15 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

EE-567299/a

File

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The CIS utilized ordinary mails in sending Source an apparently innocent letter which directed him to service a dead letter drop in the vicinity of Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. The letter by pre-arrangement was written in the German language, bore the return address of a person who acted as an intermediary between Source and the CIS, as well as the true name and correct address of Source, and contained in the apparently innocent text a number which designated the kilometer stone at which the dead letter drop would be located.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

2. The CIS made use of an ordinary scenic postal card bearing holiday greetings and addressed to Source to indicate receipt of a message in secret writing.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
15 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

BtB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Dead
Letter Drops)

KE-567299/a

Full

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

A small plastic medicinal container was found buried at a depth of about 3", about 6" behind the right rear corner of the kilometer stone when facing it from the road. The container was wrapped in a form of scotch tape for waterproofing and was found to contain a small package also wrapped in scotch tape, which, when opened, revealed a sheet of paper bearing instructions and sketches for the utilization of a mobile dead letter drop to be located in the Czech car of the Paris-Prague Express. The instructions and sketches explained in detail the exact points at which the container would be located aboard the railroad coach, and set forth a schedule of dates for transmission by both Source and the CIS.

SOURCE: B-VI

Evaluation: F-2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

CIS, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants)

EE-567298/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following method was used in an attempted recruitment on behalf of the CIS:

b1

b. Preliminary Approach: In November 1956, Source received a letter from a stepsister of whose existence she had not, until that time, been aware. This and succeeding letters expressed great happiness at having found a "long lost sister" and offered help and a home should Source ever decide to return to the CSR. During the course of the correspondence, the offers of assistance gradually changed to virtual demands that Source return to the CSR, or, at least, send her illegitimate child to the CSR where she could be "properly" reared. In either the fall of 1957 or the spring of 1958, Source was informed by her stepsister by mail that she would soon receive a letter from a "man from Prague," with whose wishes Source should comply.

c. Approach: Shortly after the letter mentioning the "man from Prague," Source received a letter in the Czech language mailed in Germany and bearing the return address: "Hermann, Tirschenreuth - Bauernstrasse." This letter made reference to the stepsister's correspondence and requested that Source come to the German/CSR border on specified days for a personal meeting. Fifty German Marks were enclosed as prepayment of expenses involved. Source did not respond to this letter, simply keeping the money for her own use. Some time later, Source received letters from both her stepsister and the writer of the original approach letter attempting to establish another meeting. Source again failed to respond, following which no further attempts have been made.

d. Payment: The first approach letter contained fifty WDM as an advance payment to cover travel expenses to the meeting. The second approach letter offered payment to Source in the form of monthly remittances to be made through the facilities of the "Red Cross" organization.

SOURCE: J-VI

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 January 1959

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

CIS, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

EE-567298/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period from November 1956 to the spring of 1958, an unidentified Czechoslovakian Intelligence Agency used the ordinary mails in establishing contact with Source and laying the groundwork for a recruitment approach. The initial correspondence was written by a step-sister, who, until that time, had been unknown to Source. After a period of correspondence, using ordinary international mails, Source was informed that she would be receiving a letter from someone else and she was asked to comply with the wishes expressed by that person. Source then received two letters, in the Czech language, mailed within Germany, which requested Source to attend a meeting at the German/CSR border. Source did not respond to the invitation but kept the expense money provided for her personal use.

SOURCE: D-VI

(F-3)

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(No. _____) (Red Un-
less _____ (red))

(SA 360-370-10)

DATE
29 Dec 1958

MAILING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT (U)

4. $AB \perp CD$

Re: Modus Operandi

KR-567299/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

- On 12 December 1958, Source A-VI reported substantially the following information relative the attempt to recruit him for employment with the Ministry of Interior in Czechoslovakia. Source stated that although they never introduced themselves as being from the Statni Bezpecnosti (StB - State Security Police), it is well known in Czechoslovakia that personnel who introduce themselves as being from the Ministry of Interior are actually members of the StB. It is his opinion that the personnel who contacted him were members of the StB.

At the end of February or beginning of March 1958, Source received a letter requesting he report to the Vojenska Obvodni Sprava (Military Draft Board), Prague 330VR6048, Vinohrady, Jugoslavska ulice. Source reported to the draft board and found two men in army uniform waiting for him. They noted that Source had listed having studied English, French, German, Czech, Russian and Italian. They asked him if he was able to use these languages at his place of current employment to which he replied in the negative. They wanted to know if he desired to take his compulsory military training in the summer or winter. Source replied that being a skier, he preferred to take his training in the winter. They wanted to know if Source would like to make the army his career so he could use his languages. Source stated he did not like military life and would prefer not to make it a career. Their questioning included his schooling, background and future plans. The interview lasted between forty-five and sixty minutes. They told Source they would inform him as to when he would be called to active duty for his military service.

About two weeks later, Source received a telephone call to report to the draft board. The same two men were there; however, they were dressed in civilian clothing. They introduced themselves as being from the Ministry of Interior. They both pulled out little black card cases with gold lettering on them, when they introduced themselves, but Source did not get a chance to hold them or read what was written on them. They explained that they had to take certain security precautions in their business; therefore, they had worn army uniforms during the last interview. They again asked Source if he wanted to make a career of the army to which he gave a negative reply. The next thirty minutes were spent in answering political and background questions. They then asked Source if he would be willing to work for the Ministry of Interior. Source assumed they meant for him to report to them on the activities of his fellow workers, or the residents in his area, etc. Source replied that he did not think he would be very good at this type of work as he could not judge people very well and might denounce someone who

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12 January 2010

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(U)
(C)
: Modus Operandi
-567299/d

29 December 1958

as completely innocent. One of them stated that they did not intend for him to do this type of work that they had plenty of other people for doing this. The other one immediately contradicted the statement by denying that such activity was even going on in the CSR. Their seemed to be a clash of wills at this point. Source then requested information as to what type of work he would be doing. They stated they could not tell him as it was secret but that he would find out after he had made his decision. Source stated he could not very well say yes because he was the type who wanted to do the very best at any job he was given and he might be given a job he would not be capable of doing. They asked him if he liked his country and he vehemently exclaimed his loyalty and love. They again asked him to sign an agreement to work for the Ministry of Interior stating they were sure Source could perform his duties in an excellent manner. Source stated he would not sign the agreement. One of them then asked him what his cousin was doing in the United States. (NOTE: [redacted] b1)

[redacted] b1 Source disclaimed having any contact with her; however, in reality he did correspond with her through her mother who resides in the CSR. They asked him why he had not entered this information of his personal history statement. He told them he had forgotten to do so. They then asked him if he knew that he could be sentenced for this and put in jail. Source made no reply. They both left the room for about ten minutes. After returning, they asked him about his linguistic capabilities. Source claimed that he actually was not a linguist and had very little knowledge about any of the foreign languages. One of them asked him if he thought he could learn English with one year of additional schooling. Source replied in the positive. They requested that Source think over their offer and have a definite answer for them at their next meeting, date unannounced. They further cautioned Source that he must not under any circumstances discuss with anyone what had transpired during the interview. The interview lasted approximately two hours.

About one week later, one of the men telephoned Source and requested a meeting at Strossmayerova namesti 33JVR59705000, Prague, CSR. Source met one of the men and they walked south until they reached Svehlovo nabrezi (former name, current name unknown) where they continued west. When they were within hearing distance of other people, the Ministry of Interior man would change the subject to sports to make it appear as though he and Source were out for a friendly walk and discussing sports. Source had decided prior to the meeting to decline the work offer even though he might have difficulties afterwards. He had already made up his mind to try and escape from the CSR and felt that he would be unable to do so once he agreed to this employment. He felt he would be given trial missions in the CSR after his training and he would have to denounce people in order to prove he had faithfully learned his lessons. He did not want to do this as he found it extremely distasteful. The Ministry of Interior man stated that Source had been right in refusing to agree to the employment without knowing more about it and that he admired Source for this. He stated he did not have the authority to do so but felt personally compelled to give Source more details on the planned employment for Source, so Source would be in a better position to render a decision. He

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(U)
STB (c)
Re: Modus Operandi
KE-567299/a

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12 January 2010
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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R
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explained that countries had been performing economic espionage for centuries. Czechoslovakia's television was based on data obtained in Italy. Secrets on plastics were obtained in England. He explained that Source might be sent to some foreign country to work in a specific industry. He would actually work to the best of his ability for the factory, not withholding any of his findings, or trying to sabotage their effort. He in turn would keep the Czech Government informed of all the experiments taking place and the results of each. The reports would be in letter form and would not be mailed directly to the CSR but to someone else in another country and eventually they would be delivered to the CSR. Further, because no one would hire a Czech national, Source would have to assume another nationality and would be fully documented as having come from that country. None of Source's relatives could know where he was at. It would be relatively easy to disguise his departure and absence by saying that Source was in Moscow attending a school. Source could write to his relatives and his letters would be postmarked in and sent from Moscow. He could also receive mail through this channel. Source asked how long he would have to be gone on each of these missions and how long it would take to complete the training course. The man stated he could not answer because he was not a chemist but that he would introduce Source to the specialist in this matter who was a chemist and could answer all of Source's questions. Source replied that this type of work had a great deal of risk attached to it and did not believe he had the psychological stability to withstand the constant mental strain imposed by this work. The man explained that life in Western countries was much different, that they were very lax and would probably never question him. Also, he would be trained in this matter so he would be mentally prepared for the risks. Source requested permission to think the matter over and give his answer at a later date. The man agreed to telephone Source for an appointment. During the conversation, the man indicated he had been on an economic espionage mission to Hungary and had found the work very easy and simple to perform.

About one week later, the man telephoned Source and asked him if he had reached a decision. Source stated he had thought the matter over and had decided against going to work for the Ministry of Interior. The man stated he had to see Source regardless and requested Source to meet him the following day near one of the Ministry of Interior buildings. Source did not remember the address of this building but remembers it was near Letenska namesti, Prague.

Source went to the meeting the next day. He was taken to an office on the second or third floor of the building. The office had a desk, typewriter and several chairs. It was a very small room. The man asked Source why he did not accept the work to which Source gave the same reply on mental strain. The man again pointed out how easy it was to do this work. He then proceeded to denounce himself for having told Source so much at once. Had he told Source only fragments about the work, Source would not be so afraid. Then as the training progressed, more and more details would have been revealed but Source would have been prepared for the slow assimilation of these so-called dangers. The man indicated he might get into trouble because he had told Source too much, that this was secret information and was not to be given to people until they had signed the work agreement. He

290

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(U)

STB (C)
Re: Modus Operandi
KE-567299/d

29 December 1958

requested Source reconsider the matter, that he had been exceptionally friendly toward Source because he felt Source had exceptional qualifications for this type work. To ensure that he would not suffer any embarrassment because of the way he had handled the affair with Source, he requested Source to sign the work agreement. Source still refused to sign. The man then left the room and returned after about ten minutes. He brought a paper which stated that Source would not reveal under any circumstances any of the details reference his dealings with the Ministry of Interior. Source willingly signed this paper. Source asked if his refusal would in any way affect his future in the CSR. The man said it would not.

Source had no further direct contact with the Ministry of Interior. Source had applied in February 1958 for permission to go on a tourist trip through the Balkan countries. In March, he was notified he could not go but could apply for the next trip in August. The tour was scheduled to depart on 14 August. On the 12th of August, Source received word he could not go. Source feels the Ministry of Interior had refused his permission to go on this trip because of his decision not to work for them; however, he was subsequently granted permission to visit East Germany. The reason for the trip to East Germany was to enable Source to visit a chemical factory in Dresden 33UV81156. Source believes he was allowed to go on this trip because being employed in the CSR as a chemist, the authorities felt he might learn something beneficial from his study of a German plant.

Source: A-VI

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

19 December 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (CIS) (e) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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1 - CE Rgn IV

1 - ICO Rgn IV

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Page(s) 429

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 380-270-10)		DATE 8 Dec 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Letter Drops)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
EX-567200/d	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>During the course of a recent operational meeting with members of the StB, Source was instructed to the effect that instructions, EEI and payments may occasionally be transmitted to him by means of a dead letter drop. The location of the drop was not specified other than an agreement that it was to be located on Federal Highway Number 8 between Nurnberg 32UPV5178, and Regensburg 35UTQ8733, Germany. The letter drop will be behind a "kilometer" marking stone, the number of which will be indicated to Source by means of a <u>naanic</u> postcard addressed to his home address which will be signed <u>b6</u> and which will contain a number in the text of the message. The material for Source is to be buried about six to eight inches behind the stone, when facing it from the road, at a depth of about six inches. The material will be contained in a glass or metal container, glass ampules being specifically mentioned in this connection.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-2)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 266-220-26)		DATE 8 Dec 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Use of Telegraph)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
EE-567299/A	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6	
SUMMARY INFORMATION		
<p>During the course of a recent operational meeting, Source was instructed to the effect that, should he find himself in Berlin 33UUU0220, Germany (or BG) during the course of a normal business or personal trip, he can notify his Handling Agents of his presence there and the possibility of a personal meeting by sending a telegram to a designated cover address in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR. Under these circumstances, Source was to use East German postal facilities and, under no circumstances, utilize the German Federal Postal system. After sending the telegram, Source was to be at a prearranged meeting place on the following day.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI</p> <p>(7-2)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR MG-320-10)		DATE 8 Dec 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications-Use of Railroad)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
RE-567299/d	b2	OF SOURCE:
		OF INFORMATION:
		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1
		PROBABLY TRUE2
		POSSIBLY TRUE3
		DOUBTFULLY TRUE4
		IMPROBABLE5
		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>During the course of an operational meeting with representatives of the StB in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, [b1] Source was informed that his principal means of communication with his Handling Agent would be through means of a small wooden box concealed aboard a daily train which operates between Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, and Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. This train has a Czech railroad coach which is a through car to and from Prague. The box, described as being about 4" x 2 1/2" x 1" in size, has a permanent type magnet attached to it's bottom which is of sufficient strength to secure the container to the car without danger of loss because of the train's motion. The selected place of concealment for the container is behind the metal shield covering the radiators found in the passageway of the car, which is supposedly open at both ends. The first container is to be picked up by Source [b1]</p> <p>[b1] This container is to be redispached [b1]</p> <p>[b1] Following this, the container will arrive in Nurnberg on the 27th, 28th or 29th of each month and will be dispatched to Prague on the 7th, 8th or 9th of each month. The container is to carry instructions, EEI and payment from the StB to Source and information from Source to his Handling Agents.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-2)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 8 Dec 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings) EE-567299/d	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
b2		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source, a recognized refugee, was advised during the course of a recent operational meeting with members of the StB in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, that, in the interests of personal and operational security, future operational meetings will be held in places to which Source can travel legally with his refugee type passport. Legal border crossings are preferable in this respect to risky illegally crossing of the CSR/GFR border for operational meetings. During the meeting in Berlin, Source was required to spend the nights of the days involved in the West Sector of the city so that, in the event of future question, he could prove through hotel registrations that he had been in the West Sector during the course of his stay in Berlin. During the operational meeting Source entered and departed the East Sector daily using ordinary transportation, the crossings being made without difficulty or challenge.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (P-2)</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(SR 380-320-10)

DATE
8 Dec 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Recruiting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

EE-567299/d

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with members of the StB in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, during the period 25 to 28 November 1958, the final recruitment of Source on behalf of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service took place. The recruitment process had extended over a period of approximately nine months prior to its completion.

a. Initial Approach: In March 1958, Source received a letter from the CSR, from a person known to Source to have been an informant of the StB during the year 1949. Source had not heard from nor been in contact with this person in any manner since 1949. The tone of the letter indicated that Source was being offered the possibility of a "business deal" but one that could not be settled by correspondence. The writer queried Source concerning the possibility of a personal meeting to discuss the matter. Source replied to the letter under the control of Agency A-VI inviting further correspondence to determine the actual nature of the proffered "business deal." At about the same time, Source received a letter from another person, a Czech re-defector and suspected double agent, which contained similar remarks. Source also replied to this letter under the control of Agency A-VI. After correspondence with the first writer appeared to be firmly established, the second person discontinued writing to Source. Various proposals were made for possible meeting places, agreement finally being made upon Vienna (nca), Austria, for the period 7 to 14 September 1958, the period of the Vienna Fall Fair. This meeting did not take place because of the restricted number of visas granted by the Austrian government to the Czech Official Travel Agency, which prohibited Source's primary contact, one b6 from traveling to the meeting. Correspondence then continued until October 1958.

b. Personal Approach: During the latter part of October 1958, Source's primary contact, b6 announced a sudden visit to Eurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. Upon arrival, he contacted Source following which there was a general discussion of Source's willingness to cooperate with the Czechoslovakian Intelligence. After Source had indicated his amenability, he signed a vaguely worded agreement which b6 hand-carried to the CSR. Before b6 departure he indicated that another personal meeting would be arranged, probably in Berlin, within a month.

c. Final Recruitment: During the period 25 to 28 November 1958, Source was in contact with two members of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence

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8 Dec 1958

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SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Recruiting)

EE-567299/d

b2

Service in Berlin. One of these persons had been identified to him by b6 as being a member of the StB while the other identified himself as representing "an agency of the Ministry of Interior." During the course of the meeting, Source was interrogated concerning his life, background, family and associates, both in the CSR and in Germany. He was debriefed concerning his knowledge of persons of interest to the StB and his knowledge of persons of interest to the StB and his knowledge of the Federal Assembly Camp for Foreigners in Nurnberg, and was assigned EEI concerning individual persons, as well as general EEI. Source was given brief training in secret writing and development methods, instructions in the servicing of dead letter drops, a method for transmission of information by normal international railroad trains, and the use of normal mails for the transmission of information and/or instructions. He was given a payment for which he was required to sign a receipt and was required to sign an obligation to cooperate with "an agency of the Ministry of Interior."

d. Motives Exploited: During the course of all contacts, both personal and mail, no mention was made of any motivation other than financial gain and personal advantage. There was no attempt to appeal to patriotism nor any effort to convince the Source on the basis of political conviction or attitude. The entire matter was handled during personal contacts as a pure "matter of business" with the StB offering payment for services performed.

e. Incentives Offered: Aside from the financial gain in payment for services rendered, Source was offered a safe haven in the CSR should there be any personal danger for him in Germany, and was offered the privilege of repatriating to the CSR, with full citizenship and a good position, however no specific period of service on behalf of the CSR or prerequisite to such repatriation was mentioned.

f. Oaths Signed:

(1) During the course of his first personal contact with representatives of the StB, Source signed a general agreement with the following text: "I declare myself to be in full agreement with the orally discussed accord." This statement was prepared following discussions with b6 believed to be no more than an informant of the StB, was signed only with the true given name of Source, and bore no indication of the date or place where it was prepared.

(2) During the course of an operational meeting in Berlin from 25 to 28 November 1958, Source was required, in conjunction with a

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Dec 1958

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Recruiting)

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EE-567299/d

b6

receipt for payment given him, to sign an obligation with the following text:

b1

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I have this date received the sum of 340 DM (three hundred and forty DM) from an agency of the Ministry of Interior.

b1

On the basis of previous discussions while meeting with (TN: members of) the above named agency, I declare myself in agreement with and bind myself to (TN: cooperation in) the uncovering of activity that is directed against the Czechoslovakian Republic.

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 380-320-10)		DATE 8 Dec 1958	
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces			
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Contacting)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
EE-567299/a	b2	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
		COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1
		USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
		FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
		UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>During the course of a meeting with members of the StB during which Source's final recruitment was accomplished and his initial REI were assigned, Source was informed that in all probability there would be no personal contact with him for a period of about five to six months, at which time a meeting would be arranged either in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG, or in a neutral country, the specific examples of which were Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. During the interim period, all contact with Source would be through letters containing secret writing, dead letter drops, or by means of a small box to be concealed in a specified place on the so-called "Prague Express," a train operating between Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, and Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (P-2)</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(32-320-10)

DATE
8 Dec 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Payment)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

13 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COMBAT INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, IIC Forces

SUBJECT

StB-(C) (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications-
Dead Letter Drops)

KE-55729970

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE F
USUALLY RELIABLE E
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE B
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with his handling agents in the CSR from 31 October to 2 November 1958, Source was instructed to establish two or three dead letter drops, in fairly heavily frequented places in the city of Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. Places with traffic were to be selected to avoid making the person "servicing" such drops obvious or noticeable by being in an isolated place at an unusual time. Source was instructed to test possible locations over a long period of time using empty match boxes taped into place and checking the sites weekly to determine which remained undisturbed for the longest period of time.

Source: A-VI

(P-2)

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64

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB (C) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications-
Use of Telegraph)

EE-567292/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with his handling agents during the period 31 October to 2 November 1958, Source was instructed to the effect that, should he be approached or be offered contact with a Western intelligence agency, specifically a US agency in this case, he should report the matter in secret writing to his handling agents, including in the message suggested pre-arranged phrases which would enable them to reply with an affirmative or negative answer by telegraph. As examples of phrases which could be used were "Uncle died this morning" to mean that Source should not accept the contact and "Baby born last night" to indicate an affirmative answer.

Source: A-VI

(F-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 380-320-10)		DATE 11 Nov 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Reports - Types required of Informants) (e) (U)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
EE-567299/a	b2	OF SOURCE:
		OF INFORMATION:
COMpletely reliable A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.1
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE4
UNRELIABLEE		IMPROBABLE5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>During the course of an operational meeting with his StB Handling Agents during the period 31 October to 2 November 1958, Source was required to prepare a written report, in his own handwriting, consolidating the material previously reported by him through the use of secret writing, at the same time being required to supplement the information with additional details, including descriptions of each person mentioned. Source was also required to prepare written reports concerning incidents which had been mentioned in casual conversation with his Handling Agents, such as the details of an event involving the desertion and arrest of a German Army soldier near the CSR border, information concerning which Source had learned only from newspapers. Following preparation of the written report, Source was orally debriefed on each item of information, being specifically questioned as to how and under what circumstances he had learned about each item. During the course of the oral debriefing, the Handling Agents concerned made notes on separate sheets of paper. Source was also required to prepare detailed sketches and a written report concerning the routes taken to the GFR/CSR border, and details concerning the area and events on the German side of the border, both on this and on the preceding trip into the CSR to meet his Handling Agents.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (F-2)</p>		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(Sr 388-320-10)

DATE
11 Nov 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants-Payment)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

EE-567299/d

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-VI

(P-2)

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Replaces WD AGO which may be used

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AGL (1) 3-57-25M-57M

58

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 340-320-10)

DATE
11 Nov 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation - Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES .1
PROBABLY TRUE2
POSSIBLY TRUE3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE4
IMPROBABLE5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . .6

EE-567299/d

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. While under the control of the StB, for the purposes of an operational meeting in the CSR, after having entered the CSR illegally, Source was transported to a number of places by motor vehicle. The vehicle, a four-door Tatraplan sedan of dark green color, bore the license plate number b6 and was the same vehicle used to transport Source on the occasion of a previous operational meeting. The vehicle was operated by a chauffeur called b6 (short for b6 - German: b6) who appeared to have no other duties than to drive and act as a handyman. The vehicle was used to transport Source from a border guard camp located at about 33UUR139152, CSR, through Tachov 33UUR3019, and Plana 33UUR3826, CSR, to an operational house located at 33UUR38103219, CSR, and for the return trip by the same route.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

2. During the course of an operational meeting, members of the StB connected with Source arrived at the operational house in a green colored Skoda model 403 sedan driven by a chauffeur. The license number of this vehicle is not known, and Source was not transported in this vehicle. The vehicle was seen by Source only from the second floor of the operational house.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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61 III

DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,
1 Dec 51 DA AGO) which may be used(Not Classified
less Data Ent)

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61

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ed)

SECRET

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

DATE
11 Nov 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Border Crossings-Legal)

EE-567299/4

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES .1
PROBABLY TRUE2
POSSIBLY TRUE3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE4
IMPROBABLE5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . .6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 31 October 1958 to 2 November 1958, while at an operational meeting with his StB Handling Agent, Source noted a great interest on the part of the StB in his citizenship status and the date by which he expected to receive German citizenship. The interest was later explained in that it was mentioned that after Source became a German citizen "other possibilities" existed for meetings which would not involve illegal border crossings, since, as a German citizen, Source could travel to Austria without a visa and could travel through East Germany without difficulty, thus allowing meetings in either neutral Austria or in Berlin 33UUU9220, EG. Under these circumstances, border crossings would be legal and relatively without risk for Source. The hope was expressed that legal travel could be used for the next meeting between Source and his Handling Agent.

SOURCE: A-VI

(P-2)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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1 SEP 1951

(Formerly
DA AGO)

Replaces
which are to be used

SECRET

(Not Cla
Issued)

AGL (1) 3-67-25M-5722

10

273

60

SECRET

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SF 368-320-10)

DATE

11 Nov 58

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Border Crossings-Illegal) (U) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

EE-567299/d

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In accordance with previously given briefings from his StB Handling Agent, Source, b1 illegally entered the CSR, crossing the CSR/GFR border at 33UUR13141564, Germany (EXHIBIT IX). He then walked in a generally easterly direction until approaching the vicinity of the barbed wire, where he laid down in the grass to await the arrival of his Handling Agent and escort. At shortly before 1200 hours, the commandant of the border guard unit stationed in that vicinity arrived with the StB members known to Source as b6 and b6. All were wearing military uniforms, b6 and the commandant having epaulets with three silver stars and b6 having epaulets with three red stripes. Source and his escort then proceeded to and through a tunnel beneath the fence, the doors being unlocked and relocked by the commandant. The party then proceeded on foot to a camp of the border guard located at approximately 33UUR139152, CSR.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

2. b1 Source reentered Germany illegally, using the same route and accompanied by the same escort which had met him when he entered the CSR b1. Prior to his actually passing through the tunnel beneath the barbed wire while enroute to Germany, patrols were dispatched to make certain that no German border authorities were in the vicinity. During the period of waiting, a report similar to that of a gunshot was heard, which Source later learned was allegedly the result of a flare having been discharged to remove Czech patrols from the area of the crossing.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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59-III

DA FORM 568

568

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DA AGO) which may be used

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

EXHIBIT NO. <u>IX</u>	66CIC GROUP Region VI 446	EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL FILE NO. DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE SE-567299/d	DATE 11 Nov 58
SUBJECT: StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings- Illegal) 106 III			
Overlay Base XXXXX of XXXXX Pages XXX Copy XXXXX of XXXXX Pages WB FORM 264 (L) 20 Nov 56			

EXHIBIT TAB

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(SF 360-320-10)

DATE
11 Nov 58

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Operational Liaison)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

EE-567299/a

b2

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with his StB Handling Agents from 31 October to 2 November 1958, Source crossed the GFR/CSR border illegally on two occasions. [b1] Source was met by two members of the StB accompanied by an officer of the Czech Border Guards, all three of them being attired in military uniforms. After being escorted within the barbed wire fence at the CSR border, the party proceeded to a border guard camp where the StB members removed their uniforms before departing from the area. [b1] as Source returned to Germany from the CSR, he was again escorted by the same two StB members and the border guard officer. The StB members had again donned uniforms at the border guard camp before proceeding to the border proper. To assist in the border crossing, the border guard officer had dispatched patrols to make certain that no German border patrols were in the vicinity, and had caused his own patrols to be withdrawn in order to prevent compromise of the source. In both cases, the officer personally unlocked and relocked the doors to the tunnels under the fence, and personally escorted Source under the fence.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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68 III

DA

1 Dec 58

259

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(Not Classifi- less Data Ent)

68

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 360-320-10)

DATE
11 Nov 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Cover
Addresses)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with his StB Handling Agents during the period 31 October 1958 to 2 November 1958 (and previously by covert means), Source was instructed to discontinue the use of the cover address [b6] to which Source was to write as though the addressee were his aunt. It was explained to Source that several of his previous letters sent to this address had been inadvertently destroyed by the recipient due to a misunderstanding on her part. It was further explained that the addressee had been on vacation and upon return had found two letters which were then destroyed due to the addressee's understanding that only magazines or newspapers were of interest. The letter reports prepared by Source were thus lost to the StB.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-3)

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1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used(Not Classified Un-
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AGL (1) 1-57-2533-373M

66

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (SR 388-320-10)		DATE 11 Nov 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB, Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Use of the Mails) (C) (U)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
EE-567299/d	b2	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Upon parting company from his StB Handling Agents following an operational meeting during the period 31 October 1958 to 2 November 1958, Source was instructed to send a postal card to a designated cover address in the CSR in order to inform his Handling Agent of his safe return to Germany. The postal card, any scenic view from any city, was to bear a text such as [b6] sends many greetings," if Source crossed the border without being checked by German authorities and without any other difficulty. If he had difficulty, he was to send a message such as [b6] sends greetings," omitting the word "many," which would then indicate possible compromise. Source mailed a card from Weiden 33UTR9506, Germany, on 2 November 1958, indicating no difficulty.</p> <p>SOURCE: A-VI (P-2)</p>		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOL/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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65

SECRET

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

9 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB (G) (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants-Contacting)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of a meeting with a representative of the StB, during the latter part of October 1958, Source was told that, within a month, he would be contacted by a person who would bring him sufficient funds to pay his current debts and to finance his travel to Berlin 33UUU9220, East Germany, for a meeting with a member of the StB. Source is to be notified of the time of the meeting by a telegram dispatched to his home from Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany, which would indicate that his contact would be waiting in the Hotel Nurnberger Hof, Nurnberg, at a given time. The telegram will be signed with the initial "L". Source is to meet his contact at a specified table in the restaurant of the hotel, the same used during his meetings with the StB representative during October 1958. The contact will identify himself by the use of the phrase, in the Czech language, "I come from b6" or "I bring greetings from b6" the key word being the name b6 a Hungarian name. While identifying himself with the prearranged phrase, the contact will also display a Czech coin (a one (1) Czech Crown coin of gold color) as a recognition symbol. Source will not be required to give any prearranged reply since the contact will have been previously given a full description of Source

Source: E-VI

(F-3)

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1 JUL 67

25

SECRET

52

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
9 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT
StB (S) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Border
Crossings)
EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. An informant of the StB dispatched to Germany for the purpose of approaching Source on the behalf of the StB was furnished with a normal passport in which was entered a visa for Germany permitting the informant a ten (10) day stay in Germany. The informant entered and departed from Germany at normal border crossing points, traveling legally by scheduled commercial railroad train.

Source: E-VI

(F-2)

2. Source, when traveling to a projected meeting with a member or members of the StB in Berlin 33UUU9220, East Germany, is expected to travel legally, by commercial aircraft to Berlin, Germany, following which it is anticipated that he will proceed or be escorted illegally across the sector borders into East Berlin. Source, because of his refugee status, cannot legally enter or travel through Communist countries.

Source: E-VI

(F-2)

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

24

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51-
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 9 November 1958
PREPARING OFFICE HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT StB (S) (U) Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F
OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. An informant of the StB who traveled to Germany for the purpose of making an approach to Source on behalf of the StB, utilized ordinary railroad facilities, traveling as a second class passenger on a scheduled train between Prague 33UVR6048, CSR and Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany. According to information furnished the Source by the informant, the railroad ticket was furnished him by his "ministry" since the travel was "official" in nature.</p> <p>Source: E-VI (F-2)</p> <p>2. Source, because of his status as a refugee who cannot legally travel in Communist dominated countries, is expected to travel by commercial aircraft when traveling to a projected meeting with members of the StB in Berlin 33UUU9220, BG (East Germany).</p> <p>Source: E-VI (F-2)</p>		
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50

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
9 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTR INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB (C) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications,
Use of Mails and Telegraph)

EE-567299/6

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The StB, through the use of an informant personally known to Source, has been corresponding with Source for a period of approximately seven months as a preliminary to personal contact for the purpose of recruitment. All correspondence has been through the use of ordinary mail channels and has been overt in nature. The letters have contained veiled comments concerning possible business ventures and have been written in such a manner as to generally preclude a person not aware of the background of the correspondents from suspecting the purpose of the correspondence. The letters did not contain direct inference of proposed intelligence activity but were directed at arranging a personal meeting during which details were to be discussed. Ordinary telegrams, both domestic within Germany and international between Germany and the CSR were used by both Source and his contact. Source utilized an international telegram to indicate his ability to meet with the contact in a neutral country, while the contact used an international telegram to alert Source to a pending visit and a domestic telegram to advise Source of his arrival and the place of contact during his visit. All telegrams were open text messages without hidden meaning and in themselves, had no intelligence significance.

Source: E-VI

(F-2)

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454

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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

9 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION, VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB (9) (U)

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants -
Approach, Motives, Incentives)

SI-557299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

For a period of approximately seven months prior to making a personal contact, a known informant of the StB has been corresponding with Source, apparently on behalf of the StB. The letters contained thinly veiled offers of possible "business" matters which would have to be discussed personally and comments leading to a meeting of the interested parties. During the latter part of October 1958, the person writing to Source appeared in Nurnberg 32UPV5178, Germany, for a personal visit, to renew their former acquaintanceship. During the course of a visit of several days duration, the visitor discussed several actual business matters which would possibly help Source out of his financial difficulties but finally expressed the thought that the best method and the most profitable would be "intelligence". After further discussion, Source declared himself prepared to cooperate in this manner and signed a vaguely worded declaration of his agreement. During the course of the discussions, there was no attempt to appeal to patriotism or any other motive other than pure financial gain. At the conclusion of the visit, Source was informed that he would be contacted and furnished with funds to pay his present debts and provide him with sufficient money to allow him to travel to Berlin 33UUU9220, EG (East Germany), where he would meet with a member of the StB for final arrangement of the matter.

Source: E-VI

(F-2)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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53-II

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1 JUN 47

21

Incl #2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
9 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION VI, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB (c) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants -
Obligations signed)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of a personal contact with a person who visited Germany for discussion with Source on behalf of the StB, the visitor informed Source, that he must bring back (to the CSR) some concrete indication of Source's intentions. After extensive discussion of the matter, Source, at the direction of his visitor, wrote the following statement in his own handwriting in the Czech language: "I declare myself to be in full agreement with the orally discussed accord". The statement was not dated and did not give any indication of the place of preparation. The statement was signed only with the correct given name of Source.

Source: E-VI

(F-2)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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54-II

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

incl #2

54

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

js
DATE
3 November 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

EE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (C) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: A-IV

(C-3)

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19 Incl 3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

DATE
27 Oct 58

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region VI, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB, Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications - Use of Mails)

(c) (U)

EE-567299/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source and the StB continue to communicate with each other through the use of normal mail channels. Source, after preparing his reports in secret writing, encloses them, with an innocent message on the opposite side of the page, in an envelope addressed to a cover address which he then places in normal German postal channels. The StB continues to send instructions to Source through the use of messages in secret writing written on the inner surface of an envelope addressed to Source at his home address. The letters continue to be mailed to Source from Vienna (nca), Austria, and to have an innocent overt text.

SOURCE: A-VI

(F-2)

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AGL (1) 1-57-35M-57235

22 241

207

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Entered) **SECRET**

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

in

DATE

26 Sep 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

SE-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence (U)
Service (CIS) (c)

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

SOURCE: V-14-M

(c)

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1 - ICC Region IV

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1 Dec 1951

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less Data Entered)

SECRET

1824

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CIS

REGION VIII (BERLIN)
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US FORCES

AEUC-SCCE 274/10 EE-567299 *(d/e/f/g)*

25 July 1958

SUBJECT: StB,
RE: Modus Operandi, Installations, Personalities,
Sources (c) (U)

b6

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55 and messages I-1818 and F-4286.
2. FORWARDED: SOIs dated 25 July 1958, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources:

b1	b1
b1	Previous address: b1
b1	Presently in West BERLIN refugee channels.

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Source was recruited by the StB.

d. Date Source obtained information: March 1957 - May 1958.

e. Date agent received information: 19 May - 21 May 1958.

4. REMARKS:

a. Source was allocated to CIC, USAFE, and USAREUR by the Non-German Refugee Panel on 16 May 1958. After debriefing by this Region, Source was turned over to USAFE on 23 May 1958.

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Reg VIII
Log A-2993

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AEUC-SCCE 274/10 EE-567299/d/e/f/g

25 July 1958

SUBJECT: StB,

RE: Modus Operandi, Installations, Personalities,
Sources (C) (U)

b. Background data on Source is being forwarded in AR,
file b1 (U) (e)

b6

4 Incl

1. SOI dtd 25 Jul 58 (C) (U)
2. SOI dtd 25 Jul 58 (C) (U)
w/Exhibit "I" (in ser) (C)
- 3-4 SOIs dtd 25 Jul 58 (C) (U)

Lt Col, ~~MI~~ (Arty)
Commanding

BERLIN 43354/ b6 /TFB/WWM/ma

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233

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DATE 25 JUL 1958

66th CIC Group, Région VIII, CE Section KE-567299/d

StB, (U)
RE: Modus Operandi (C)

Fast Copy Available

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFUL
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH UNKNOWN

1. Recruitment: In January 1957, Source returned to the CSR from a vacation with relatives in the GDR. In March 1957, Source received a letter inviting her to report to the VEJPRFY n.c.a., CSR, SNE (Sbor Narodni Bezpecnost - Corps for National Security) station. Source was met there by two men in civilian clothing. One of these men, [b6] interviewed Source concerning her recent GDR trip. [b6] inquired about the economic and political situation, public opinion, rationing and the food supply, and the addresses of Source's relatives in the GDR. Source answered all questions truthfully. Then [b6] asked questions concerning Source's employment, financial status, and avocations. Continuing, [b6] inquired whether Source had any relatives in the FRG. Source answered that she had two uncles living in the FRG. [b1] [b6] was quite interested in this latter uncle and spoke privately with the other man for a few minutes. Source was then asked whether she would like to perform some special services for the government. This work could be done, according to [b6] just by keeping her eyes and ears open while pursuing her normal life. At first Source refused to cooperate. [b6] accused Source of possibly being an agent for the West and attempted to intimidate Source. Source was told to go home and to think about the proposition. One week later Source received another letter instructing her to report to the SNE station. [b6] again met Source and asked if she had thought it over. Source was afraid to refuse and so agreed to cooperate. Source was not asked to sign a statement at this time.

2. Cover Name: At the second meeting with [b6] at the SNB building, Source was given the cover name [b6]. Source was required to write the following statement: I, [b1] [b6] bear from now on the cover name [b6] [b6]. Source signed this statement with her cover name.

3. Identification: At the first meeting in the forest area, [b6] showed Source a credential. It was a dark green laminated card, bearing [b6] name and his picture in a uniform. Source was able to read his name, but [b6] covered the rest of the card with his hand. At this time, [b6] said he is a StE officer, working in the counter-espionage section.

4. Contacting of Informants: After agreeing to cooperate with [b6] Source was instructed to meet [b6] each Thursday at 1430 hours in a wooded area on the outskirts of the village, VEJPTY, CSR. Meetings took place at this spot until approximately September 1957. At each meeting [b6] arrived in a car and talked with Source for about 30 minutes. Source was told that, in the event one or the other did not appear for a meeting, the meeting would be automatically postponed to the next Thursday at 1430 hours. [b6] did not give Source his telephone number or his office address in KARLOVY VARY UR4966.

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CE Section; KE-567299/d

SUBJECT: StB,

RE: Modus Operandi (U) (S)

2 JUL 1958
file
DLC/ma

CSR. From September to December 1957, Source met [b6] in the VEJPTY, CSR, railroad station every Thursday at 1430 hours. From January 1958 to the time of her flight, Source met [b6] in the MNV (Mistni Narodni Vybor - Labor Union) building, VEJPTY, CSR, as before, on Thursdays at 1430 hours. Following occasions when Source did not appear for a meeting, she would receive a letter from [b6] mailed to her place of work, the VEJPTY, CSR, clothing factory. This letter was always from [b6] and was addressed to Source's real name. The message usually read as follows: "Dear [b6] I'm sorry that we didn't meet for a few weeks. I'd be very pleased to see you again on Thursday at the usual time and place. Sincerely your girl friend, [b6]."

5. Missions:

a. Source was assigned a variety of missions. She was to observe the attitudes and actions of the Germans living in the VEJPTY, CSR, area. Source was also to watch her female co-workers, noting their character, diversions, and correspondence. Source was to report on the young men she dated and also the factory foreman, known as Brigadiers. [b6] told Source to be especially on the look-out for possible defectors to the West.

b. In the summer of 1957, [b6] and another man in civilian clothing met Source at the forest meeting point. This unidentified man was introduced to Source as a high-positioned StB man. This man asked Source if she would like to visit her uncle, who lives in BONN, FRG. Source was not asked to perform any missions, and she answered that she would like to go. In the following meetings, the trip to BONN, FRG, was always discussed. The trip was to be financed, but no extra pay to Source was mentioned. [b6] told Source that the StB is very much interested in the BONN, FRG, area. Source was instructed to apply for the visa and travel accommodations through the routine channels of the CEDOK Travel Bureau, PRAGUE VR6048, CSR. [b6] implied that the matter would be expedited by the StB. Source submitted the necessary applications and awaited further instructions from [b6]. The trip was to take place in May or June 1958. During these travel preparations, Source was already planning to escape to the West with her fiancé. Source was to be given her mission instructions on the day she left for BONN, FRG. [b1] [b6] Source illegally left the CSR with her fiancé, eventually entering the West BERLIN refugee stream. Source has no idea of what mission she was to perform in BONN, FRG.

6. Reports: In August 1957, Source reported orally to [b6] that a family acquaintance had a hidden pistol at home. Several weeks later, she was instructed to write a complete dated report of this matter. She complied and was told to sign the report with her cover name. Source submitted no other reports.

463

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CE Section; KE-567299/d

SUBJECT: StB,

RE: Modus Operandi (U)

25 JUL 1958
DLC/ma

7. Oaths: In April 1958, while making preparations for the trip to BONY, FRC, Source wrote substantially the following with pen on a plain sheet of paper: "I promise to keep everything secret and I am willing to serve communion." This statement she signed with her cover name.

8. Payment: Source neither received nor was promised any payment of money or incentive supplies.

(F-6)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

b6

AEUC-SCCE; EE-567298/a

(U)

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (6)
Re: Modus Operandi

JUL 15 1958

Best Copy Available

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55, dated 9 November 1955.

2. FORWARDED:

a. Agent Report, this region, subject and file as above, dated 7 July 1958.

b. Two (2) Summaries of Information, subject and file as above, dated 7 July 1958.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Information was obtained as indicated and on date indicated through direct contact with Source B-IV by Special Agent **b6**

b. Source A-IV is identified as a confidential informant, evaluated F, of Source B-IV.

c. Source B-IV is identified as **b1** born **b1** **b1** in **b1**

d. Preparing agent for the Summaries of Information was Special Agent **b6**

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4. REMARKS:

a. The enclosed information is forwarded as items of interest.

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Date 465
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308

M/C 19003

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AEUC-SCCB; EE-567298/8

Ltr to: CG, 66th SIG Gp, APO 154, US Forces, Attn: AEUC-SCCB, subj:
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (C), Re: Modus Operandi,
confd:

b. Case open.

b6

2 Incl

1. AR subj as stated in
para 2 above dtd 7
Jul 58
2. 2 SOIs subj as stated
in para 2 above dtd 7
Jul 58

Lt Col, MI (Inf)
Commanding

FIELD OFFICE NURNBERG

Log Nr. C-49

MFR/ACJ/GES/opt/Ho2 E12

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service- CIS
Re: Modus Operandi, Informants

2. DATE SUBMITTED

7 July 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-5672998/d

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

b6 born approximately 1922, birthplace unknown, presently residing in Chodau 33UUR3968, CSR, and b6 born approximately 1922, birthplace unknown, presently residing on Blankenheimstrasse, Ober-Chodau, are thought to be working as informants for the CIS in Karlovy-Vary 33UUR4966, CSR.

b1 obtained this information from a Confidential Source, who was recently a visitor in Selb from the CSR. b1 declined to give any further information concerning his source.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th CIC Group 467

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 58

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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306

Incl #1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 7 July 1958
PREPARING OFFICE Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Forces		
SUBJECT Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service- CIS Re: Modus Operandi, Informants D-5672998/d	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION The following individual is identified as a possible informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency: NAME: <u>b6</u> DATE OF BIRTH: ca 1922 PLACE OF BIRTH: Unknown ADDRESS: Blankenheimerstrasse, Ober-Chodau 33UUR3968, CSR OTHER DESCRIPTIVE DATA: Unknown REMARKS: Source A-IV told Source B-IV that Moertl came into contact with the CIS through his friend, <u>b6</u> born approximately 1922, birthplace unknown, presently residing in Chodau. Source A-IV believed that both <u>b6</u> and <u>b6</u> worked for the CIS in Karlovy-Vary 33UUR4966, CSR. Source: A-IV P-6 Source: B-IV C-3		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE **4 JUL 1958**

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Division; **EE-567299/d**

DLG/bb

SUBJECT

StB, Re: **Modus Operandi** (U) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

OPNS OFF

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment: **b1**

b1

b1

b6 inquired

whether Source had any knowledge concerning these thefts. Source replied that he knew nothing. **b6** then escorted Source to an adjacent office, where Source met Lieutenant **b6**. They continued to discuss the **b1** and **b6** requested that Source report any suspicious activity in the vicinity of the **b1**. Source was also asked to report anti-communistic statements and actions on the part of his co-workers. Source replied that he would like to think about such a proposal before making a decision. **b6** told Source to return to Room 83 in two weeks. Two weeks later Source returned to Room 83 and stated that he would cooperate. **b6** then read aloud a statement which Source copied in his own hand. The oath stated that Source promises to report all information he learns concerning the **b1** and any other assignment that he receives. The oath further swore Source to secrecy, even under threat of torture or death. Source then signed the oath with his real name. **b6** instructed Source to select a cover name, and Source decided on **b6**. Source was required to promise that he will study communist theory in his spare time.

2. Contacting of Informants: Meetings were always arranged by sending a letter to Source's mail box **b1**. The letters were written on OPS stationary. The message would ask Source to go shopping on a particular day and to meet the sender at a designated place. The letters were always signed with Source's cover name. From April to July 1956, **b6** was Source's handling agent. During the period, Source met **b6** three times. At their first meeting, Source met **b6** in the main room of the VEJPRTY, CSR, post office. They immediately left the post office and drove to the OPS building in JACHYMOV, CSR. The second meeting was in the MNV (Mistni Narodni Vybor - Local office of the National Committee) building in VEJPRTY, CSR. From here, Source was again driven to the OPS building in JACHYMOV, CSR. The third and last meeting with **b6** took place in a third floor room in a rooming house on Ulice Stalinova, VEJPRTY, CSR. At this meeting, Source was told that, in the future, Source will work with **b6**. During the period July 1956 - October 1957, Source met **b6** once a month in the room on Ulice Stalinova,

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1 JUN 47

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4 JUL 1950

CE Division; EE-567299/d (U)
SUBJECT: StB, Re: Modus Operandi (C)

1916
b6/bb

VEJPTY, CSR. In October 1957, [b6] became Source's handling agent. Source continued to meet [b6] once a month either in the room on Ulice Stalinova or in the OPS building in JACHIMOV, CSR. Source met with [b6] until the time of Source's flight from the CSR in May 1958.

3. Training: Source received no training in espionage from his handling agent.

4. Missions: Throughout his employment as a StB informant, Source was instructed to determine who [b1] and to report on anti-communistic actions among Source's co-workers. [b6] showed Source photographs of [b6] born approximately 1927, [b6] born approximately 1930, [b6] and [b6] and [b6] stated that these men were suspected [b1] and that Source was to watch these men especially. On another occasion, Source was shown a thatch of cloth, which was a sample of material allegedly stolen from a Soviet post exchange in JACHIMOV, CSR. Source was told to report the appearance of such cloth.

5. Reporting: Source was to report his information orally. Source never submitted a report.

6. Payments: During his employment as an informant, Source received neither money nor incentive supplies. Financial payment was never mentioned by Source's handling agent.

(P-6)

2

471

RESEARCH DIVISION

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE
Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT
StB
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
Letter Drops)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the course of an operational meeting with his StB Handling Agents
b1 Source was provided with two cover addresses
in the OSR for use in transmitting information to his Handling Agents. In-
formation and/or instructions mailed to Source would bear either of the two
designated addresses: b6 to whom Source
is to write as though she were his cousin, and b6
b6 to whom Source is to write as though she were his aunt. The
addresses are to be used alternately or irregularly, according to the desires
of Source.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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63

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
Use of the Mails)

FE-567299/3

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source has been instructed to use the mails in the transmittal of information to his StB Handling Agents. The communications will be in the form of messages prepared in secret writing and contained in either a magazine or in an apparently innocent letter. The letters or magazines are to be forwarded to either of two designated cover addresses in the CSR.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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64

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

3 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi

(Informants - Training)

REF 567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 during the course of an operational meeting with members of the StB in an operational house near Pisto 33WUR3932, CSR, Source was given training in the preparation of a message in secret writing, as well as designation of cover addresses to be used in future correspondence with the StB. SUBJECT was also instructed in the manner in which he was to develop messages sent to him in secret writing although he was not specifically instructed in the development methods to be used in connection with the secret writing preparation designed specifically for his use.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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67

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation - Road)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 while under the control of the StB, after having entered the DDR illegally for the purpose of an operational meeting with his Handling Agents, Source was transported by motor vehicle to a number of places in the CSR. The vehicle used was a four-door Tatra sedan of dark green color which bore the Czech license plate b6. This vehicle was used to drive Source from a CSR Army or Border Guard camp located at coordinate point 33UUR39152 to Tachov 33UUR3019; Marianske Lazne 33UUR3639, and to an StB operational house near Pilstov 33UUR3932, all CSR. The vehicle was also used for a trip to and from the operational house and Marianske Lazne, and finally from the operational house to the previously mentioned Army or Border Guard camp. The vehicle was driven by a chauffeur who appeared to have no other responsibility in connection with the processing of Source.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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68

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~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

3 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants - Payment)

EE-567299/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

b1

Source received a payment of 400 German Marks which was described to him as a payment for past and future expenses in connection with his activities on behalf of the StB. The payment consisted of two 100 German Mark notes and four 50 German Mark notes. He was required to sign a receipt which indicated that the money was received from the "Security Organ of the GSR."

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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69

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

13 July 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi

(Border Crossings - Illegal)

EE-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. [b1] Source entered the CSR illegally crossing the CSR-German border at about 1230 hours at or near coordinate point 33UUR130154. He walked in an easterly direction for about ten or fifteen minutes until he arrived at a border fence which he then followed in a northerly direction until encountering a three-man Czech Army labor detail repairing the fence. After a few minutes waiting and some discussion with the person in charge of the detail, Source was escorted along the fence until the regular two-man patrol on the Czech side of the fence was encountered. After some discussion with the patrol, Source, his escort and the two-man patrol returned to a tunnel which passed under the fence. After the doors were unlocked and the lights turned on, Source passed under the fence unescorted. His original escort returned to the working detail while one member of the patrol escorted him to his destination, a CSR Army or Border Guard camp located at coordinate point 33UUR139152.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

2. [b1] at about 1200 hours, Source reentered Germany illegally, crossing the German-CSR border at the same point from which he had departed from Germany [b1]. He was guided from the CSR Army or Border Guard camp at coordinate point UUR139152 by the commandant of the camp who escorted him through the tunnel beneath the Border fence and into Germany after first ascertaining that no German Border Police patrols were in the vicinity.

SOURCE A-IV

Evaluation: F-6

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70

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b2

DATE
26 June 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Communications) (G)

EE-567299/a

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Post Copy Available

Letter Drops and Use of Mails: On approximately 11 June 1958, Source received a letter from StB which contained in secret writing the locations of the following letter drops which Source is to service:

- a. [b6] Highway 11 between Munich 32UPU9135, GFR, and Freising 32UQU0365, GFR.
- b. [b6] Highway 12 between Munich and Muehldorf 33UUP1646, GFR.
- c. [b6] Highway 12 between Munich and Landsberg 32UPU4024, GFR.
- d. [b6] Highway 13 between Munich and Ingolstadt 32UPV7804, GFR.
- e. [b6] Highway 2 between Munich and Starnberg 32UPU7419, GFR.
- f. [b6] Highway 4 between Nurnberg 32UPV5179, GFR, and Bamberg 32UPA3629, GFR.
- g. [b6] Highway 252 between Frankenberg 32UMB8656, GFR, and Marburg 32UMB8328, GFR.
- h. [b6] Highway 3 between Marburg and Giessen 32UMB7704, GFR.
- i. [b6] Highway 54 between Frankfurt 32UMA7752, GFR, and Wiesbaden 32UMA4548, GFR.
- j. [b6] Highway 10 between Stuttgart 32UNV1206, GFR, and Goepingen 32UNU4895, GFR.
- k. [b6] Highway 14 between Stuttgart and Nagold 32UMU7977, GFR.

Source will receive notification to make a pickup in the form of a telegram, letter, or postcard, in which a number is mentioned. The number will be that of a kilometer stone located on the highway whose code name will be used as the writer of the message. The package or message to be picked up will be located in the immediate vicinity of the kilometer stone indicated. The letter drop with the code name [b6] was also located and identified to Source at a meeting with StB [b1]

SOURCE A-IV

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Evaluation: P-6

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Page 1 of 79 II
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79

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 17 April 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

D-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)

RE: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In future exchanges of correspondence between Source A-IV and the CIS representative, Source is to treat with an electric iron all letters beginning with [b6] instead of 'Dear [b6]'. He will then find instructions written in invisible ink. Source is to write confidential matters in the same manner using an invisible ink of his choice.

2. The CIS representative subsequently produced a number of small plastic bags and stated that these are to be used to bury messages next to a kilometer marker yet to be designated along a certain road. The road would receive a code name like for instance [b6] and would be referred to as such in future correspondence. For example, the sentence 'I still get RM 29.50 from [b6]' would mean that an object was buried next to kilometer marker 29.5 along the road concerned.

(B-3)

SOURCE A-M

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28

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 April 1958PREPARING OFFICE
Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

D-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Soviet "Pobeda", four door sedan, new model, winter tires, dark blue color, bearing East German license DS-14-67 was allegedly used by Czech Intelligence Service personnel for transportation in East Berlin 33UUU92, Germany, on 23 and 24 March 1958. The vehicle's interior was in medium blue without seat covers and all instruments were in German.

SOURCE: A-M

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
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FIELD OFFICE MUNICH
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO 108 US FORCES

b6

AEUC-SCCE: D-359027/d

(U)

MAR 24 1958

SUBJECT: CSR Intelligence Service in Austria (c)
Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. Reference: Operational Memorandum 6/56, your Headquarters, dated 30 April 1956.

2. Forwarded: a. Summary of Information, Field Office Munich, subject and file as above, dated 14 March 1958.

b. Summary of Information, Field Office Munich, subject Hungarian Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation), file D-567323/d, dated 14 March 1958.

c. Summary of Information, Field Office Munich, subject Soviet Intelligence Service, Austria, Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation), file D-567007/d, dated 14 March 1958.

3. Control of Information: a. Source A-M is identified as X-8-M, evaluated C, who received the information from a friend employed with the [b1]

b. Preparing agent is Special Agent [b6] Field Office Munich.

c. Case is pending.

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4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

b6

maj, m2(mpc)

3 Incls

SOI's dtd 14 Mar 58

b6

Major, MI (Sig C)
Commanding

JWR/ag/MoG M 8195

27 MAR 1958

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-8

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Forces

D-359027/d

SUBJECT

CSR Intelligence Service in
Austria (C) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi
(Transportation)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. A Mercedes 190 automobile bearing Austrian license number b6 has been registered since 9 September 1957 as belonging to b6. This license number was formerly assigned to a black Skoda automobile belonging to the CSR Embassy in Vienna.

2. A grey Tatraplan 600 automobile, bearing Austrian license number b6 has been registered since 19 July 1957 as belonging to b6. b6 an editor, residing at b6. From 19 July 1954 until 26 April 1955, the vehicle was registered in b6 name. From 26 April 1955 until 19 July 1957 the vehicle was registered under the name of b6 a translator, residing at b6.

SOURCE: A-M

(C-3)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US FORCES

b6

AEUC-SCCE: D-567298/d

20 March 1958

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

MAR 26 1958

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 8/57, dated 23 July 1957.
2. FORWARDED: Summaries of Information, subject and file as above, dated 21 February 1958.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Source A-IV is b1 born b1 in b1 presently residing at b1 b1 who obtained the information through direct contact with the persons, and from letters from their fellow prisoners, and reported to Special Agent b6 on 17 February 1958. The preparing agent is Special Agent b6

4. REMARKS:

a. b1 descriptions are vague because he has not seen these persons since 1956-57, when, they were fellow prisoners at the prison at Leopoldov, CSR.

b. Further information of this nature will be forwarded as it becomes available.

7785
This document has been
Carded by C/R
Date 3-20-58
b6

- 1 Incl
3 SOIs (6 pages) re subj
as above dtd 21 Feb 58

JDH/SGN/ges/opt/Bof 4396

Ex-Off. MI (Inf)
Commanding
FIELD OFFICE NURNBERG
Log Nr 1430

81 MAR 1958

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BE PREDETERMINED

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US FORCES

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Best Copy Available

The following individual is identified as a possible informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna 33UXPO040, Austria:

Name:	b1
Date of birth:	ca 1925
Place of birth:	Unknown
Present address:	Unknown
Nationality:	Austrian
Marital status:	Single
Profession:	Unknown
Occupation:	Mercenary intelligence informant
Height:	5'9"
Weight:	165 pounds
Build:	Stocky
Face:	Oval with shallow cheeks
Hair:	Thick and black
Eyes:	Blue
Distinguishing marks:	Blue scar at left side of mouth
General appearance:	Looks like a Gypsy
Characteristics:	A fanatical communist with an unscrupulous drive to gain that which he desires.
Other information:	b1 speaks Russian, Czech and German fluently and English poorly. He reads a great deal and is well informed.
	b1 was an officer in the German army during World War II and was captured in Russia. When he was a prisoner in Russia, he was a member of the NFDE (Nationale Freies Deutschlands Komitee - National Free Germany Committee). After the war, he was sent to the Communist party school in Moscow (nca), Russia. b1 was also trained by the NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs - renamed MVD). He worked as an NKVD agent in Camp 27, Krasnogorsk (nca), Russia, and at Lubjanka Prison in Moscow. In 1949, b1 returned to Austria to organize the Communist party there.
	b1

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48

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CONFIDENTIAL**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1 In 1952, b1 was kidnapped from the GFR into the CSR. A man in a US army uniform with the insignia of a first lieutenant told b1 in Frankfurt/Main 32UMA7752, GFR, that he had a mission for b1 in either Passau or Munich 32UPU9135, GFR. They entered an automobile and began to drive in the direction of southern Bavaria. Without b1 realizing what was happening, the man in the US army uniform conveyed him across the GFR/CSR border and delivered him to the authorities in the CSR. He was then sentenced to imprisonment. In 1957, while preparing for release from the prison at Leopoldov 33UPV7489, CSR, b1 offered his friends employment as informants for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna. b1 is a friend of b6 b6, born approximately 1925, Austrian citizen, and b6 born approximately 1927, Austrian citizen, who were fellow prisoners of Kneal in the prison at Leopoldov. b6 and b6 may be working with b1 as informants for the same unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna. b6 b6 identifying data unknown, whose address is Hofkirchen Pest, Bappersdorf (nca), Austria, is a friend of b1 and may have knowledge of his whereabouts.

SOURCE: A-IV

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F-6

485

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298

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi Informants

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Exact Copy Available

- The following individual is identified as a possible informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna 33WIP0040, Austria:

Name:	b6
Date of birth:	ca 1925
Place of birth:	Unknown
Present address:	Unknown
Nationality:	Austrian
Marital status:	Single
Profession:	Unknown
Occupation:	Mercenary intelligence informant and smuggler
Height:	5'5"
Weight:	143 pounds
Build:	Slim
Face:	Thin with low forehead
Hair:	Long brunette with streaks of grey at the temples
Eyes:	Grey
Distinguishing marks:	None
Characteristics:	Intelligent and businesslike in manner
Other information:	b6 is not a Communist and has no interest in politics. He would be acting as an informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency only for financial gain. Before 1950, b6 was employed by several Jewish organizations in the CSR and also by an unknown Czech intelligence agency as an informant. His primary source of income was derived from smuggling contraband goods across the GFR/CSR border, and selling them in the black market. A companion in this operation was b6 b6 born approximately 1927, Austrian citizen, who may be presently working with b6 in Vienna as an informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency. In 1950, both men were apprehended with contraband goods while crossing the

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297

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CONFIDENTIAL**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Best Copy Available

GFR/CSR border. They were sentenced to imprisonment in the CSR. [b6] was a friend and fellow prisoner in the prison at Leopoldov 33UPV7489, CSR, of [b6] born approximately 1925, Austrian citizen, with whom he may also be working as an informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna. [b6] was released from imprisonment at Leopoldov in 1956. [b6] identifying data unknown, whose address is Hofkirchen Post, Rappersdorf (nca), Austria, is a friend of [b6] and may have knowledge of his whereabouts.

SOURCE: A-IV

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

Best Copy Available

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence

Service

Re: Modus Operandi

ER-567298/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A US civilian, employed by a USAREUR Military Intelligence Unit, was contacted by an agent of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service (CIS) and offered the opportunity to work for that agency. In receipt for information to be given to the CIS by the American, he was guaranteed the following:

a. The best and free sanitorial treatment for his mother, who is a resident of the CSR and who has not been able to obtain a visa for travel out of the CSR.

b. The American could visit his mother or his father-in-law, who is also a Czech national and a resident of the CSR, in the CSR.

c. Financial support for his mother as if he, personally, were rendering it himself.

d. If the American decided to reside in the CSR, he would receive Czech citizenship, a type of position which he could choose according to his experience, and a position in life which he is accustomed to, including a completely furnished residence.

e. Financial reward in the currency of his own choosing and placed in a bank of his own choosing. This reward would be dependent upon the value of the information he submitted and the utilization of the information at political gatherings.

f. Supplies of foreign stamps and an open market for the sale of other items that the American would wish to sell.

For his wife, who is a former resident of Czechoslovakia and who is now an American Citizen, the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service offered the following, providing she also agreed to work for them:

a. They would make it possible for her to visit her father and mother-in-law in Czechoslovakia whenever she wished and without a time limit on the visit.

b. Return to the CSR, without punishment for having fled, and permanent residence there, if desired.

c. Financial reward in the currency of her choosing and banked where she so desired.

Source: A-IV

Evaluation: None

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence

Service, -

Re: Modus Operandi (U)

EE-567298/d

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A

USUALLY RELIABLE B

FAIRLY RELIABLE C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D

UNRELIABLE E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4

IMPROBABLE 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service utilized the assistance of the father-in-law of a United States civilian employed with a USAREUR Military Intelligence Unit as a source and recruiter for the CIS. The father-in-law, a Czech national, residing in the CSR, attempted to recruit the American, during a visit in Vienna, Austria, to work for the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service. As payment for the operation and information, the American was not only to receive monetary gains but would also be helping the father-in-law, and the mother of the American, who also resided in the CSR, to have a better life in their homeland.

Source: A-IV

Evaluation: None

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

CIS - StB

(KE-567299/a)

Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Codes and Use of Mails: [b1] Source was given the assignment of determining the exact address, telephone number, and other information concerning a person residing in Nuernberg 32UPV5179, GFR. As soon as he has determined the address, he is to inform the StB of that information by means of an innocuous letter written to Source's mother, who [b1]

[b1] The letter is to contain a sentence something like the following: "...My aunt lives at (street and house number of the person concerned), I talked with her a short time ago and she is fine..." Source was instructed not to mention the name of the city of Nuernberg in the letter, just the street and house number, and was further instructed not to mail the letter in Nuernberg.

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

2. Codes and Use of Telegraph: [b1] Source was instructed to use the following system to report that he had made a pickup at a dead letter drop. He is to send a telegram to a cover address in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, in which a date will be mentioned which will be the date he is coming to the border for another meeting, and will sign it with a name which indicates the highway on which the dead letter drop is located. Example: "My aunt will arrive on 9 March at 1500 hours. [b6] That means that Source will be at the regular meeting place at the regular time on the date indicated and that he made a pickup at the dead letter drop located on the highway whose code name is [b6] The cover address in Prague to which the telegram is to be sent is [b6] Source was instructed to send such telegrams in the German language and always to use a false return name and address.

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

3. Letter Drops, Use of Mails, and Codes: [b1] Source was informed that kilometer stones on certain highways will be the location of dead letter drops. They will be set up by the kilometer stones, on the side away from the street and immediately adjoining the stones, at a depth of two to four inches. The highway between Stuttgart 32UNV1206, GFR, and Vaihingen (noa), GFR, will be known as [b6] and the highway between Stuttgart and Reichenbach (noa), GFR, will be known as [b6] Instructions for making a pickup will be received in a

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122 I

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

CIS - StB EE-567299/d
 Re: Modus Operandi
 (Communications)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

picture post card mailed to him from Austria or another country.
 Example: "Greetings from Vienna. I will be in the hospital on and
 after the 30th, [b6] That means that Source is supposed to make
 a pickup at kilometer stone thirty on the Stuttgart-Vaihingen highway.
 The same instructions are valid for the Stuttgart-Reichenbach highway,
 except that the card will be signed [b6]

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

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121-Z

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 March 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

CIS - StB ~~RE-567299/A~~
 Re: Modus Operandi
 (Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Payment: b1 Source received payment of 300 WDM, which was described as reimbursement for past and future expenses in connection with carrying out his assignments. The payment consisted of two 100 WDM notes and two 50 WDM notes wrapped in a piece of paper on which was typed Source's latest EEI, the whole bundle being contained in the same plastic shaving brush container which Source had used earlier as a protective device for the report which he gave to the StB. A note accompanying the payment informed Source that after his reports are carefully checked he would be paid whatever they are worth.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

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123

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REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US FORCES

AEUC-SCCE; EE-567299/d/f

3 MAR 1958

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service, (U)
RE: Modus Operandi, Personalities (C)

b6

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Forces
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum 16/55 and letter,
file [b1] dated 18 February
1958.

2. FORWARDED: SOIs dated 3 MAR 1958, subject and file
as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b1] born [b1]
[b1] Present address: FRG (exact address unknown).

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Source
was an StB informant while working for CSR Labor Service. [b1]
was Source's handling agent.

d. Date Source obtained information: March 1954 -
November 1954.

e. Date agent received information: 7 January - 9
January 1958.

4. REMARKS: 320 EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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a. Source was allocated to CIC by the Non-German
Refugee Panel on 7 January 1958. After debriefing by Region VIII,
[b1] was returned to refugee channels.

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7 MAR 1958

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Reg VIII

Log A-0913

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AEUC-SCCE; EE-567299/d/r

3 MAR 1958

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service, (U)
RE: Modus Operandi, Personalities (C)

b. Source's previous address was b1

b1

c. Regional registry contains no information concerning Source.

b6

3 Incl

1-2 SOIs dtd 3 MAR 1958 (U)

3. Photos of Source w/neg (U)

b6

Lt Col, MI (Arty)
Commanding

BERLIN 43354, b6 TFB/WFM/ma

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& DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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283

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**DATE **3 MAR 1956**

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Section EE-567299/d

DLC/ms

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service,
RE: Modus Operandi (0) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOURCE ST
 PROBABLY TRUE ST
 POSSIBLY TRUE ST
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE ST
 IMPROBABLE ST
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED ST

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment: Source was formerly employed with the CSR Labor Service. In March 1954 while his company was building an ammunition depot in a forest, he and some co-workers killed a deer. They were discovered by an officer, who reported them to Labor Service Headquarters, SMECHNO (VR3260), CSR. The following day, Source had to report to Headquarters, where he was met by two men in civilian clothes. These men took Source by auto to the Dom Armade, Ulice Dejice, PRAGUE (VR6048), CSR. He was then interrogated about his life, relatives, and a brother, living in the FRG. At the end of the interrogation he was given the choice of serving two years in prison for killing a deer or becoming an informant for the StB. Source was reminded that he was arrested in 1951 for attempted illegal border crossing. Source consented to work for StB. With his real name, Source signed an oath, which obligated him to work for the StB and to report all anti-communist activity. Source was given the cover name **b6**

2. Contacting of Informants: At the time of recruitment, Source was told to report to a Lieutenant **b6** at the Labor Service Post, SMECHNO u KLADNO, CSR. Upon reporting to **b6** Source was told to mingle among the Labor Service members working at the Nosek coal mine, STOCHOV (VR2656), CSR, to listen to their conversations, and to report anti-communist attitudes and planned escapes to the West. Reports were to be written on plain paper, dated, and signed with the cover name. Source was then to mail the reports to himself in care of his Labor Service number, which was at that time **b6**. In some way, unknown to Source, **b6** received these letters. Source could also hand over the letter personally in **b6** office. Source was told by **b6** that possibly other men might contact him (Source) to give him missions unknown to **b6**. These men, dressed in civilian clothing would approach Source, call him by his cover name, and give him his mission.

3. Payment: Source received no money, since his work for the StB was considered part of his Labor Service duties.

4. Dropping of Informants: When Source's Labor Service enlistment expired in November 1954, he reported to **b6** office and was told that his work for the StB was finished. **b6** warned Source to be silent about Source's StB work or Source would be sent to prison. Source did not have to sign anything upon dismissal. Source has not seen **b6** since Source's release.

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495

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282

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ZC 500343

69013 231A

Report# CIB-7-58

Date of Report 25 February 58

Prepared By: USASETAF, AC of S, G2,CIB

Country Reported On: Czechoslovakia

Date of Information: Jan 1958

References: None

Subject: espionage - Sabotage School

Evaluation: As indicated

Pilsen, Czechoslovakia

SUMMARY:

Report furnishes information regarding a sabotage - espionage school located at Pilsen, Czechoslovakia; the Flying Red Squad and the squad's personalities.

1. a. An espionage - sabotage school is located in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. The school is directed by a high ranking Czech army officer who is assisted by two former German Army officers, believed to have been members of Hitler's Wehrmacht. The school, supervised by the Czechoslovak Communist Party, admits citizens from any nation so long as the individuals are Communists of unquestionable faith, and providing they are physically and mentally qualified to perform the missions to which they might eventually be assigned.

b. Courses at the school last an initial 15 months, but upon completion, some graduates remain for an additional 10 months for specialization training. The curriculum includes: detailed study of industrial equipment and heavy industries; military installations and equipment of countries which border the Satellite countries; how to maintain relations with the citizens of the countries to which graduates may be sent on intelligence-sabotage missions; methods of crossing frontiers and the use of identification documents and various currencies; specific position, job or profession which the individual will perform as a cover in the country to which he will eventually be sent. For many those destined to serve in West Germany, many are taught traits and mannerisms of traveling salesman; and grammatical and phonetic use of languages.

c. Five Italian Communists have graduated from the Pilsen school. Two are natives of Turin and two are from Milan. The two from Milan are former members of the "Flying Red Squad" which operated in Milan just after World War II and which committed numerous crimes against anti-Communists. The two natives of Turin are reportedly operating in the Frankfurt, Germany area.

d. Most of the graduates from the Pilsen school are sent into West Germany. Before going to West Germany, they are kept in the Soviet Zone of Berlin for a period during which they are taught the latest customs of West Germany. The instructors in this case are Soviet officers.

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e. Once in the operational zone to which they have been assigned, the agents remain for a minimum of six months. Their mission includes the collection of military, economic and political intelligence and proposed sabotage sites such as airfields, rail centers, radio-radar stations, military industries and military installations. The use of local citizens is encouraged and sought as collaborators for their intelligence missions. Eval B6

2. a. The Flying Red Squad (Volante Rossa) was a terrorist band which existed from May 1946 until February 1949. The band terrorized the city of Milan, Italy, and the surrounding area committing many murders, robberies and other crimes. The members of the band were former partisans and all were members or at least sympathizers of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano)(PCI).

b. Many of their crimes were perpetrated against former fascists or anti-partisan elements. Many persons were murdered in cold blood and numerous others were wounded. Many business establishments were robbed and physically wrecked and the custodians of the establishments were killed or wounded.

c. The band was organized and led by Giulio Faggio. Faggio, who was 25 years old at the time the band was broken up in 1949, fled the country to escape prosecution. Other members of the band were [b6] [b6] and [b6]. Twenty-seven members of the band were indicted and tried; six other members were indicted but were not tried because they either fled the country or managed to escape arrest.

d. The following individuals were indicted as members of the Volante Rossa and tried by the Verona Court of Assizes for crimes committed by the members of the Volante Rossa:

✓ (1) Giulio FOGGIO -- son of Ferdinando and Enrica [b6] born 29 September 1925 at Saronno (Milano), Italy; resident of Gallarate (Milano).

✓ (2) [b6] - son of Giuseppe and Emilia [b6] born [b6]

✓ (3) [b6] - son of Antonio and Angela [b6] born [b6]

✓ (4) [b6] - son of Umberto and Francesca [b6] born [b6]

N/A (5) [b6] - son of Agostino and Maria [b6] born [b6]

✓ (6) [b6] - son of Domenico and Maria [b6] born [b6]

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✓ (7) [b6] - son of the late Giovanni and Teresa [b6]
born [b6] resident of Milano.

✓ (8) [b6] - son of Anna; born [b6]

✓ (9) [b6] - son of Edoardo and Giovanna [b6]
born [b6]

✓ (10) [b6] - son of Antonio and Margherita [b6] born
[b6] resident of Sagrate
(Milano).

✓ (11) [b6] - son of Natale and Tarzilla [b6] born
[b6]

✓ (12) [b6] - son of Luigi and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (13) [b6] - son of Arturo and Angela [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (14) [b6] - son of Luigi and Teresa [b6] born
[b6] resident of Milano.

✓ (15) [b6] - son of Derino and Rosa [b6] born
[b6] resident of Milano.

✓ (16) [b6] - son of Carlo and Esterina [b6] born
[b6] resident of Milano.

✓ (17) [b6] - son of Enrico and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (18) [b6] - son of Angelo and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (19) [b6] - son of Pietro and Giuseppa [b6] born
[b6]

✓ (20) [b6] - son of Alfredo and Pierina [b6] born
[b6]

✓ (21) [b6] - son of Mario and Teresa [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (22) [b6] - son of Giovanni and Maria [b6] born
[b6]

✓ (23) [b6] - son of Mario and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

✓ (24) [b6] - son of Ottavio and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

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✓ (25) [b6] - son of Astorre and Stella [b6] born [b6]
born [b6]
✓ (26) [b6] - son of the late Carlo and Cesarina [b6]
born [b6]
✓ (27) [b6] - son of Andres and Elvira [b6]
born [b6]

a. Four of the leaders, POGGIO, [b6] were sentenced to a high security penitentiary (ergastolo) for criminals convicted of the most serious crimes. This is a life sentence, with solitary confinement for one year for POGGIO and for six months for the others.

f. On 25 November 1950, the following persons were found guilty and sentenced as indicated:

b6	30 yrs	b6	4 yrs
	5 yrs, 2 mos		2 yrs
	2 yrs, 8 mos		4 yrs
	2 yrs		2 yrs, 4 mos
	1 yr, 6 mos		1 yr, 6 mos
	4 yrs		4 yrs
	4 yrs		4 yrs
	4 yrs		2 yrs
	4 yrs		2 yrs
	4 yrs		2 yrs

[b6] was sentenced to 9 years and 4 months but the decision was reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence.

POGGIO, [b6] and [b6] were tried "in absentia" on charges of homicide, assault and battery, breeding and entering, attempted homicide, property damage and vandalism. According to various reports, those tried in absentia are supposedly members of the French Foreign Legion. The Italian Supreme Court has denied all those convicted the right to appeal. Evaluation: B-2

COMMENT:

1. Information contained in this report was obtained from reliable confidential Counterintelligence Corps sources.

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CONTENT continued.

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2. An attempt is being made to identify the five Italian Communist who graduated from the Pilsen School. (para 1c)

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OSI - Aviano, Italy
430th CIC Detachment

APPROVED:

b6
Colonel
AC of J,

C1

C2

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11 February 1958

VOLANTE ROSSA (U)
(FLYING RED SQUAD)
PROVINCE OF VERONA, ITALY
PROVINCE OF MILANO, ITALY

On 11 February 1958, Dr. [b6] Director of the Political Section (Ufficio Politico) of the Provincial Police (Questura), Verona, Italy, was queried concerning SUBJECT and stated substantially the following:

SUBJECT was a terrorist band which existed from May 1946 until February 1949. The band terrorized the city of Milan, Italy, and the surrounding area committing many murders, robberies and other crimes. The members of the band were former partisans and all were members or at least sympathizers of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano)(PCI).

Many of their crimes were perpetrated against former fascists or anti-partisan elements. Many persons were murdered in cold blood and numerous others were wounded. Many business establishments were robbed and physically wrecked and the custodians of the establishments were killed or wounded.

The band was organized and led by Giulio Paggio. Paggio, who was 25 years old at the time the band was broken up in 1949, fled the country to escape prosecution. Other members of the band were [b6] [b6] and [b6] Twenty-seven members of the band were indicted and tried; six other members were indicted but were not tried because they either fled the country or managed to escape arrest.

The first trial involving members of the VOLANTE ROSSA was transferred from Milan to Verona because of the public feeling in Milan against the band. The first trial was held in 1951. Even in Verona, public feeling was strongly against the defendants and strict security measures were taken by the police to prevent mob violence. Except in a few cases, all members of the group were convicted and are still serving prison sentences.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source's information is not detailed because his agency was not involved in the investigation of the case. The request for the above information was made as a result of XIR Report 0075, 29 Jan 58, resulting in Agent Report dated 4 Feb 58, Subject: Espionage-Sabotage School, Pilsen, Czechoslovakia; File - LC 15155.

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[b6]

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11 February 1958

VOLANTE ROSSA (U)
(FLYING RED SQUAD)
PROVINCES OF VERONA AND MILANO, ITALY

REF ID: A61200

On 11 February 1958, the files of the 430th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, USASETAP, APO 168, were examined concerning the following individuals and organization and no record was revealed:

Giulio Paggio

b6

VOLANTE ROSSA

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b6 430th CIC Detachment

501

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VOLANTE ROSSA (U)
(FLYING RED SQUAD)

15 February 1958

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On 15 February 1958, Source 3025 was queried concerning SUBJECT and stated substantially the following information:

The following individuals were indicted as members of the VOLANTE ROSSA and tried by the Verona Court of Assizes for crimes committed by the members of the VOLANTE ROSSA:

Giulio POGGIO - son of Ferdinando and Erika Moretti; born 29 September 1925 at Saronno (Milano), Italy; resident of Gallarate (Milano).

N/A [b6] - son of Giuseppe and Bailia [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Antonio and Angela [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Umberto and Francesca [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Agostino and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Domenico and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of the late Giovanni and Teresa [b6] born [b6]
[b6] resident of Milano.

N/A [b6] - son of Anna; born [b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Edoardo and Giovanna [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

N/A [b6] - son of Antonio and Margherita [b6] born [b6]
[b6] resident of Sagrate (Milano).

N/A [b6] - son of Natale and Tarcilla [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

[b6] - son of Luigi and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

[b6] 430th CIC Detachment

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VOLANTE ROSSA (U)
(FLYING RED SQUAD)

15 February 1958

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[b6] - son of Arturo and Angela [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Luigi and Teresa [b6] born [b6]
[b6] resident of Milano.
[b6] - son of Darino and Rosa [b6] born [b6]
[b6] resident of Milano.
[b6] - son of Carlo and Esterina [b6] born [b6]
[b6] resident of Milano.
[b6] - son of Enrico and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Angelo and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Pietro and Giuseppa [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Alfredo and Pierina [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Mario and Teresa [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Giovanni and Maria [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Mario and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Ottavio and Ida [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of Astorre and Stella [b6] born [b6]
[b6]
[b6] - son of the late Carlo and Cesarina [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

[b6] 430th CIC Detachment

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VOLANTE ROSSA (U)
(FLYING RED SQUAD)

15 February 1958

East City Annals

[b6] - son of Andrea and Elvira [b6] born [b6]
[b6]

Four of the leaders, POGGIO, [b6] were sentenced to a high security penitentiary (ergastolo) for criminals convicted of the most serious crimes. This is a life sentence, with solitary confinement for one year for POGGIO and for six months for the others.

On 25 November 1950, the following persons were found guilty and sentenced as indicated:

[b6]	30 yrs	[b6]	4 yrs
[b6]	5 yrs, 8 mos	[b6]	9 yrs
[b6]	2 yrs, 8 mos	[b6]	4 yrs
[b6]	2 yrs	[b6]	9 yrs, 4 mos
[b6]	1 yr, 6 mos	[b6]	1 yr, 6 mos

[b6] - 4 yrs
[b6] - 2 yrs

[b6] was sentenced to 9 years and 4 months but the decision was reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence.

POGGIO, [b6] were tried "in absentia" on charges of homicide, assault and battery, breaking and entering, attempted homicide, property damage and vandalism. According to various reports, those tried in absentia are supposedly members of the French Foreign Legion.

The Italian Supreme Court has denied all those convicted the right to appeal.

On 15 February 1958, the files of the 430th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, USASITAP, APO 168, were examined concerning all the above named individuals and no record was revealed.

REF TO:
LC 15165

504

[b6] 430th CIC Detachment

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22 February 1958

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Army

CIS - StB EE-567299/d
Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants)

1. Security Factors: b1 Source was instructed never to carry on his person written instructions which he received from his handling agent. He was also instructed always to write up a report as soon as he completes an assignment, wrap it in a little package, and hide the package somewhere until it is time to bring it to his handling agent on the West German-CSR border.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

2. Payment: b1 Source received payment of 250 WDM, which was described as reimbursement for past and future expenses in connection with carrying out his assignments. The payment consisted of one 100 DM note and three 50 DM notes wrapped in a package together with Source's new EEI. The package was thrown through the window of Source's car as he drove slowly along the West German-CSR border. In a note accompanying the EEI, Source was told that his handling agent realizes that 250 DM is not very much, but that Source should try to manage and the handling agent will try to settle the difference later.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

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48

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22 February 1958

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Army

CIS - GtB

Re: Modus Operandi
(Cover)

EX-567299/a

1. Cover Story for Source: [b1] Source was instructed to have a cover story prepared explaining his presence in the border area every time he came to the West German-CSR border to meet his handling agent.

(F-6)

Source: A-IV

2. Cover Activity for Source: [b1] Source was instructed not to leave his car during his trips to the West German-CSR border meeting place with his handling agent; but if it becomes necessary to stop, he should pretend that something is wrong with the motor of his car, raise the hood, and while examining the motor, throw out the package with the reports and material for his handling agent. He is then to leave the area as soon as possible.

(F-6)

Source: A-IV

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67

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22 February 1958

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Army

CIS - StB

EV-567299/d

Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications)

1. Codes and Use of Telegraph: [b1] Source was instructed to use the following system to report that he had made a pickup at a dead letter drop. He is to send a telegram to a cover address in Prague 33UVR6048, CSR, in which a date will be mentioned which will be the date he is coming to the border for another meeting, and will sign it with a name which indicates the highway on which the dead letter drop is located. Example: "On the 25th my aunt goes to the hospital. [b6] That means that Source will be at the regular meeting place at the regular time on the 25th of the month in which the telegram is sent and that he made a pickup at the dead letter drop located on the highway whose code name is [b6]. The cover address in Prague to which the telegram is to be sent is [b6].
[b6]

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

2. Letter Drops, Use of Mails, and Codes: [b1] Source was informed that kilometer stones on certain highways will be the location of dead letter drops. They will be near the stone, about 2-4 inches away from the road itself. Highway Number 2 between Muenchen 32UPU9135, Germany, and Starnberg 32UPU7419, Germany, will be called [b6] while Highway Number 2 between Muenchen and Augsburg 32UPU4060, Germany, but in the direction from Muenchen to Fuerstenfeldbruck 32UPU6839, Germany, will be called [b6]. Instructions for making a pickup will be received on a picture post card mailed from a western country (Austria, Switzerland, France, Norway, etc) to Source's address. Example: "Dear friend, Greetings from Paris. I've been on vacation since the 12th and am having a good time. Regards. [b6] That means that Source is to make a pickup as soon as possible at kilometer stone twelve on the Muenchen-Starnberg highway and bring it unopened to the regular meeting place on the West German-CSR border.

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

D-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following individual is identified as a possible informant for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna 33UXPO040, Austria:

Name: b6
 Date of birth: ca 1927
 Place of birth: Unknown
 Present address: Unknown
 Nationality: Austrian
 Marital status: Divorced
 Profession: Unknown
 Occupation: Smuggler
 Height: 5'7"
 Weight: 143 pounds
 Build: Slim
 Face: Thin with a large nose
 Hair: Thick and brunette
 Eyes: Grey
 Distinguishing marks: None
 Characteristics: Intelligent and capable
 Other information: b6 is not a Communist and has no other political interests. He would be working for an unknown Czech intelligence agency only for financial gain. Before 1950, b6 was engaged in a smuggling and black market operation with b6 born approximately 1925, Austrian citizen, with whom b6 may again be associated in informant activities for an unknown Czech intelligence agency in Vienna. Both b6 and b6 were apprehended while transporting contraband across the GFR/CSR border in 1950. They were sentenced to imprisonment in the CSR. b6 was also a friend and fellow prisoner in the prison at Leopoldov 33UPV7489, CSR, of b6 born approximately 1925, Austrian citizen, who may also be associated with b6 as an informant for an unknown Czech

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 February 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV, 66TH CIC GROUP, APO 696, US Forces

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SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi Informants

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

D-567298/a

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

intelligence agency in Vienna. In July 1956, [b6] was released from imprisonment in the CSR. In early 1957, [b6] wrote [b6] a letter from Vienna. [b6] is probably maintaining a residence in Vienna and is probably listed in the address book for that city.

SOURCE: A-IV

F-6

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

AEUC-SCGE; EE-567294/1

29 January 1958

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (U)

31 JAN 1958

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: AEUC-CI(SAGE)

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1. REFERENCES: Letter, this Group, Subject: [b1] file
[b1] dated 27 September 1957.

2. REMARKS:
(SECRET)

- a. (X) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. () Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
- c. (X) Source(s) of the inclosed report was (were). X-9-POMUX, who received his information from a friend who is employed by the [b1]
- d. () Date of the information was: as stated.
- e. (X) Investigation is continuing.
- f. () Investigation is considered closed.
- g. Central Registry, this Group, reveals no record of any of the personalities mentioned in the inclosed reports.
- h. In the above referenced letter, it was disclosed that [b1]
[b1] was kidnapped with one [b6] from VIETNAM on
18 September 1957. [b1]
[b1]
- i. All further reports concerning the above mentioned incident will be forwarded to your Headquarters as soon as received.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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2 Incl
SOIs, FOM, dtd 16 Jan 58 (trip)(G) (U)

[b6]
Major, MI(CE)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mill 8372

DES/EEF/ps

WE PL 206 (L)

29 Nov 55

REGARDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

076

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 January 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 108

B-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service
Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. It is alleged that the Czechoslovakian motor ship "Turiec" has been used by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service on occasion. The vessel was moored near the Lobauer (nca), Austria, harbor on the night of 13 September 1957 and left the next morning. On the night of 13 September 1957, a Czech refugee was kidnapped in Vienna 33U1P04, Austria, and is believed to have been transported into the CSR. The Lobauer harbor is a Danube port area near Vienna.

2. ^{NIR} b6 born b6 in b6 is the commander of the vessel. Josef Jandarik, born 19 March 1898 in Veseli i Morave (nca), CSR, is the nautical assistant to the commander. b6 born b6 in b6 is also an assistant to the commander. He acts as political commissar for the vessel and is allegedly a member of the Statni Bezpecnost (StB - State Security Service).

3. The "Turiec" travels almost daily between Bratislava 33U1B53, CSR, and Vienna, Austria.

SOURCE: A-POMUS

C-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 January 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUH, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

b-567299/a

b2

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. (SECRET) Contacting of Informants: b1 Source was instructed to come on foot to the place on the West German-CSR border where meetings have normally been held (33UTR955687) to make his reports. As soon as he sees a member of the CSR border or security organization, he is to walk right across the border into the CSR without stepping. The meetings are to be held according to the following schedule:

b1

If Source does not appear on the scheduled date, he will be expected the following day at the same time. He is not to write or send a telegram concerning the meetings or his assignments unless he has something most urgent or unusual to report. Source was specifically instructed not to loiter in the area where the border crossing is to be effected.

SOURCE: A-IV

(F-6)

(U)
2. (SECRET) Security Factors: At the first several meetings, Source contacted his Czech handling agent at 33UTR955687, where a West German road parallels and adjoins the West German-CSR border. At that time, meetings were scheduled only for weekdays. Source inquired whether it would be possible to schedule future meetings for weekends, when it would be much easier for him to appear, but was told that his security would be endangered if meetings were held on weekends as there is so much traffic in the area at that time. Of the next five meetings scheduled, however, all but one are to take place on a Saturday or Sunday.

SOURCE: A-IV

(F-6)

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Payment: b1 Source received payment of 400 VDM, which was described as reimbursement for past and future expenses in connection with carrying out his assignments. The payment consisted of eight banknotes of fifty Deutsche Mark denomination wrapped inside a West German newspaper. The newspaper was thrown to Source across the West German-CSR border at the time he received his second assignment.

SOURCE: A-IV

(F-6)

Classified SECRET per authority of

LT. COL. b6

Commanding Officer

Region IV, 66th CIC Group

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512

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SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL**SUMMARY OF INFORMATION**

DA

15 January 1958

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications)

D-567299/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Codes and Use of Telegraph: [b1] Source sent a telegram to [b1] wishing her a happy birthday. This message meant that he wished to meet his StB handling agent the next day at the usual time (1200 hours) at the usual place (33UTR955687). The meeting took place as requested by Source.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

2. Letter Drops: [b1] Source was instructed to obtain the name and address of a person to whom the StB could send instructions in secret writing. After the StB receives the address, it will send the material necessary to decipher the secret writing to Source by means of the regular dead letter drop. A post office box under an assumed name would also be satisfactory.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

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EVALUATION SHEET		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TO: CO, Region IV, 66th CIC Group APO 696, US Army, ATTN: AEC-SCCE		FROM: Hq, 66th CIC Group, APO 154, US Army
DATE OF EVALUATION 10 January 1958	REPORT NR. AEC-SCCE: WL-567298	DATE OF REPORT 6 January 1958
SUBJECT GIS		REFERENCE
SOURCE NR. BSP	DATE RECEIVED 9 January 1958	REQUESTED
EVALUATION DATA		
OVERALL VALUE		VALIDITY
	1. OUTSTANDING (based on importance, timeliness, completeness and accuracy)	1. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
	2. VALUABLE (of value but does not meet criteria for outstanding)	2. PROBABLY TRUE (accepted as true until proved false)
X		X 3. POSSIBLY TRUE (not accepted as true until proved true)
	3. WORTHLESS	4. DOUBTFUL (not accepted, possibly false)
		5. PROBABLY FALSE (accepted as false until proved true)
<p>COMMENTS: (In all cases, comments will consist of a narrative critique to substantiate and explain the overall value and validity. This critique will include the factors evaluated, the facts bearing on evaluated factors and pertinent discussions and conclusions derived therefrom. Comments may also contain recommendation, suggestions, or transmit informational data to the collection agency.)</p> <p>1. Debriefing of [b6] should be accomplished at the earliest date possible. From all appearances [b6] is in possession of a wealth of information on GIS.</p> <p>2. Regrading date cannot be predetermined.</p>		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>514</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> <p>First Copy Available</p>		
SIGNATURE OF EVALUATOR [b6] BAC		APPROVED - SECTION CHIEF [b6] Major, MI (Inf)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 December 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

EE-567298/d

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Communications)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following procedure was to be followed by [b6] an espionage agent sent into the GFR (German Federal Republic) by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service [b1] to report on the Bundeswehr (West German Army), for contacting his handling agent, receiving instructions, and submitting reports. [b6] was to go to the nightclub "Pascha" on the corner of Fraunhoferstrasse and Muellerstrasse, Munich 32UFG9135, Germany.

b1

months. After the floorshow had begun, [b6] was to sit down at a table, call Table 28 by means of the table telephone, and say, [b6] is here and has reserved Room 33." [b6] was to be [b6] cover name, [b6] his cover number. If the answer was received, [b6] is not here, and has not reserved 33," [b6] was to leave and return on another of the above-listed dates. If he received the answer, [b6] is not here and 33 is reserved," he was to remain and wait to be contacted. The contact was to be initiated by the other person, [b6] handling agent. Although he never met him, [b6] had been informed that his handling agent was to be an American captain, [b6] who supposedly frequents the nightclub "Pascha" in uniform. [b6] supposedly makes use of a certain [b6] as his courier. [b6] allegedly possesses a Yugoslavian diplomatic passport. In cases of great importance when [b6] himself could not be contacted for some reason, [b6] was to approach a girl named [b6] at the bar in the "Pascha", identifying himself by means of a password, and give his report to her. [b6] was to address [b6] first with a statement such as, "The train is leaving." [b6] was to answer with the negative form of this statement, thus, "The train is not leaving." With this the contact would be established. This password system was to be changed regularly. In cases of danger or emergency the left leg of Table 30 (pointing toward the dance floor) was to bear a chalk mark or other similar alert symbol down near the floor where it could not be seen from the other tables. Such a mark was to be a signal for [b6] to destroy any reports in his possession and flee as quickly as possible back into Czechoslovakia.

Source: A-IV

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 December 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

EE-567298/d

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi

(Illegal Border Crossing)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following procedure was used by [b6] an espionage agent sent into the GFR (German Federal Republic) by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service [b1] to report on the Bundeswehr (West German Army), in crossing illegally from Czechoslovakia into the GFR. [b1] at about night-fall, [b6] was brought by car from Freiwaldau (Fryvaldov) 33UXR5866, Czechoslovakia, to the Czech-German border area near the Dreilaendereck (point where the borders of Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Austria join) 33UVQ1402, Germany. [b6] was accompanied by two (2) uniformed Czech border soldiers wearing green caps. As [b6] arrived one of these soldiers remarked that the time was not yet right for the border crossing. One of the soldiers instructed [b6] that after he had crossed the border he should head southeast to the community of Wegscheid 33UUP1084, Germany, and from there follow a railroad line to Passau 33UUP8681, Germany. At [b1] [b6] slipped under the barbed wire fencing on the border with the aid of a wire-spreading machine operated by one of the soldiers. Shortly after he had gotten through the fence, [b6] heard a person on the German side of the border cry, "Halt! Who is there?". One of the Czech soldiers immediately replied, "Is Post there?", and a conversation between the Czechs and what seemed to [b6] to be two (2) German customs officials ensued. [b6] continued on his way into the GFR as he had been instructed to do, and therefore did not hear any of this conversation. [b6] is of the opinion that some sort of meeting had been arranged between the Czechs and the German customs officials. [b6] [b6] continued on foot to Wegscheid and thence to Passau, according to his previous instructions. [b6] claims to be aware of the exact number of the border stone at which his illegal border crossing and the conversation between the Czech soldiers and the German customs officials took place, but he refuses to give this information.

A-IV

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
4 December 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT EE-567298/d
Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following procedures were employed by the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service in the period February to September 1957 in the selection, recruitment, and training of [b6] an espionage agent sent into the GFR (German Federal Republic) [b1] to report information on the Bundeswehr (West German Army). In February 1957 a film on the October Revolution in Hungary was shown to a group of political prisoners at a prison in Ungarisch Hradisch (Uherake Hradiste) 33UXQ8554, Czechoslovakia. During a subsequent discussion of the film, Sudeten German prisoners were led to believe that they could gain Czech citizenship if they performed certain unnamed services for the Czechs. This offer was repeated later during a discussion of a "Pravda" article concerning Sudeten Germans, and [b6] and several of his fellow prisoners indicated that they were interested in the proposal. Because he had thus volunteered, [b6] was released from the prison at [b1] and sent for "probation" to a state collective farm at Soehle (Zilina) 33UEU8697, Czechoslovakia. At this farm [b6] was required to sign and submit a short life history including his opinion of his previous conviction by Czech courts for crimes against the state, and of his past treatment by the Czechs. From 1 May until 19 June 1957 [b6] and approximately 80 fellow trainees were given some five (5) hours of "political training" per day, in addition to having to do some eight (8) hours' manual work a day around the farm. The political training consisted of discussions on newspaper articles and lectures given by a certain [b6] supposedly an official of the Czech counter-espionage service, on intelligence operations in the West. These intelligence lectures included supposedly true stories of Czech espionage agents, and seemed to be intended to arouse interest on the part of the trainees in engaging in intelligence operations. All trainees who demonstrated active interest in [b6] lectures were noted down by the Czechs. Later these people, [b6] included, were approached to attend an intelligence training school. [b6] agreed, and was accordingly sent to an intelligence school in the Cadet School at Valachisch Meseritsch (Valasske Mezirici) 33UYQ1584, Czechoslovakia. [b6] attended this school twice: from 19 June to 2 July 1957 and from 23 July to 17 September 1957. During the first of these two periods [b6] attended a general "basic training" course in intelligence. Included in the curriculum was familiarization with conditions and behavior in West Germany, instructions on illegal border crossings, and a preliminary description of the various intelligence operations being carried on in the GFR. Upon leaving this first course of instruction [b6] was required to sign an oath that he would be strictly silent about his attending the intelligence school. During the second period of study at Valachisch Meseritsch, instruction on specific areas and techniques was begun. Trainees with specific mechanical or scientific skills were assigned to an "industrial" course, nearer details of which are unknown. [b6] and others not specifically qualified were assigned to a course for agents to be employed in espionage.

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Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service

4 December 1957

Re: Modus Operandi
(Informants)

against the Bundeswehr. Six (6) basic areas of study were included in this course: 1) forced entry, a laboratory course in which trainees were instructed in picking and by-passing locks and taking wax impressions; 2) microphotography, concerned with the operation and handling of equipment for photographing documents secured during illegal entry; 3) the Bundeswehr, a series of lectures explaining the makeup of the West German Army and setting out the Czechs' EEI regarding it; 4) codes, a course during which trainees were taught the Czech number code (Numeri Kodak) which they were to use in transmitting their reports; 5) the organization and missions of the various West German police agencies; and 6) physical training, Jiu-Jitsu, and pistol training. At the beginning of this course of instruction, trainees were required to sign an oath stating substantially the following: "From today, I agree to work truthfully and with obligation for the Czechoslovakian State and its people and to fulfill all missions given me. I further recognize that I must follow all of the school's rules and that if I deviate from any of the tasks given me by the school, suffer the consequences. If I should fall into unfriendly hands I must not divulge any information about the school or any of the material that I learned there. Everyone who leaves this school has received such extensive knowledge that he is able to help himself in case of danger. It is strictly forbidden to deviate from any of the intelligence methods given here at the school." At the end of the course trainees were required to take another oath stating substantially the same as above. Throughout both of the above periods of intelligence training, [b6] and his fellow trainees were forbidden to address each other by their true names. Trainees were instead addressed either by a cover number or merely by the term "comrade". In addition, agents were assigned both a cover number and a cover name before being sent into the GFR to begin operations. [b6] code number [b6] and his cover name was [b6]

Source: A-IV

(F-6)

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 519-519A

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

Field Office Munich, 66th CIC Group, APO 106, 98-100

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service
Re: Motion Operands: (Illegal Border
Crossings) (S) (U)

DATE FOR USE IN SUMMARY: PARAGRAPH 1

OF SOURCE:

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

LOCALITY OF ORIGIN

DATE OF ORIGIN

RELIABILITY OF ORIGIN

RELIABILITY OF SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Czech intelligence agents frequently enter Austria, and return to the country through an opening in the barbed wire fence located about 75 yards from the road running between Hevlin (Hoeftlein) (USA), CHN, and Lap on the border with Austria. The road between Hevlin and Lap has been torn up and is impassable.

SOURCE: A-FOUR

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 May 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Munich Field Office, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Modus Operandi (c) (U)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 b6

(L-5)

SOURCE:

b1

370 INITIALS
DOCUMENT
CONTAINED IN THIS
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DER/REI //Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
11 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (c) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 born b6 in b6 was apprehended on 8 December 1956 in MUNICH, Germany, on the premises of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees Inc., for seditious relations with the CSR.

The following is substantially the same as that information contained in a report received by this Group from b1

b1 b6

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DER/REF/

Stgt Mil 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

11 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 151, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (e) (U)

KE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

[b6] born [b6] and presently in the custody of
the [b1] for seditious relations with CSR, revealed substantially
the following concerning his recruitment by the CIS:

b1 b6

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

11 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, IIS Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (G) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
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FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 born b6 in b6 was apprehended on 8 December 1956 in MUNICH, Germany, on the premises of the American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees Inc., for seditious relations with the CSR.

The following information concerning compensation received by b6 for his services with the Czech Intelligence Service is substantially the same as that information contained in a report received by this Group from b1

b1

b1 b6

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DER/REI/pc/Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

56-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] confessed Czech Intelligence Service courier, [b6] and presently in custody of the [b1] [b1] was interviewed. [b6] stated substantially the following:

b1 b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DISTRIBUTION

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DER/RFP/oc/Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 5 March 1957
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army		
SUBJECT Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U) EE-567298/d	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] confessed CIS courier, born [b6] in [b6] and presently in the custody of the [b1] was interviewed. [b6] revealed substantially the following: <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 48pt; margin: 20px 0;">b1 b6</div>		
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 5 March 1957
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army		
SUBJECT Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) Re: Modus Operandi (G) (U) EE-567298/d	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] born [b6] in [b6] a confessed CIS courier and presently in custody of the [b1] was interviewed and revealed the following:		
<div style="font-size: 100px; display: inline-block; margin-right: 100px;">b1</div> <div style="font-size: 100px; display: inline-block;">b6</div>		
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (G) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
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OF INFORMATION:

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PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, b6 born
b6 in b6 a confessed CIS courier and presently in custody
of the b1 was interviewed.
b6 stated substantially as follows:

b1 b6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

KE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
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FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] born [b6] in [b6] a confessed CIS Courier and presently in custody of the [b1] was interviewed. [b6] stated substantially as follows:

b1 b6

DISTRIBUTION

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529

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DER/RE²/pc/Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
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FAIRLY RELIABLE C
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UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (Continued)

b1

b6

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DER/REF/rc/Stgt H11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 5 March 1957
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army		
SUBJECT Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) RE: Modus Operandi (C) (U) XE-567298/d	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] confessed CIS Courier, born [b6] in [b6] and presently in custody of the [b1] [b6] was interviewed. [b6] revealed substantially the following: <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 48pt; margin: 20px 0;">b1 b6</div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 100px;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</div>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		5 March 1957
Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
Re: Modus Operandi (G) (U)	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
EE-567298/d	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] confessed CIS courier, born [b6] in [b6] and presently in custody of the [b1] was interviewed.		
[b6] revealed substantially the following:		
b1 b6		
EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)

Re: Modus Operandi - (C) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6] born [b6] in [b6] a confessed CIS courier and presently in custody of the [b1] was interviewed. [b6] states substantially as follows:

b1 b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DER/REF/dc/Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 March 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (CIS)
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

EE-567298/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
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UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During the period 23 November 1956 to 8 December 1956, [b6]
 confessed CIS courier, born [b6] in [b6] and presently in
 custody of the [b1]
 was interviewed. [b6] revealed substantially the following:

b1 b6

THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTRINSIC DOCUMENT ON FILE
 AT IRO, FT. MONROE, MD. IT IS EXCLUDED FOR
 YOUR LOG AS IT IS NOT A COPY OF A DOCUMENT SUBMITTED
 TO ANOTHER AGENCY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISSEMINATION OF DA.
 IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DA DETERMINATION
 RE SUBJECT

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 20 February 1957
PREPARING OFFICE Headquarters, Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army		D-557290/a
SUBJECT <u>Czech Intelligence Service - CIS</u> Re: <u>Modus Operandi</u> (U)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		b6
<p>On 15 February 1957, Source was interrogated at the City Jail in Kronach PA4668 and gave the following information concerning the CIS Modus Operandi:</p> <p>a. <u>Informant</u></p> <p>(1) <u>Selection Standard</u>: Source was apparently selected because he had indicated on many occasions that he would like to return to his homeland in the CSR. Source was a resident of the German Federal Republic (GFR) and would have a base of operations. Source also indicated on many occasions that he was dissatisfied with treatment by US and German authorities in the GFR. Source was also financially in dire straits and very susceptible to recruitment by an intelligence agency.</p> <p>(2) <u>Recruiting</u>: Source voluntarily accepted recruitment by CIS. During his several years in refugee camps and especially in Valka Camp in Puerberg PV5080, Source became very dissatisfied with the lot of a refugee. Source came under the influence of a CIS recruiter who used every means at his disposal to discredit Allied and German authorities in the eyes of Source. Source's recruiter, b6 b6 systematically reduced Source to a point of poverty and need. Source's great desire to return to the CSR made the job of the recruiter very simple. After two years of being under the influence of his recruiter, Source readily accepted recruitment by the CIS. After the groundwork had been laid by b6 Source was told to report to Berlin where he met his handling agent. Source, with no hesitation, immediately accepted his handling agent's offer to fulfill missions for CIS. Source's first indication that he was to be recruited for Czech intelligence came in May 1956. Source signed his pledge to work for CIS b1</p> <p>(3) <u>Training</u>: Source was never given any formal training, however, b1 b1 his handling agent gave him a thorough indoctrination in the use of secret ink for submission of his written reports. The secret ink system taught Source by his handling agent consisted of taking the ashes from four or five Aster or Nestor (German cigarettes) cigarettes and placing these ashes in a clean glass. Source was instructed that nothing other than ashes should be in the glass. The ashes were then to be crushed to form a fine dust. The ashes were to be mixed with pure alcohol or cologne water to form a pasty substance. The ash-paste was then to be, by use of a cotton swabber, thinly and evenly spread on a sheet of onionskin. This was to be left to dry and with a clean swabber, the dried ashes to be removed from the onionskin. He was then to lay the prepared side of the onionskin on a mirror and with a Number 3 pencil write several words very gently in a corner of the unprepared side of the onionskin. After it was noted by use of the mirror that the writing came out evenly, Source was then to prepare to write his message. The message was to be written on a schmitt masterbogen (women's dress pattern) which are to be found in most German women's magazines. Source was not told what methods</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 February 1987

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region III, 66th GIC Group, APO 787, US Army

B-557238/4

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service - CIS
Re: Edwin Oberndorf (S) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

were to be used to bring out this secret writing.

(4) Contacting of Informants: Source met his handling agent, [b6] only on one occasion and that was during the period 2 through 6 February 1957 in Berlin. Source, however, was recruited by [b6] in May 1955 at the Falka Camp in Kuerberg. Source accomplished no missions during the time from his recruitment until he met his handling agent in Berlin.

(5) Security Vow: [b1] Source signed a pledge which bound him to work for CIS. Source wrote the pledge out himself and signed it with his real name after it was dictated by his handling agent. The pledge read as follows:

"I will work for peace and world freedom. I know I make myself liable to punishment if I do not carry out the orders given me."

(6) Payment: Source was sent 150 DM West to defray expenses for his trip to Berlin by his recruiter [b6] in January 1957. [b1] Source was given 400 DM West by his handling agent in Berlin. The 400 DM were to defray expenses on Source's return trip to Kuerberg and for his trip to Berlin [b1] [b1] Source discussed payment with his handling agent and it was decided that further discussions would take place at the meeting [b1] Several suggestions were made by the handling agent, such as, the use of bank accounts either in the GDR or in Germany; payment in a lump sum after [b1] or monthly payments with no specified amounts. During the entire time of the discussion of payment between Source and his handling agent, no specific amount was ever mentioned. Source was informed that in the event his work proved valuable, his family would be taken care of in the GDR and that the way would be made open for him to return to the GDR.

(7) Cover Story: Prior to Source's leaving Berlin, [b1] he was given a German Democratic Republic (GDR) identity document. Source was informed that in the event that he was stopped on the border while attempting to cross into the GFR, he was to state that he was a resident of Berlin and going to Kuerberg to visit friends. Source was also informed that in the event anyone had noticed his absence at the Falka Camp, he was to state that he had been visiting friends for a few days in the GFR.

(8) Documentation: [b1] Source received from an unknown member of CIS a Soviet Zone identity document. Number [b6] issued [b1] [b1] by the Volkspolizei (People's Police - VPO) Berlin Mitte. This identity document was made out to [b6] born [b6] divorced and living at [b6] This document was to be used

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 February 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region III, 66th CIG Group, AF9 707, US Army

D-507290/a

SUBJECT

Speech Intelligence Service - SIA
Re: Medus Garmadi (G) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

by Source to enable him to cross the interzonal border both in the GDR and the GFR at the interzonal crossing point Probstzella PAB901 - Ludwigstadt PAS995. This document was to be destroyed by Source immediately after he was once safely in the GFR.

b. INTERROGATION:

(1) Source was interrogated continuously by his handling agent during the period 3 through 6 February 1957, except for brief periods for eating and sleeping.

(2) [b1] Source's handling agent started a complete debriefing. Source was queried if he knew an individual named [b6] whether he was married; if he had any children; where he was presently located; what was his first name; where he was employed and whether he had any contact with the [b1]

[b1] Source answered that he did know [b6] however, had seen him in the Vorka Camp and had heard that [b6] had returned to the GDR. Source did not know if he was married or if he had any children. [b6] Source stated, was employed with Radio Free Europe and that [b6] living in Naumburg; [b6] living in Vorka Camp; [b6] presently in the GDR and [b6] presently in the GFR were all employed by Radio Free Europe. [b6] then asked Source if he knew whether a [b6] and a [b6] were members of the [b1] Source answered that [b6] [b6] and another unknown individual are all employed at the office of the [b1] [b1] [b6] asked Source where the [b1] was located, a description of the building, number of rooms, room numbers and number of windows. Source answered that the office is located on Glogauerstrasse and that there were two rooms and five windows, but could not give room numbers. [b6] then volunteered the information that the room numbers were 16 and 18. [b6] asked if the building were especially protected and by what means. Source answered that the building was housed with a police office. Source was made to give a complete and detailed description of all the personnel he mentioned as working for the [b1] including in the description requested by [b6] habits, likes, dislikes, weak points, etc. [b6] was extremely and especially interested in [b6] Source was asked if any Greeks were in contact with the [b1] Source answered that [b6] a former resident of Vorka Camp and presently a waiter in Naumburg, and [b6] a member of a Labor Service Company in Kaiserlautern NV1198 since 1955, were the only two Greeks that he knew that had contact with the [b1] Source was asked if he could give the exact mission of the [b1] He thereupon replied that it was a screening unit for refugees to determine their political affiliation and leanings. Source stated he got the impression that [b6] had his doubts about this answer. Source

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1-CCO, 66th CIG Group
1-Region III File

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 February 1967

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region III, 66th GIC Group, APO WFT, W2 Army

D-657222/1

SUBJECT

Greek Intelligence Service - GIGRe: Nikos Gerasimidis (G)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

was asked where the [b1] headquarters is located and if that unit sends Greeks into the GIG for intelligence purposes. Source answered that the headquarters of the [b1] is located in Cologne LBS433, but could not answer as to whether Greeks were being sent into the GIG by the [b1]

(3) [b1] Source was further interrogated by his handling agent, [b6] Source was queried whether he could give any information about the organization Gehlin. Source claimed that he had heard that such an organization existed but could give no particulars about it. Source was asked several times during his interrogations if he knew whether any Greeks were being sent into the GIG by any intelligence agency. [b6] asked Source if he knew anything about an organization called the [b1] Source replied in the negative. (Note: [b1])

[b1] Source was queried in great length about the [b1] Source was asked if he knew an individual named [b6] Source stated that he knows personally that [b6] is connected with the [b1] He gave a complete description of [b6] Source's handling agent was interested in the [b1] located in the Valka Camp. He wanted to know who was in charge, how many employed, where they were located, if there was any friction between the members of the [b1] all information about a [b6] Source answered that the [b1] has four or five rooms at Valka Camp, that [b6] is the chief, an individual named [b6] is a member of that unit and that [b6] is in charge of the political section of the [b1] [b6] questioned Source as to who is located with the GIG Office, where it is located and description of personnel. Source described the office of the GIG in the Valka Camp and stated that there is only one man normally assigned for duty at the Camp. Source could not give his name, and gave a brief description of him.

(4) On 5 and 6 February 1967, most of the information covered in the interrogation of the above two days was repeated and repeated.

c. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) On 12 or 13 January 1967, Source received a letter from [b6] [b6] a GIG recruiter, with the addresser on the letter as being [b6] [b6] Source was informed by his handling agent in Berlin [b1] that this cover address was no longer valid. The letter received from [b6] was postmarked Furberg and had two ten Pfennig stamps affixed. The letter contained actually two letters. One was written in December 1966 and went as follows:

Dear Friend:

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1-OO, 66th GIC Group
1-Region III File

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7 JUN 67

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 February 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region III, 66th SIG Group, APO 757, US Army

D-557298/d

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service - CIA
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

You always knew that I have been a good business man. I now have some business for you. It is not of a political nature and is not dangerous for you. I will be in Berlin on 22 or 23 December 1956 or on 29 or 30 December 1956. I would like very much to be able to spend the Christmas Holidays with you there. I am enclosing 180 RM West to defray expenses of the trip. You must take a plane from Frankfurt to Berlin. The plane leaves Frankfurt at 1045 and arrives in Berlin at 1230 hours. Take the U-Bahn to Noringdam. Change and go to Alexanderplatz. Change and go to Karl Schumakerplatz. At Friederichsstrasse station, get out and take S-Bahn to Ost Bahnhof (East railway station) where I shall meet you at 1800 hours.

Yours,

b6

The other letter enclosed in the envelope was as follows:

Dear Friend:

For several reasons I did not mail the other enclosed letter. As I did not want to rewrite the instructions, I am enclosing the other letter with this one. Follow the instructions of the other letter and I shall meet you in Berlin on 2 February 1957. Do not tell any one about this letter or about our meeting in Berlin.

B.

(2) Source was informed by his handling agent that in the event an individual was sent to him by the handling agent, the following code would have to be used for authentication:

Unknown individual would say, "I come from Intra."

Source answers, "What do you want from me? I have not seen you for nine years."

Unknown individual would answer, "And it is for that reason that I come."

Source was informed by his handling agent that the above dialogue could either be in Czech or German, depending on who would be sent. Source was also informed that it could be a man or a woman.

(3) b1 Source was given the cover name, b6 This was to be used in signing all transmissions between Source and his handling agent. In

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1-Region III File

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1 JUN 47

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264

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
30 February 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 787, US Army

B-667390/d

SUBJECT

Special Intelligence Service - SIS
Re: Maine Command (C) (U)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

the event that Source felt that he had been compromised, he was to immediately send a letter to his handling agent and sign it b6. The addition of the word b6 would be an alert for the handling agent that Source was either being watched or had been compromised. At the same time that Source received his cover name, he was informed by his handling agent that all correspondence would be sent to b6.

Source was made to repeat this cover address numerous times by his handling agent. All transmissions between Source and his handling agent must be conducted by the use of the secret ink writing method explained in Paragraph a(3) of this report. There was no provision made for written correspondence from handling agent to Source. Source was informed by his handling agent that immediately upon arrival in Hamburg he was to send a birthday card with the following text to indicate that he had arrived safely:

Many wishes on your birthday. I hope to hear from you soon.

b6

This card was to be sent to the cover address in Prague.

d. TRANSPORTATION:

(1) Air: Source was instructed by his CIC recruiter to take an Air France scheduled flight from Frankfurt to Berlin in preparation to meet his handling agent.

(2) Rail: Source was ordered by his handling agent to return to the GFR by means of the interzonal train, Berlin to Munich P8235, passing over the interzonal crossing point, Prebstzella - Ludwigstett.

e. BORDER CROSSING: Source attempted to cross the interzonal border at Ludwigstett with a false GDR identity document and was arrested b1.

b1 in Ludwigstett. Source was furnished a GDR identity document by his handling agent to facilitate his crossing the interzonal border.

No further information was available.

(F-6)

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1-Region III File

540

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 57

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file
AEUC-OCB; EE-567298/*Cam*

31 January 1957

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: AEAGB-C

b6

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference is made to letter, this Group, dated 29 January 1957, Subject and file as above, and letter, this Group, dated 22 January 1957, Subject: b1 (C), file b1

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith are the following Summaries of Information:

a. CIS, Re: Modus Operandi, file EE-567298/d, dated 29 January 1957.

b. CIS, Re: Personalities, file EE-567298/f, dated 29 January 1957.

b1

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) It is requested that no information be passed to any other agency which would possibly compromise this b1

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL upon removal of SECRET inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2 Incl
SOIs dtd 29 Jan 57 (trip)(S)

b6
Captain, MI(Armor)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371
DER/KCH/pc

541

Page 1 of 1 Pages
Copy 3 of 6 Copies

243
b1

b6

~~SECRET~~

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 542-
559

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(Not
Issued)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 320-320-10)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

DATE

24 Oct 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567298/d

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIDENTIAL
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFUL
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by the CIS, PRAGUE: b1 b6 born b6 traveled from FRANKFURT/MAIN (MA7751) to the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, reported to an unidentified GDR police station, explained his intentions of returning to the CSR, and was referred to the boarding house of b6 b6 and told to wait for further instructions. b1 b6 was interviewed by a Czech national who attempted to send b6 back to the GDR, allegedly to work for the Czech Intelligence Service. b6 refused employment, and b1 was driven to the GDR/CSR border town of BAD SCHANDAU (VS4142), transferred to another car, and was driven to a small hotel in PRAGUE, location unknown, where other returnees were housed. b1 b6 was transferred to another villa in another section of PRAGUE and recruited by the CIS. b6 was to be sent back to FRANKFURT/MAIN and register with the police as moving to HAMBURG (NE6534). He was also given a brief instruction in secret writing and told that approximately two months after he had established himself in HAMBURG, he was to write to b6 b6 The letter was to include a date when b6 would be able to appear in a Soviet Sector of BERLIN cafe, "Warschau". On b1 b6 was taken to the GDR/CSR border near WEIDEN and supplied with 500 DMW. b6 was instructed to go to KAISERSLAUTERN (MV1077) and report to the police his change of address. Instead of traveling to KAISERSLAUTERN, b6 went to the home of his girl friend, b6 b6 and remained until approximately 10 June 1956. b6 again returned to the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, anticipating repatriation to the CSR, reported to the former boarding house in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, and immediately cabled PRAGUE. b1 b6 was contacted by the same Czech national and was told by b6 that he was unable to stay in KAISERSLAUTERN since the police were searching for him. The Czech national gave b6 300 DMW and instructed him to return to KAISERSLAUTERN. b1 b6 departed the Soviet Sector of BERLIN and again visited his girl friend in BAD KREUZNACH, and recorded his change of address in KAISERSLAUTERN as instructed. About b1 b6 again returned to the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, reported to the same boarding house, and sent a cable to PRAGUE. b6 was again visited by the same Czech national and was told to stay in the boarding house to await further instructions. b6 did not remain in the boarding house, was arrested, and was released on

b1

b6

2. An examination of the files maintained by Region VIII revealed no information concerning the personalities or addresses mentioned in this report with the following exceptions:

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used

(Not Classified Un-
less Data Entered)

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210

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
(SF 360-220-10)

DATE
24 Oct 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567298/d

CBW/awt

SUBJECT

CIS
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 has been previously mentioned in connection with Czech contacts he made b1 the latest being 66th CIC Headquarters letter dated 9 October 1956, Subject: b6 no evaluation.

b. Cafe "Warschau", located in BERLIN-Mitte, Stalinallee, has been previously reported as a meeting place for Soviet and German intelligence agents, evaluation B-2.

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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209

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☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 562-
564

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 106 US ARMY

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6 September 1956

D-567298

SUBJECT: Suspected Czech Intelligence Activity

(U)
(C)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. Reference is made to the following:

a. Operational Memorandum 16/55, your Headquarters, dated 31 October 1955.

b. Agent Report, subject and file as above, previously submitted to your Headquarters.

2. Forwarded herewith are the following:

a. Key Sheet, Region IV, subject and file as above, dated 5 September 1956.

b. Two Summaries of Information, Region IV, subject and file as above, dated 5 September 1956.

3. Case is closed in the Region IV area.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

3 Incls:

- 1 - KS dtd 5 Sep 56
- 2-3 - SOIs dtd 5 Sep 56

b6

/encc/Luft M 625-23

b6

Lt Col, MI (Inf)
Commanding

7. SEP. 1956

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Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010

by USAINSCOM FOIPA

Auth para 4-102; DOD 5200-1R

File 567298/F

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

41-3200

57

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 September 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

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SUBJECT

Suspected Czech Intelligence

Activity

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1 b6

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Date 9/24/58 Init 320

DISTRIBUTION

1 - Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, USARFOR 566 1 - Region IV File

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1 JUN 47

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AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(U)
Suspected Czech Intelligence Activity (c)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 July 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567298

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

b6

199 July 56

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6
Region IV, 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

567 b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JAN 52, WHICH MAY BE USED.

ACL (1) 15-52-2004-0000

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195

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

6 August 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XII, 66th SIG Group, APO 227, US Army

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SUBJECT

GTS

RE: Medus Operandi

D-567298/4

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

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567298/4

56

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FORM 8-64

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 August 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567290/4

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service

Re: Modus Operandi (U)
(Recruitment) (C)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

In late February 1956, [b1] born [b1] in [b1] who was being held as an illegal border crosser in a prison located at Karlsbad (WM4966), CSR, was questioned by two members of an unknown Czech intelligence agency over a period of several days concerning his personal affairs and acquaintances. After determining that he was in poor financial condition, his interrogators indicated that [b1] could earn extra money by doing "favors" for them. The nature of these "favors" was not explained to him. In the course of a subsequent interrogation, a statement was dictated to [b1] to the effect that he would obligate himself to voluntarily and willingly carry out all orders given him by his handling agent and that he could expect severe punishment in the case of treasonous activities on his part. [b1] signed this statement and was promised 50 Deutsche Mark (DM) for each mission properly carried out and an additional 30 DM for each illegal border crossing. After signing this agreement, [b1] was allowed full freedom of movement within the prison confines and given a daily allowance of from 15 to 20 cigarettes, which he had not had previously. [b1] was also given explicit instructions not to reveal the fact to anyone that he was interrogated in the prison by civilians.

EVALUATION: (F-6)

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573

1 - Region IV File

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 57

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310

342

HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 108 US ARMY

AEUC-OTS: D-567298

19 July 1956

SUBJECT: Suspected Czech Intelligence Activity (U) (S)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. Reference Operational Memorandum 4/55, your Headquarters, dated 31 October 1955.
2. Forwarded herewith is Agent Report, Subject and file as above, dated 10 July 1956.
3. Control of information is as follows:

b1

b. Case is closed in the Region IV area.

4. No investigative action is contemplated by this office. If the unidentified individual mentioned in the attached report reappears in this area and an identification is obtained, a further report will be submitted.

1 Incl:
AR dtd 10 Jul 56

b6 /rvf/MM 625-27

b6

b6
Lt Col MI (Inf)
Commanding

- 3. AUG. 1956

3674

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IV 910

This Document Has Been
Carded by C/R Section
Date 4/8/56 Init 320

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED
571 CONFIDENTIAL

194

1-2562

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 280-320-10)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Suspected Czech Intelligence Activity (U)
(S)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 July 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567298

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1 b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

Region IV, 66th CIC Group

572

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 51

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 841, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (7) 12-32-5004-30088

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 580-520-10)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Suspected Czech Intelligence Activity (U)
(S)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 July 1956

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567298

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 11 July 1956, files of Regional Registry, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, Munich 32UPU93, Germany were examined concerning Ida [b6] with negative results.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6] 573
Region IV, 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6]

DA FORM 341
1 APR 56

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 10, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-520M-50003

193

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

BY D-234946

BY D-567298/4

DATE

21 June 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region IV, 66th CIC Group, VBAHEUR, APO 108, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (c)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

One selection standard used by the Czech Intelligence Service in recruiting an informant is the proximity of the individual to the German/CSR border. On 18 April 1956, an individual who lives near the German/CSR border was approached by several Czech Border Guards. The first step in the attempted recruitment was to establish common acquaintances with the individual. The next step was to provide this individual with approximately 500 DM, allegedly without demanding a receipt or a promise of future action. In this manner the Czechs have shown the person how easy it would be to earn some money to augment their income and probably at the next meeting would request the person to perform some simple task, e.g. bring some German newspapers to the border. Once the individual has been introduced to this easy method of obtaining extra money, it is a simple problem for the Czechs to request certain simple tasks to be performed thus obtaining another low level informant. (P-6)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 108 US ARMY

19 JUN 1956

AEUC-OCE
IV-D-567298

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
(S)

TO: Commanding Officer
66TH CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: Operational Memorandum Nr. 17/55, your headquarters, dated 14 November 1955.

2. FORWARDED:

a. Summary of Information, subject: "Czech Intelligence Service Re: EEI's and Targets (C)" (U) file IV-D-567298/c, dated 7 June 1956.

b. Summary of Information, subject: "Czech Intelligence Service Re: Modus Operandi (Communications-Possible Contact by Mail) (C)" (U) file 567298/d, dated 7 June 1956.

c. Summary of Information, subject: "Czech Intelligence Service, Re: Modus Operandi (Communication-Possible Letter Drop) (C)" (U) file 567298/d, dated 7 June 1956.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

b1

b. This information was obtained on 3 May 1956 by
Special Agent b6 this region, during the course of
b1

This Document Has Been
Carded by C/R Section
Date JUL 2 1956 Init 310

9 JUN 1956
In Log Nr.
515 8577

OUT LOG Nr.
IV 10816

21. JUN 1956
39458

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AEUC-OCE

IV-D-567298

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
(e)

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4. REMARKS:

b1

b1 Case is considered open. Subsequent reports concerning this case will be forwarded so as to reach your headquarters on or about 8 July 1956.

b6

3 Incls:

1. SOI (1 page) Lt Colonel, Inf
dtd 7 Jun 56 (dupe) Commanding
2. SOI (1 page)
dtd 7 Jun 56 (dupe)
3. SOI (1 page)
dtd 7 Jun 56 (dupe)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 23 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region IV, 66th CIC Group, APO 108, US Army

D-567298/2

SUBJECT

Czechoslovakian Intelligence
Service (S) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. [b6] a confessed operative for CIS in BUDWEIS, CSR, was given a cover address to be used to contact his CIS handling agent in BUDWEIS in late 1954. The address is as follows:

[b6]

SOURCE: A-IV

EVALUATION: (P-6)

2. Source B-IV had been given a cover address by [b6] which was to be used to establish mail contact with the CIS handling agent of Source B-IV in the CSR. The address is as follows:

[b6]

SOURCE: B-IV

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EVALUATION: (B-3)

3. The numerous border crossings [b6] made on behalf of the CIS from the CSR to Austria from 1953 to 1956 were all made at a railroad bridge which is within walking distance of C. VHELENICE, CSR, in the direction of GMEIND 33TNU50, Austria. The bridge passes over a small river which forms the actual boundary between Austria and the CSR. On either side of the river, along the bridge, are water pumping stations for the two towns. A CIS agent always accompanied [b6] to the border when [b6] left the CSR on a mission, but the Czech bridge guard never questioned them. According to instructions, [b6] would cross the bridge, then leave the railroad tracks, and continue the journey into GMEIND on the path which ran along the tracks between the pumping station and GMEIND. If he was stopped by a border guard at the time of crossing, he was to state that he was a Czech railroad mechanic who was making a check of the track. Should he be away from the tracks, but not yet into the town of GMEIND, he was to state that he was checking the power station on the Austrian side of the border. Should he be stopped anywhere after he passed the power station, he would not be in for any trouble, since he would be in the town of GMEIND. The CIS handling agent supplied [b6] with Austrian documents for all trips. Return trips were to be made at designated times at the same location, and he was always met at the border by his CIS handling agent. In all

(continued)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION IV-D-567298/4 (IV-D-254946)		DATE 21 May 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region IV, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 108, US Army		
SUBJECT CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U) (Recruitment)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 1. During the period from 28 October 1955 to 26 January 1956, while Source A-IV was detained at a prison in PILSEN (35UWR8412), CSR, an attempt was made by an unknown CIS to recruit him. The original approach was that of economic security because Source A-IV had lived in orphanages most of his life, and had not remained at one employment for any long period of time. The CIS agent proposed to keep him in prison for a while so that the Germans would not be suspicious of him upon his return. They would give him some German Marks for his expenses and return him to Germany. When the recruitment attempts did not meet with success, Source A-IV was told that they would supply him with an apartment in MUNICH (32UPW9135), Germany, and give him money to live on. As a final attempt at recruitment, he was offered a possible reunion with his parents whom he crossed the German/CSR border to find. Threats and force were not used in the recruitment attempts. (P-6) 2. During the attempts to persuade Source A-IV to work for CIS, Source A-IV was told that he would be sent back to Germany the same way he had come to the CSR. He was then to write the information down that he had gathered and go to the German/CSR border in the FURTH in WALD (35UWR4801), Germany, area. There, he was to contact the Czech border guards. Once he made this contact, he was then to write on a piece of paper, "Everything is fine in Germany, I have work." The guards would then contact Source A-IV's handling agent. The information would then be checked to ascertain whether Source A-IV was really working for the CSR. If the information proved correct, he then could return to MUNICH and would be given added financial help and an address in MUNICH to which he would send subsequent information. No name was given Source A-IV by his handling agent. (P-6) Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION 573 BEST COPY AVAILABLE		

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☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 580

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

VI-D-56, 18/d
(VI-D-391827)DATE
20 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service (GIS);
Re: Modus Operandi (O) (U)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

One selection standard used by the GIS in recruiting an informant is the proximity of the individual to the German/Czech border. The informant is approached initially while he is in the border area. In the case of Source B-VI, the Czechs, during their first meeting, attempted to establish common acquaintances with him. He was asked whether he knew [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 or a wood-dealer from ESLARN (33UUQ2095), Germany, named [redacted] b6 [redacted] b6 On subsequent meetings Source B-VI was requested to perform minor missions, such as purchasing literature or newspapers. Each time the informant is paid a small sum, with the offer of future payments as an added inducement for prompt accomplishment of the missions. (F-6)

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

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SUMMAR OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
(U) StB (Statni Bezpecnost) - State Security (G); Re: Administration (Uniforms and Insignia)	OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. Source A-VI has seen persons known to be members of the StB office in PARDUBICE (33UWR)5643, CSR, regularly wearing uniforms. The uniform was described as being identical in style, cut and color to the uniform of the Czechoslovakian Army with the exception of a broad red band which encircles the service cap worn by the StB. (F-3)</p> <p>2. The shoulder board worn by one person had a red background color which was superimposed by a yellow stripe lengthwise through the center and two yellow cross stripes. (EXHIBIT <u>1</u>) (F-6)</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>		
D-567299/8		
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
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SOI, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army
SUBJECT: StB; Re: Administration (Uniforms and Insignia)
FILE: VI-D-567299/b; b2; dtd 16 April 1956

EXHIBIT 1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

VI-D-567298

DATE

16 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service)
(G); Re: Modus Operandi (Border
Crossings - Illegal)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source A-VI, in being dispatched into Germany on behalf of the CIS, was escorted to a point near the East/West sector border within BERLIN (33UUU9220), DME, and instructed to cross the sector boundary into the western sector. Source A-VI encountered no difficulty in the crossing and was not challenged. (P-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REF ID: A66729		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (U) (G); Re: Modus Operandi (Border Crossings - Legal)	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source A-VI, prior to his dispatch into Germany on behalf of the CIS was transported by auto in the company of his handling agent from a safe-house in the vicinity of PRAGUE (33UVR6048), CSR, to East BERLIN (33UUU9220), DDR. During this trip a legal crossing of the CSR/DDR border was made as well as a legal passing of the East German and Soviet Control point at SCHOENEFELD (33UUU9805), DDR, which controls entry into the Soviet sector of BERLIN. At both the Czech and DDR border stations, the handling agent entered the station alone to arrange passage for the party and in neither case was the vehicle inspected or Source A-VI seen or questioned by the border guards. In passing the BERLIN control point at SCHOENEFELD, the party was required to await the arrival of another car which escorted them into the city of BERLIN. (P-3)</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: right;">BEST COPY AVAILABLE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-56-98/d	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2	16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
(U)(C); Re: Modus Operandi (Reports - Types required of informants)	OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI, who was dispatched into Germany on behalf of the CIS, was instructed to submit all reports to his handling agent written in secret ink on an otherwise innocent appearing letter sent by ordinary mail to a designated cover address within the CSR. The reports were to be brief and contain only essential material and confined, unless otherwise instructed at a future date, to the specific EEI given to Source A-VI at the time of his dispatch. The EEI, in this case, concerned the contacts of and the communications system utilized by Source B-VI and were to include any available information concerning the dispatch of agents into the CSR.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-3)</p>			
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>BEST COPY AVAILABLE</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-567-18/8	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (U)(C); Re: Modus Operandi (Operational Liaison)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>The CIS appears to maintain operational liaison with and to receive the cooperation of the Czech PS (Pohranicni Straz - Border Guard) and its East German counterpart as well as that of East German Intelligence agencies. Source A-VI was accompanied by his CIS handling agent, taken across the CSH/East German border, into the controlled area of East BERLIN (33UUU9220), DDR, without appreciable delay at any check point and without being seen or questioned, or having the vehicle in which the party was travelling inspected at any time. At the East German/CSH border crossing point, Source A-VI's handling agent entered both the Czech and East German border stations alone to obtain clearance for the vehicle and the party, while at the BERLIN control point at SCHOKENFELD (33UUU9805), DDR, the party awaited the arrival of another vehicle which escorted them into East BERLIN and to a hotel where the party was quartered without any formality of registration or presentation of Identity Documents. At least one member of the party in the escorting vehicle was a German.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-6)</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-567, 1/1a	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE	Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (UIC); Ref: Modus Operandi (Cover - Cover Stories)		
	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI was dispatched by the CIS on a mission into Germany under the guise of a political refugee who had fled from Czechoslovakia in order to avoid arrest. As a part of his training for the mission, Source A-VI was required to memorize a cover story which detailed both the reasons for his flight and the alleged manner of escape from the CSR into the DDR and eventually into the western sector of BERLIN (33UUU9220), Germany. (F-3)</p> <p>a. Source A-VI, in order to establish himself as a political refugee in Germany, was to relate that he had fled the CSR to avoid arrest and imprisonment on charges of anti-regime activities and illegal possession of weapons. The basis of the investigation of Source A-VI was to be explained by his relationship to a [b6] who had recently been arrested on such charges. It is to be noted that although Source A-VI was unaware of the existence of this person, his CIS handling agent informed him that such a person existed and had been arrested on the stated charges, so that if the story was checked in any manner by western authorities who would later interrogate him, his statements in this connection would be verified. Source A-VI was to explain his prior knowledge of the imminent arrest by stating that he had been warned by an acquaintance who was a member of the local police. The name of the particular police officer was not given to Source A-VI, instead he was told to use the name of any officer known to him so that there would be less chance of error while being interrogated. (F-3)</p> <p>b. Source A-VI who was dispatched into Germany through East BERLIN, was instructed to relate a false story of his flight from the CSR in order to explain his appearance in that city. Source A-VI was to state that, following the warning that he was soon to be arrested, he travelled to PRAGUE (34UVR6048), CSR, in order to contact an alleged acquaintance, [b6] a locomotive engineer, for the purpose of obtaining his assistance in fleeing the CSR. [b6] was to have agreed to assist Source A-VI by concealing him in a coal tender of a train going into the DDR. Source A-VI was to further relate that he had given [b6] 2000 Czech Crowns with the understanding that [b6] would obtain a quantity of both German and East German Marks to assist Source A-VI through the DDR and into Germany. Source A-VI was to further relate that he had been taken to</p>			
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VI-D-367298/d1 b2 (U)
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (S)
Re: Modus Operandi (Cover - Cover Stories)

16 April 1956

the railroad yards in PRAGUE by b6 and after being given coveralls to protect his own clothing, was hidden in a protected place under the coal which had been formed by the use of lumber. After a trip of four to five hours the train was to have arrived at SCHNITKA (33UVB4638), DDR, where he and b6 remained overnight. On the following morning b6 was to have purchased a rail ticket for BERLIN and to have given it, together with 100 German Marks and about 20 East German Marks to Source A-VI and to have instructed him to travel by train until a station or two before SCHONENFELD (33UVU9805), DDR, where he was to leave the train and to await darkness before proceeding on foot to SCHONENFELD where he was to attempt to pass the East German/Soviet control point without detection. Source A-VI was then to state that after successfully by-passing the controls, he walked to East BERLIN where he wandered around the city until he found the sector border on the following day and successfully crossed into the Western sector of the city. (P-5)

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 890-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT (U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C) RE: Modus Operandi (Cover - cover stories)		2. DATE SUBMITTED 16 April 1956	
		3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER VI-D-567298/d	
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (REGIONAL REGISTRY) On 20 March 1956, the files of the Registry, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army, were examined and revealed no record of the personalities mentioned in the foregoing Summary of Information.			
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 66TH CIC GROUP 590			
6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT b6			

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-567-48/4 b2	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (UIC); Re: Modus Operandi (Communications Security, Practices and Devices)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
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<p>Source A-VI was provided with a number of devices to indicate the presence and validity of secret writing in messages mailed to his CIS handling agent. These devices included: (P-3)</p> <p>a. All messages were to be numbered consecutively, the number being the first word of the message written in secret ink. The presence or absence of this number was to act as an indication of the validity of the message and was to be omitted if Source A-VI suspected that the information contained in the message was being planted and was false. The number could also act as a control factor in the operation of the letter drop. (P-3)</p> <p>b. The presence or absence of secret writing in any given message was to be indicated by the use of the word "In" preceding the name of the city appearing in the date line of the open text letter. For example, if the letter were to be written in BERLIN and the date line read "In BERLIN, 20 March 1956", it would be an indication of the presence of secret writing, while the use of "BERLIN, 20 March 1956" would be an indication that no secret report was contained in the letter. The use of the phrase indicating the presence of secret writing without it's actual presence, using instead a thinly veiled double meaning open text would indicate that the letter was being written under duress. (P-3)</p> <p>c. All valid messages in secret ink were to be closed by the use of the word "Konec", a Czech word meaning "End" placed before the signature. (P-3)</p> <p>d. An open and readily apparent check on the validity of any letter report mailed by Source A-VI was provided in the method of opening the open text of the message. If the sender desired to indicate that the letter contained information he considered reliable and that the letter was not written under any sort of duress or supervision, the letter was to be written in a normal manner with the first sentence beginning on the line following the salutation and indented in the usual way. In the event that the sender had been apprehended and the letter was being written under compulsion of any sort, the opening sentence would be written immediately after and on the same line as the salutation. This would indicate that any information contained in this report should be disregarded. (P-3)</p>			
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VI-D-567298/d; b2 (U)
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C)
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications
Security, Practices and Devices)

16 April 1956

e. A further check of the validity of the message was to have been indicated by the repeating of all names of persons and places as well as the writing of all numbers and dates both in figures and in words.
(F-3)

f. Source A-VI was instructed to use only the first and third pages of any letter which was to be folded booklet style. This practice was not only to insure legibility of the developed message but was also to serve as a validity check, the use of the second and/or fourth pages indicating either that the message was prepared under duress or had been written by a person other than Source A-VI.
(F-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 7-2-56729b		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE b2		16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C); Rei Modus Operandi (Communications - Letter Drops)	OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source A-VI was provided with an address in the CSR to which all reports to his CIS handling agent were to be addressed. The actual reports were to be contained in an apparently innocent letter in secret writing, utilizing only ordinary mail to avoid attracting attention to the letter in any manner. All letters were to be addressed to b6</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-3)</p>		
<div style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</div> <div style="text-align: right;">BEST COPY AVAILABLE</div>		
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AGENT REPORT

(SR 280-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Letter
Drops)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 April 1956
3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

VI-B-567298/4

b2

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(REGIONAL REGISTRY) On 20 March 1956, the files of the Registry
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, W3ARREUR, APO 696, US Army, were examined and
revealed no record of b6

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

594

b6

66TH CIC GROUP

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-567	b/d	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		16 April 1956		
SUBJECT		b2		
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (U)(C); Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation - Road)		Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USARMC, APO 696, US Army		
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:		
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1		
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE 2		
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE 3		
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4		
UNRELIABLE E		IMPROBABLE 5		
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION				
<p>Source A-VI, from the time he initially came under the control of the CIS until he was escorted to the East-West BERLIN sector border to attempt an illegal crossing into the Western sector of the city, was transported only by automobile. During the one-week period of detention while Source A-VI was under the control of the CIS, he was moved by car from OHREUDIM (33UWR5733), CSR, to PARDUBICE (33UWR5643), CSR, then to a safe house near PRAGUE (33UWR6048), CSR, and finally from the safe house to East BERLIN (33UWR9220), DDR. During this period two cars, both either black or dark blue in color, of the Tatra-Plan type were utilized. Source A-VI had the impression that the cars were regularly assigned to specific chauffeurs who were solely responsible for the operation and maintenance of the vehicles.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-3)</p>				
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>				
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-7298/1	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2	16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service)	OF SOURCE:		
(U)C; Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Recruiting)	OF INFORMATION:		
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI was recruited as an informant of the CIS specifically for a mission into Germany, during an interrogation concerning his connection to and activities on behalf of Source C-VI, alleged by the CIS to be an agent of a western intelligence agency. During the course of the interrogation it became evident to Source A-VI that the information known to the CIS interrogators could only have come from an interrogation of Source C-VI, whereupon he admitted the relationship. Source A-VI was then offered the alternative of either redeeming himself for his act of treason by working on behalf of the CIS or having his family and himself imprisoned for his activities. At the same time that thinly veiled threats of punishment were being voiced by his interrogator, Source A-VI was being appealed to on the grounds of patriotism and in the name of communism. During this period Source A-VI was constantly reminded of his duty to his country and being told of the inevitable victory of communism which was in the interest of the welfare of himself, his family and his country. The principle motive exploited, however, was an inference that Source A-VI and his family would be permitted to live normal lives if he would cooperate with the CIS and work actively for them. At no time were any actual promises of immunity or material or financial reward for either Source A-VI or his family offered or discussed. After Source A-VI agreed to work on behalf of the CIS, he was informed that preparations would begin immediately, and he then remained under the control of the CIS for a period of one week, undergoing indoctrination and training, until his dispatch into Germany. Source A-VI was not required to sign any agreement to work for the CIS or any oath of silence or loyalty in connection with his recruitment. The only papers signed by Source A-VI were the statement prepared as a result of his interrogation which was, in effect, an admission of treason on his part, and, prior to his actual dispatch into Germany, an acknowledgement of receipt of 100 German Marks which were given to him for expenses. (F-3)</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		567298	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		b2	
SUBJECT (U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (c); Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Training)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E SUSPECTED 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI, after the initial approach to him and his recruitment by the CIS, was transported by car to an isolated safe-house where he underwent approximately five days of training for his future mission. (F-3)</p> <p>a. The training was divided into four phases and although of a rudimentary and generally non-technical nature was intensive and specifically designed for one particular mission (F-3)</p> <p>(1) The first phase was that of political, emotional and patriotic indoctrination with the aim of influencing Source A-VI to carry out his mission in the name of communism and Czechoslovakia, regardless of personal or other factors which might come into being. This phase was particularly stressed since Source A-VI was to be dispatched on a mission which directly involved relatives living in Germany. The entire first day in the safe house was devoted specifically to this phase and further periods of indoctrination occurred from time to time as an appropriate opportunity presented itself. (F-3)</p> <p>(2) The second phase of training was that of memorizing a cover story which had been previously prepared. The major portion of the cover story was based upon the true facts of Source A-VI's life and varied from the truth only in so far as it dealt with his reasons for allegedly fleeing Czechoslovakia and his manner and means of flight. The second day of training was almost entirely devoted to the memorization of this cover story. (F-3)</p> <p>(3) The third phase of training was devoted to methods of preparing reports, the use of secret writing materials, and the memorization of a letter drop address and the predetermined devices to indicate the presence and validity of secret writing in an otherwise innocent appearing letter. About 12 hours was devoted to this type of training. (F-3)</p> <p>(4) The final phase of training was a general briefing covering the manner in which Source A-VI was to conduct himself during interrogation by American and German authorities, his actions upon crossing the border into Germany and his general method of operation against his target. During this period Source A-VI was also given a specific mission and REI. (F-3)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>			
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VI-D-567298/d: b2 (U)
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C)
Re: Medus Operandi (Informants - Training)

16 April 1956

b. The entire course of training was delivered to the safe-house by a driver after preparation at some other installation. It consisted of a number of typewritten sheets which, according to Source A-VI, appeared to have been prepared especially for use in this single operation. (P-3)

c. The method of instruction was based simply upon a constant repetition and drill on the basic facts until Source A-VI had achieved the desired mastery of the materials presented. The material would be first outlined orally from the prepared scripts until Source A-VI had memorized the basic facts, then he would be given the actual scripts to study for the purpose of learning the details of the particular phase of study. Following this Source A-VI was questioned at length by one or both of the CIS members responsible for his instruction until he had reached the desired proficiency. Another technique employed to test his mastery of the subject matter was a sudden interruption of a conversation or drill period to question him about a completely unrelated phase of his training. (P-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-56	AB/d	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2 16 April 1956		
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army				
SUBJECT		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C); Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Payment)		OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:		
		COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1		
		USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2		
		FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3		
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4		
		UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5		
		RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION				
<p>Source A-VI received no payments or promise of monetary reward for his services on behalf of the CIS, however, prior to his dispatch as an illegal border crosser into West BERLIN (33UUU9220), Germany, he was given 100 DM (West German Marks) with the understanding that the money was to be utilized for his living and transportation expenses during the period of his processing as a refugee. Source A-VI was required to prepare, entirely in his own handwriting, a simple acknowledgement of receipt of the money.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-3)</p>				
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>				
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-58, 298/d	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th GIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		b2	
SUBJECT (U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C) Re: Modus Operandi (Informants - Contacting of Informants)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E DISPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI, during his briefing for a mission into Germany on behalf of the CIS was instructed to the effect that unless otherwise ordered at a future date, he should attempt no personal contact with the CIS. Source A-VI was informed that following his initial report to the CIS by mail to a pre-arranged cover address within the CRR, at which time he would give his return address, he would, from time to time, be sent further instructions written in secret ink in an apparently innocent letter. The secret ink used in this case could be developed by simply applying heat to the letter. In the event that it was necessary for him to be personally contacted, the person making the contact would come to the address given in Source A-VI's most recent report and would identify himself by the use of the phrase "I am a Prager" spoken in the Czech language. (F-3)</p>			
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOL/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service)	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
(C); Re: Modus Operandi (Interrogations - Interrogators)	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source A-VI underwent a preliminary interrogation which was conducted by an unnamed member of the CIS. This interrogator was the same person who had taken Source A-VI into custody and his questioning dealt primarily with the personal data, employment and general background of Source A-VI, including his places of employment, military service and political affiliations, and data concerning his immediate family. The questioning was done in a routine manner with the interrogator typing the answers directly onto a partially pre-printed form. This phase of the interrogation was carried through quickly and left Source A-VI with the impression that all the information was already known and was actually of no interest except insofar as it was necessary to have a complete and formal statement. The preliminary interrogation was interrupted by another CIS member known to Source A-VI only as the Major, who assumed control of the interrogation immediately upon his arrival. The first interrogator appeared to be somewhat startled by the appearance of the Major, and upon his entry showed a great amount of deference to him, addressed him as "Comrade Major" and formally reported the presence and identity of Source A-VI to him. The Major, after reading the partially prepared statement including the replies of Source A-VI to questions relating to his relationship to Source C-VI, made light of the replies, indicating that he already had knowledge of the falsity of them and was in possession of all the facts in the case. The Major then read portions of a statement, presumably made by Source C-VI and indicated that he already had sufficient evidence to secure the conviction of Source A-VI on charges of treason. During the latter portion of the interrogation the Major made use of thinly veiled threats of punishment for both Source A-VI and his family as well as an appeal to patriotism, the denunciation of the enemies of Czechoslovakia and communism, and declamations concerning the inevitable victory of communism throughout the world. These appeals and approaches were made not only in an attempt to gain the confession of Source A-VI, but also to recruit him on behalf of the CIS for a specific mission. While no promises of any kind were made to Source A-VI during the course of the interrogation, it was inferred that after the completion of the work given him, he would be permitted to resume a normal life within the CSR. (F-3)</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>		
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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION		VI-D-5t 298/d	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2	16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (U)g; Re: Modus Operandi (Interrogations - Techniques)		OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
		COMPLETED RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	
		USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2	
		FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
		UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5	
		RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>Source A-VI was approached by a CIS member on the street, and without being given any reason, was asked by a member to accompany him. After being taken to a villa in which an office was located, Source A-VI was questioned concerning his personal data, his employment and his background without the reason for the interrogation being explained to him, during the preliminary stages. The first interrogator maintained a friendly, though somewhat formal and disinterested attitude throughout the interrogations. At no time was any physical coercion or threat of coercion utilized. The preliminary interrogation was on a question and answer basis with replies being typed directly on a partially pre-printed form. Soon after the preliminary stages of the interrogation were completed and Source A-VI was being questioned about his relationships with Source C-VI, the interrogation was interrupted by the arrival of the second CIS member who then immediately took control of the interrogation. After reading the portion of the statement that had already been typed, the second interrogator indicated to Source A-VI that he already knew that some of the statements made by him were false and then read portions of a statement, alleged to have been made by Source C-VI, to him. During this phase of the interrogation Source A-VI was treated simply as a person, who although patriotic and hard working, had been misled by enemies of his country who desired to utilize him for criminal purposes. At the same time, the interrogators acted as though they had complete knowledge of the activities of both Source A-VI and Source C-VI, and while making thinly veiled threats of imprisonment for both Source A-VI and his family, offered Source A-VI a chance to redeem himself in the eyes of the CIS. At this point in the interrogation, Source A-VI readily admitted his connections with Source C-VI and accepted the offer to work in the interests of the CIS. The technique of interrogation varied from apparent disinterest and impression of pure routine on the part of the original interrogator to the attitude of "since everything is known, it should be admitted" on the part of the second man, all coupled with appeals to patriotism, denunciation of enemies of Czechoslovakia and communism in general, the fact that Source A-VI had been misled and with threats of punishment if full cooperation were not given in this matter.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-3)</p> <p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DD FORM 56729-1	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2	16 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
(U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service)	OF SOURCE:		
(C) Re: Modus Operandi (Interrogations - Use of Coercion)	OF INFORMATION:		
	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>During the course of the interrogation undergone by Source A-VI, the conduct of the CIS members present was formal but friendly throughout and there was no physical coercion or threat of it used at any time, however, a state of mental coercion was induced by the interrogators through thinly veiled threats of imprisonment for both Source A-VI and his family on charges of not having reported alleged contacts with a presumably self-confessed representative of a western intelligence agency. Source A-VI was further made liable to imprisonment for allegedly having passed military and economic information to this contact. (P-6)</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION-D-5672-2/d		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		b2 14 April 1956
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
CIS (Czech Intelligence Service)	OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
Re: Modus Operandi (Interrogations - Note-taking by Interrogators)	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Source A-VI was given a preliminary interrogation concerning his personal data and general background by an interrogator who typed the particulars given him in the course of the interrogation, in finished form, on paper which had the pre-printed heading of "Statement" and provided blanks for the personal data. The preliminary interrogation was interrupted by the arrival of a second CIS member who assumed control of the interrogation. Neither of the CIS members took notes of any description until Source A-VI had made admissions of implication in espionage. Following completion of the interrogation, the second CIS member dictated the balance of the statement to the first member who typed it directly in finished form. Source A-VI was then required to sign four copies of the statement.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-6)</p>		
<p style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		REF ID: A66729	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		b2	
SUBJECT (U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C); Re: Modus Operandi (Interrogations - Use of Inducements, Promises, Rewards)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>During the interrogation and recruitment of Source A-VI by members of the CIS, after Source A-VI was convinced that the truth of his connection with Source C-VI was known to his interrogators, he readily admitted the relationship and, by inference, queried the interrogators about the consequences of his acts. At this point Source A-VI was approached with the possibility of earning a remission of any charges against himself or his family by active work and cooperation on behalf of the CIS. At no time was any actual promise of material or financial reward made or discussed, the only inducement being made was an inference that, after the satisfactory completion of his assigned tasks, Source A-VI and his family would be permitted to "live in peace" and that they would no longer be in any danger of arrest and prosecution. During the same period, his interrogators were appealing to Source A-VI on patriotic grounds and attempting to convince him that it was a matter of duty to his country to assist them.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-3)</p>			
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9-1382

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE																								
PREPARING OFFICE		16 April 1956																								
SUBJECT																										
Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army (U) CIS (Czech Intelligence Service) (C); Re: Modus Operandi (Communications - Use of the Mails)		b2 CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: <table border="0"> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE</td> <td>E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN</td> <td>F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED</td> <td>6</td> </tr> </table>	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1	USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2	FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4	UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1																							
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2																							
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3																							
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4																							
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5																							
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6																							
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																										
<p>Source A-VI, during his briefing for a mission in Germany on behalf of the CIS was instructed that all reports submitted to the CIS by him would be forwarded by the use of ordinary mail to a pre-arranged address within the CSR. The actual report would be written in a secret ink between the lines of an otherwise innocuous letter being written to a friend. Source A-VI was further informed that additional instructions might be sent to him in the same manner using another secret ink. Source A-VI was specifically instructed to avoid the use of registered mail, air mail and special delivery to avoid attracting attention to either himself or the letter. (F-3)</p>																										
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>																										
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1 JUN 47 173

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-56 b2	DATE 16 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army			
SUBJECT Czech Intelligence Service (C) (U) Re: Administration (Identification Documents)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION Source A-VI at the time he was taken into the control of the CIS (Czech Intelligence Service), was shown an identification document described as being about 4½ x 2 inches in size, and as having a photograph of the bearer, about 1 x 1½ inches in size mounted on the left side. The photograph was secured in place by two eyelet type fasteners near the top of the photo. The card appeared to be dark yellow or tan in color and had several lines of printing in black. The first line of print, extending almost the length of the card consisted of the words "Ministerstvo Vnitra" (Ministry of Interior) in larger and heavier type than the printing of the balance of the card. The background engraving, apparently designed to render the document erasure-proof, included a star approximately 1½ inches in size. At the time the card was presented to Source A-VI, it was held in such a manner as to obscure a portion of the photograph and any name or identifying number that may have been otherwise visible. (EXHIBIT 1). (F-6)			
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R			
D-567798/B		EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE	
DISTRIBUTION		BEST COPY AVAILABLE	


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The card is tan or dark yellow in color with printing in black. An erasure proof background engraving of a star about $\frac{1}{4}$ inches in height is clearly visible. The photograph is secured by two eyelet type fasteners.



DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE



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SOI, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USARSUR, APO 696, US Army
SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (C); Re: Administration (Identification Documents); FILE: VI-D-567298/b; b2 dtd 16 Apr 56

EXHIBIT

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Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

VI-D-100

DATE

D-567298/d

9 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
RE: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. One standard used by the Czechs in recruiting an informant is the proximity of the individual to the German/CSR border. The informant is approached when he is in the border area. The first time that Source B-VI was approached, in March 1955, he was gathering wood in the border area across from HASELBACH (33UUQ4941), CSR. The Czechs only spoke of incidental matters and did not try to recruit him.

2. The second meeting, during last of May or first of June 1955, the Czechs asked Source B-VI for more personal data, such as was he employed, and how much did he earn. Two of the three officers at this meeting were at the first meeting. One of the Czechs, who spoke good German, gave a 50 DM bill to Source B-VI and told him if he wanted to earn more money to meet them in the same place [b1]. The Czech said that he must determine if Source B-VI had told him the truth before he could assign him a mission. The Czech suggested that Source B-VI buy a camera for himself and learn to use it. The camera was not to cost more than 150 DM, and the Czechs promised to reimburse him for the cost of the camera. Source B-VI was cautioned not to tell anyone about his meetings with the Czechs.

3. At the third meeting, [b1] the same three Czechs asked Source B-VI certain questions from which he drew the impression that the Czechs had made inquiries concerning him in West Germany. At this meeting he was given letters to mail and was instructed to obtain magazines or newspapers about the German army. He was paid 100 DM and told to be at the same place [b1].

4. At the fourth meeting, [b1] Source B-VI was told that he must again attempt to send the newspapers to CSR on the train going to TAUS (33UUQ5079), CSR. He received 100 DM and was told to meet the Czechs on the border [b1] or on the same date in [b1] if there was no snow on the ground.

5. Source B-VI received a total of 250 DM from the Czechs. He signed a receipt each time he received money. He did not sign any other type of papers.

6. When Source B-VI was given the letters to mail, he was instructed by the Czechs not to mail all of the letters at one time and not to mail all of them at the same place.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: VI-D-5600		DATE
D-567298/d		9 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE		
SUBJECT: Region VI, 66th CIC GROUP, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
Czech Intelligence Service RE: Modus Operandi		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>7. Source B-VI was instructed by the Czechs to drop the newspapers, which he was to procure, on the train going from FURTH IM WALD (33UUQ4364), Germany, to TAUS, CSR. He was to drop the newspapers onto the train at 2320 hours as it went under the bridge in FURTH IM WALD on its way to TAUS. The Czechs said that they wanted to know if things could be sent across the border this way. They said the newspapers would be picked up in TAUS.</p> <p>8. Source B-VI did not receive training of any type. The Czechs did suggest that he should learn to use a camera. (P-6)</p>		
DISTRIBUTION		

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		VI-D-254	204/4	DATE 6 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army				
SUBJECT Czech Intelligence Service; (U) Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment)		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		
		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION While being held as a prisoner for illegal border crossing, Source "A-VI" was asked by a man from an unknown Czech Intelligence Service if he would accept employment as an agent for that organization. Upon giving a negative answer, Source "A-VI" was told that he could not be forced to accept the offer, and no further overtures were made. (P-6)				
<p>D-567298/D</p>				
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>				
<p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>				
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138

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XII, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, APO 227, US Army

SUBJECT

StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

1. Source A had been originally recruited by the StB to penetrate a US intelligence agency in West Germany. However, Source A declined to carry out his mission, and joined Labor Service in Kaiserslautern 32UMV1176, Germany, during February 1955. b1 Source A was discharged from Labor Service at his own request, and decided to return to the CSR under the Czech amnesty. (F-6)

2. Upon entering the CSR, Source A was taken to Sadaka 33UVR9854, CSR, and placed in a large boarding house set aside for repatriates under control of the StB. b1 Source A was informed by an StB agent that he must return on a mission to Germany before he could see his family. b1 Source A was again contacted by the StB agent and driven to Pilsen 33UVR8312, CSR. While in Pilsen, Source A stayed at the Hotel Tourist, and registered under the name of b6 Source A was told to remain in his room except to eat meals. A man came every day to give him money for food and cigarettes. (F-6)

3. b1 the StB agent, who had become Source A's handling agent, again contacted Source A in his hotel and disclosed the mission to be carried out in West Germany. He first lectured on the importance of the task about to be performed since it was for furthering the cause of the workers' party, i.e. the Communists. He then told Source A that he was to first establish a letter drop in Kaiserslautern. When this was accomplished, Source A was to send a picture post card of Kaiserslautern to b6 and sign it b6 Source A was also to make plans for bringing a Czech agent to Kaiserslautern. Since the proposed agent did not speak German and had never been to Germany, it was deemed imperative that Source A determine the best route of travel and arrange to rent a room in Kaiserslautern for about one week, which room was not subject to police control. The handling agent went on to say that there were several people employed in Labor Service in the Kaiserslautern area who work for the StB, concerning whom the Czech agent is to give new EEI's and to reestablish lost contacts. (F-6)

4. b1 Source A was taken by his handling agent to Ceska Kubic 33UWQ4471, CSR, at the Czech border. Source A was given 100. DM and a small packet which appeared to be tightly folded paper bound by cellulose tape to be placed in the letter drop in Kaiserslautern. b1 Source A was placed aboard a freight train bound for Furth in Wald 33UWQ4364, Germany, and instructed to jump from the train 15 minutes later, between the Czech border and Furth. Source A was then to proceed by train to Kaiserslautern, and to accomplish his assigned mission. He was also told that he would illegally return to

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1 JUN 47

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StB

Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

15 March 1956

the CSR by way of his departure route [b1] in order to bring the Czech agent to Kaiserslautern. (P-6)

5. [b1] Source A returned to the Czech-German border and reported to two members of the PS (Pohraniční Stráž - Czech Border Guards) who were in a bunker near the railroad tracks. The guards led Source A to a guard tower a short distance away. This tower was also manned by two PS guards. Here Source A gave his name as [b6]. A telephone call was made, and, about 20 minutes later, two more guards appeared and took Source A away in handcuffs. After walking for about eight minutes, Source A was put in a jeep and driven to Ceska Kubice 33UUQ4471, CSR, where he again met his StB handling agent in the PS barracks. While in Ceska Kubice, Source A was given time to clean the mud from his shoes and clothing, which he soiled when forced to take cover before reaching the Czech border. Source A was then told that a change had been made in plans. At about 2230 hours, Source A was driven by his handling agent in a "Tatra-Plan" automobile to the PS headquarters in Pobezovice 33UUG164, CSR, where they stopped for only a few minutes before driving on to Pilsen 33UR8312, CSR. Source A and his handling agent arrived in Pilsen [b1] [b1] and stayed in the Hotel Tourist. Later on the same day, Source A was required to write a complete report of his trip to Kaiserslautern. Source A's handling agent then took the report and Source's Reiseausweis (travel pass) with him to Prague 33UVR5948, CSR. (P-6)

6. In the meantime, Source A stayed in the Hotel Tourist and was handled by a man by the name of [b6] who supplied him with money and cigarettes. Whenever Source A left his room, he was accompanied by this man. For the next week, Source A entertained himself by attending movies, dancing and frequenting bars in Pilsen. (P-6)

7. [b1] Source A's handling agent returned from Prague and took Source A to lunch in the Hotel Salzmann. At about 1300 hours, Source A returned to his room with his handling agent. Here he was informed that a post card which he had sent from Kaiserslautern had been received, and that he was to return once more to West Germany. Source A was then given the mission of establishing a dead letter drop in Nuernberg 32UPV5179, Germany, and to return to the CSR as soon as possible. Source A was then given his Reiseausweis and 50. DM for travel expenses, plus a small packet which appeared to be folded paper bound by cellophane tape. This packet was to be placed in the letter drop in Nuernberg. At 1630 hours, Source A was driven from Pilsen to Pobezovice, accompanied by his handling agent and a driver. They arrived in Pobezovice at about 1830 hours. Source A and the driver went to a restaurant and drank wine until about 1945 hours. At 1945 hours, Source A was taken to Ceska Kubitz by his handling agent. They were accompanied by a Lieutenant from the PS. The man from Pilsen remained in the PS headquarters building in Pobezovice. At 2100 hours the party drove on a road leading from Ceska Kubitz until it arrived at a closed gate. Here they were met by two PS officers. The two officers accompanied Source A on foot to the railroad tracks about one and one half kilometers from the border. One of the officers went ahead and gave light signals when it was safe for Source A to proceed. Source A crossed the Czech-German border at [b1] (P-6)

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DR

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 12 1956

D-567298/4

8 March 1956

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to ICM 2/54, subject: Czech Intelligence Services, dated 19 May 1954.

2. Forwarded herewith are six 66th CIC Group, Region VI Agent Reports in triplicate, subject: [b6] dated 7 February 1956; and one Region VI Summary of Information in triplicate, subject and file as above, dated 21 February 1956.

3. In view of the fact that the [b1] [b1], this Group plans no action in the matter, the case being considered closed.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

7 Incls:
1-6 ARs dtd 7 Feb 56 (trip)
7. SOI dtd 21 Feb 56 (trip)

[b6]
1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371
DER/ICH/bg

M/R: Above fws G2 info developed by Rgn VI relative to an alleged recruitment effort on the part of the CIS. [b1]

[b1] this hq contemplates no further action.

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134

CIC FILE
Re:
JES

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CDC FILE

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 7 1956

6 March 1956

298
D-567226/4

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants) (S)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch

1. REFERENCE: Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-CE-4-54.

2. REMARKS:

- a. (x) Contents of inclosure have not been disseminated to any other agency.
- b. () Contents of inclosure have been passed to:
- c. (x) Source(s) of the inclosed report was: See Remarks, h below.
- d. (x) Date of the information was: 1955.
- e. () Investigation is continuing.
- f. (x) Investigation is considered closed.
- g. (x) This information may (source) be released to other allied (source) intelligence agencies.

h. (x) Source "A" [redacted] b1
Source "B" is [redacted] b1 presently being held in the CHAM District Court Jail awaiting trial.

i. Permission for members of this Group to interrogate SUBJECT was denied by the pretrial investigating judge for the CHAM district. The pretrial judge has advised that he may not give permission for any other agency to question the subject of an espionage case without the approval of the Court in MUNICH, which has jurisdiction of the case.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1 Incl
HQI, Reg VI, dtd 13 Feb 54 (trip)
WB Form 206
Rev 8 Nov 55 Telephone: Stgt Hll 8371

615

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

133
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HEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US ARMY

VI-D-567298/d

FEB 20 1956

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE, RE: MODUS OPERANDI
(Communication - Possible Contact
by Mail) (c) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division (External)

This Document Has Been
Classified
JUN 13 1956

1. REFERENCE: Letter, this region, subject: "Czech
Intelligence Service, Modus Operandi (c)," file as above,
dated 13 December 1955 and 1st Indorsement, your headquarters,
subject, file AEUC-ORS D-257530, dated 19 January 1956.

2. FORWARDED:

a. Summary of Information, this region, subject and
file as above, dated 16 February 1956.

b. Agent Report, this region, subject and file as
above, dated 16 February 1956.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: Information in the attached
Summary of Information was obtained by Source "A", identified
as [b1] evaluated "C". The preparing agent for
the attached Summary of Information is S/A [b6]
this region. Case is closed.

4. REMARKS: Should the workmen who appear next spring
to clean the water wells attempt to mail another letter, your
headquarters will be notified.

- 2 Incls:
1. SOI (1 page) dtd 16 Feb 56 (dupe)
2. AR dtd 16 Feb 56 (dupe)

[b6]

Major Artillery
Commanding

616 21480 EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
21 FEB 1956 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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BE PREDETERMINED
CONFIDENTIAL

CIC REG VI
LOG 1046

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SI-D-567298/d

DATE

16 February 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army

SUBJECT

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE, RE: MODUS OPERANDI
(Communications - Possible Con-
tact by Mail)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 2 December 1955, Source "A" was interviewed and pro-
vided substantially the following information:

a. At certain times each year the Utilities Department
of the City of EGER (33UUR1251), CSR, sends workmen to clean the water
wells in the area of BUCHBRUNNEN-SEEDORF, on West German territory. On
10 and 11 November 1955, the following two men were assigned to the job:

(1) [b6] born [b6] in [b6]
[b6] residing at [b6]
EGER City Utilities Department.

(2) Frantisek URBAN, born 29 July 1893 in KLADNO, (cna),
CSR, residing at Trida csl. Armady 239, FRANZENBAD (33UUR1055), CSR.

b1 b6

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FEB 1957

AMDC-OCB; EE-567298

31 January 1957

SUBJECT: Czech Intelligence Service (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: AEAQB-C

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference is made to letter, this Group, dated 29 January 1957, Subject and file as above, and letter, this Group, dated 22 January 1957, Subject: b1

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith are the following Summaries of Information:

a. CIS, Re: Modus Operandi, file EE-567298/d, dated 29 January 1957.

b. CIS, Re: Personalities, file EE-567298/f, dated 29 January 1957.

b1

5. (UNCLASSIFIED) REGRADED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ upon removal of SECRET inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
SOIs dtd 29 Jan 57 (trip)(8)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371
DER/KCH/pc

b6
Captain, MI (Armor)
Adjutant

Page 1 of 1 Pages
Copy 5 of 6 Copies

b1

b6

This document is classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by
Authority of Colonel b6
Hq. 1st Cavalry Group.

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DER/KCH/pc/ 11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
29 January 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment)
- (c) (U)
EE-567298

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b6

(Continued)

DISTRIBUTION

3 cy - G2
1 cy - CIC File
1 cy - CIC Central File

620

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Page 1 of 2 Pages
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DER/KCH/c/Stgt M1 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

29 January 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

Czech Intelligence Service
Re: Personalities (C) (U)

EE-567298/r

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

b6

DISTRIBUTION

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567299/d

24 January 1956

SUBJECT: StB (Statni Bezpecnost - State Security)
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICB)

(U)
1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference is made to the following:

a. ICM CI-CE-2-54, as amended, your Headquarters, dated 19 May 1954.

b. Letter, this Group, subject: [b6]
[b6] dated 18 January 1956.

c. Letter, this Group, subject and file as above, dated 29 December 1955.

d. Letter, this Group, subject: [b6]
[b6] dated 23 November 1955.

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Forwarded herewith is Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 24 January 1956.

3. (SECRET) As indicated in reference paragraph 1 b, [b6] reported to Region IV of this Group that he had returned to the CSR under the Redefestation program and had been recruited by the StB in FILSEM and returned to the Federal Republic with an Intelligence mission. This

[b1]

[b6]

4. (SECRET)

[b1]

[b6]

[b1]

[b6]

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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~~SECRET~~

130

285-7126
HQ

~~SECRET~~

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D-567299/d

SUBJECT: StB (Státní bezpečnost - State Security)
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

b1

b6

~~SECRET~~ 24

2

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

129

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 625

~~SECRET~~

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D-567299/d

SUBJECT: StB (Statni Bezpecnost - State Security)
Re: Modus Operandi - (C) (U)

b1

b6

9. (U) ~~(SECRET)~~ Your attention is invited to similarities in reported recruitment by the StB and information previously forwarded to your Headquarters by references paragraph 1 c and d above. The friendly, lenient treatment afforded redefectees which the CIS return to Germany appears to be a recent change in modus operandi not previously encountered. Whether the recruitment of redefectees constitutes a "bons fide" Intelligence technique or confusion cannot be determined at this time.

10. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
SOI dtd 24 Jan 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371
DER/DRC/pe

b6
1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

M/R: b6 who was walk-in to Rgn IV rept info contained in incl. Before he could be given a hostile interr he disappeared. Above fwd info to G2 and indicates action to be taken in future. Coord w/Capt b6 Tech Spec.

127

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

628

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DER/URC/p' at WLL 8371

24 January 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

StB (Státní bezpečnost - State Security)

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

D-567299/4

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

1. Recruitment: In October 1955 Source arrived at the decision to avail himself of the opportunity to return to the GDR under the recent amnesty which was promulgated by the Czech regime to encourage the return of its members who had defected to the West. Once contact with the Czech Border Guard had been accomplished and word of Source's presence disseminated to the rear echelon, Source was evacuated by automobile to PILZEN within a few hours. He was driven to StB headquarters and introduced to the person who later handled him. Source was then interviewed in detail concerning his background, length of residence in the West, relatives in the GDR and/or West Germany, and general conditions prevailing within the Federal Republic. Upon completion of the interview, Source was engaged in casual conversation during which he was flattered as to the caliber of his character and intelligence, his sense of patriotism toward Czechoslovakia. Finally, he was requested to assist the cause of his country through actively cooperating with the StB. This approach was supplemented by a promise of continuous monthly payment and a terminal bonus of 10,000 Czech kronen, plus a home in the GDR provided that Source operated satisfactorily on behalf of the StB for one year. It was then expected of Source that he render a decision in the matter, which he did by agreeing to the proposal. His acceptance was thereafter recorded through his signature on a prepared statement whereby he pledged cooperation. The topic was then pursued further to include Source's attitude toward performing an intelligence mission in West Germany. As Source indicated that he was not opposed to such a venture, there followed a general discussion regarding the potentiality of the operation. At no time during Source's interrogation or subsequent handling was he treated in other than a humane, and even cordial, manner. Source was then removed from PILZEN to Camp SADSKA, a home for the aged which is also being used as a processing installation for returnees. The Camp is located in the eastern suburbs of PRAGUE and is the only known collection point for persons returning to the GDR under the 1955 general amnesty. Source passed through the normal channels of refugee screening under the alias of [b6]. During his sojourn at the Camp, Source was enjoined not to reveal to anyone his true identity or reason for being there. Within a week's time, Source was issued his new documentation and transferred by his StB handling agent to the Eleven Hotel in PILZEN. During the journey from SADSKA to PILZEN, Source was informed that his security check had been favorable and that he was now eligible for utilization in StB operations. Once settled at the hotel, Source was again required to sign a pledge of loyalty to the GDR government thereby he agreed to cooperate with the StB.

2. Training: Over the course of the following three weeks, Source was intensively instructed by his handling agent concerning the mission he was to perform as well as the techniques of intelligence work which he may be required to

REGRADE DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

(Continued)

3 cy - G2
1 cy - GIC File
1 cy - GIC Central File

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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24 January 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

StB (Statni Bezpecnost) - State
Security)

Re: Mokus Operandi (U)
(C)

D-367299/4
(continued)

outline. Each day Source met with his handler at a prearranged place within the city limits in order to receive the training scheduled for that time. The two would then walk through the city discreetly discussing, demonstrating, and practicing the various points of the instruction. Methods of surveillance and establishing letterdrops were greatly emphasized as were secret writing procedures and a code system. It was explained to Source that the most common method of surveillance involved the use of a three man team, each member alternately assuming the lead position in order to prevent the suspect from becoming aware of the surveillance. Source was also informed that during his mission in the Federal Republic, he should always be alert to the possibility that he is being followed. The handling agent then described several methods of evading surveillers or testing for surveillance; threading through crowded department stores, entering a cinema and leaving by way of a side exit as soon as the picture begins, jumping on a street car as it pulls away from the stop, or jumping from a streetcar as it is leaving the stop.

With regard to letter-drops, Source was informed that the important points of this technique were choice of location and description. The former stressed anonymity, and the latter accuracy and thoroughness. Two methods of secret writing were explained to Source. In both instances the basic substance was water; the first employing a small quantity of human blood as an additive and the second a Bayer aspirin tablet. Once a solution had been effected from either mixture, it was to be applied to ordinary paper on which an innocuous message had been written. Any sharpened piece of hard wood could be utilized as an applicator. When either system was employed, Source was to so indicate by terminating the first paragraph of the overt message with a word ending in "I." As mentioned, Source was instructed in a method of conveying a message through use of code. A series of apparently innocent phrases, each of which would signify a different thought, were to be placed individually on an ordinary post card according to what obstacles, if any, were encountered by Source during his crossing into West Germany. On the occasion of each entrance into the Federal Republic, Source was to mail one of these cards to a given cover address in PILSEN. In the event that Source would be unable to comply with a given reporting date, he was to write a casual letter to a cover address mentioning a date on which friends or relatives were planning to be married or give a party. This date, plus ten days, was to be the alternate time of the meeting.

3. Contact of Informants: Source was informed that, if possible, he should maintain regular contact with his handling agent through normal postal channels. He was to compose letters, the content of which would be meaningless to anyone but himself and the handling agent. In addition, he was instructed to send to his

(Continued) (2)

3 cy - G2
1 cy - CIC File
1 cy - CIC Central File

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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24 January 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

StB (Státní Bezpečnost) - State
Security) (U)
Re: Nodus Operandi (G)

D-567299/d
(continued)

handler post cards in the manner and under the conditions described above. All such correspondence was to be addressed to [b6] the cover address provided him by the Czechs. All other contact between Source and his handling agent was to be direct; Source was to report to the border area near SILEBNÁ, inform the Czech Border Guard that he was returning from an Intelligence mission, and request that the handling agent be telephoned at PILZEN 2821, extension 378. At the time of Source's return to the CSR in November 1955, this system was employed without complication.

4. Security Factors: During the time Source was undergoing processing at Camp SADEKA, the StB, having obtained a statement of cooperation, conducted a background investigation concerning him which was of an undetermined intensity and thoroughness. That some type of a security check was performed is indicated through the handler's remarks to this effect prior to Source's arrival at the Hotel Slovan in PILZEN. Before Source entered the refugee collection point near PRAGUE, he was given the cover name, [b6] and admonished not to reveal his true identity during the time he would be in the CSR. Source was continuously reminded of the importance of such measures, and he was carefully instructed in the use of his cover story while in PILZEN; he was to state that he was employed by a construction firm having current contractual agreements in the PILZEN area. Source was not permitted to contact his relatives in the CSR and was directed never to attempt access to the StB headquarters in the city. That the information he was acquiring during his training and association with the StB was highly classified was another security measure with which Source became monotonously familiar. In addition, it was made crystal clear to Source that any effort on his part to reveal or compromise his mission and/or his affiliation with the StB would be punished with expedition and severity.

5. Payment: The final preparation for Source's assignment in the Federal Republic consisted of a payment to Source of 500 DM which was to be utilized for the defrayment of expenses encountered. Source was not required to sign a receipt for the money or in any other manner acknowledge the transaction. On 23 November 1955 Source was forced, by lack of funds, to return to the CSR where his handler replenished his exhausted finances. Source received another 500 DM payment without hesitation or having to sign a receipt. Aside from the 100 krona daily expense account provided Source during his stay in PILZEN and those mentioned above, no other arrangements for or actual payments were made to Source. (F-6)

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by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

(3)

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SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567239/d

29 December 1955

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Services
Re: StB Methods of Operation (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICB)

(U)

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-2-54, file 350.09, your Headquarters, dated 19 May 1954.

(U)

2. ~~(SECRET)~~ Forwarded herewith are two summaries of information, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, pertaining to StB Modus Operandi.

3. ~~(SECRET)~~ Source "A" mentioned in inclosed reports b1

b1

4. ~~(SECRET)~~ b1

b1 only to facilitate his return to the CSR under the amnesty program, was apparently accepted by the CIS, and he was returned with instructions that he would be contacted in the Federal Republic by a CIS operative. Source has written a letter to the cover address in the CSR given him by his CIS handler. Using the secret writing solution, he indicated that he had information of value to the CIS but could not travel to the CSR at this time. b1

b1

97
630
SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~SECRET~~

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D-567299/d

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Services

Re: StB Methods of Operation (c) (U)

(U)

7. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ It is requested that the inclosed reports not be distributed to any other intelligence agency.

8. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

2 Incl

SOIs, Rgn IV, dtd 11 Oct 55
(trip)

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt W11 8371
DER/DRC/ps

M/R: Source V-300 was apprehended in East BERLIN en route to CSR. He was subsequently turned over to StB and returned to Federal Republic, being told he would be contacted later. Above fwd G2 SOIs in accordance with ICM 2-54. Coord w/ Lt b6

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~SECRET~~

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HEADQUARTERS REGION IV
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 108 US ARMY

20 December 1955

D-567298/D

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - CIS

(U)
(e)

b6

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: Captain b6

1. Forwarded herewith is the following:

a. Agent Report, Region IV, MUNICH, Subject and file as above, dated 20 December 1955.

b. An original copy of the letter mentioned in the attached report.

2. Source "A" is 52-176, evaluated B. Source "B" b1

b1 evaluated F. b1

b1 Evaluation of information is as indicated in the attached report.

3. Source "A" was contacted in SALZBURG, Austria, on 1 December 1955, through Source 21-49, b1

b1

4. Source "A" was instructed, through Source 21-49, to obtain from b1 a knowledgeable report of b6 and his activities, for the purpose of determining if he is engaged in the recruitment of intelligence sources for the CSR from those refugees who desire to return to their homeland.

5. Attention is invited to the fact that b6 is mentioned in Agent Report, subject: CIS, Re: CSR Legation - Austria, file D-567298, dated 21 November 1955, a copy of which is on file in your headquarters.

2 Incls: a/s

b6 encc/MM 625-23

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

b6

Lt Col Inf
Commanding

88
632
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIC Confidential File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 December 1955

Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service - CIS (C)

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

D-567298/D

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 1 December 1955, Source "A" was interviewed and revealed that on 20 November 1955 Source "B" reported the following information:

a. Source "B" had obtained a copy of a letter currently being distributed by the CSR Legation in VIENNA 33UXPO4, Austria, to CSR refugees in Austria. The letter urges recipients to return to the CSR. A free translation is as follows:

"CSR EMBASSY
VIENNA

28 October 1955

The Embassy of the Czechoslovak Republic desires to invite your attention to the fact that the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Antonin ZAPOTOCKY, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the CSR, promulgated an amnesty, article 10, which pertains to such persons who, without authority, cross the boundary of the CSR, and who at this time are residing on territory other than that of the CSR. These persons may return to CSR territory with immunity from punishment, and will be granted all citizenship rights. In case you desire to return to the CSR, we request that you visit, within the immediate future, the CSR embassy in VIENNA XIV, Penzingerstrasse 11-13, where you will be furnished with detailed information relative to your eventual return to your homeland.

For the Ambassador

/s/ [b6]

(B-2)

b. Source "B" also revealed that [b6] signee of the above letter, is [b6] residing at [b6] currently serving as the CSR Consul at the CSR Legation in VIENNA. [b6] is seldom in his office, and travels extensively in Austria, supervising the distribution of the above letter to CSR refugees.
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

(P-3)

12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

633

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF DEFENSE
SCHEDULE 1

TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6]

Region IV, 66th CIC Group

SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6]

DA FORM 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL 11) 12-52-200M-30093

87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY of INFORMATION

DATE _____

28 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XII, 66th CIC Group, APO 227, US Army

SUBJECT

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTELLIGENCE

SERVICE-External

Re: StB, Modern Operations and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE

USUALLY RELIABLE
SOMETIMES RELIABLE

FAIRLY RELIABLE . . .
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

UNRELIABLE,

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE

IMPROBABLE

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source A furnished the following information:

Source A believes that he was recruited by CIS through the recommendation of his brother-in-law, [REDACTED] b6 No direct threats were made to Source A concerning what might happen if he refused to work for CIS, but since CIS had shown interest in the fact that Source A wanted to see his parents, Source A feared reprisals against his parents if he refused to work for CIS. Source A received no formal training as such, but was visited at his hotel room where he was instructed in his mission and shown how he was to communicate with CIS. He was shown how a glass pen or sharpened match stick could be used as a pen to write with a solution made by dissolving a small amount of a styptic pencil in water. This writing was to be placed on glossy advertisements in magazines and sent to [REDACTED] b6

b6 When the paper is charred the writing becomes visible. Source A was to forward the required information as well as any other correspondence such as requests for money, by this method. Source A would receive correspondence in the form of letters, the envelopes of which would contain the messages, also written with the styptic pencil process. A corner was removed from a photograph which Source A had with him, and he was told that whoever presented the missing corner to his photograph would be a representative from CIS. While in PRAGUE, CSR, Source A was given a telephone number, 60509, and told to ask for b6 (phonetic), if he needed to contact his handling agent. Source A was to identify himself as b6 in all communications with CIS. His handling agents maintained a very friendly atmosphere at all times, taking him for tours in the vicinity of PRAGUE, buying his meals, paying for his entertainment, transportation and lodging in PRAGUE, and supplying him with spending money as he needed it. Source A believes that he received about 3000 Krone in the fourteen days he was in PRAGUE. They told him that he could have all the money he wanted while in PRAGUE, because the money did not come from their own pockets. Before returning Source A to the CSR border, they gave him 700 DM (West). No receipts were required, but Source A did sign a paper stating that he was working for CIS. When he returned to Western Germany, he was to send a card of greeting to the above address, but to use no return address. When he had established himself at a permanent address, he was to communicate this address to CIS in one of the magazines. Black "Tatra" automobiles were used at all times by members of the StB. Source A was given no identity documents by CIS, but told to return to Western Germany and obtain valid documents there. He was taken to the CSR border at night in the company of a Czech officer. (P-6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 7 October 1955
PREPARING OFFICE Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army		
SUBJECT Issue of New Czechoslovakian Personal Identity Documents	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION The new Obcansky Prukaz (Personal Identity Document), in most areas of the CSR, has not to date been issued. In KLATTAU (33UUQ7673), CSR, none had been issued as of 30 August 1955. In PRAGUE (33UVR6048), CSR, a few new ones have been. When the new documents will have been issued, they will vary in form from one area to another. For example, the new identity documents which will be issued for the Klattau district will differ slightly in form from the ones to be issued in the Prague district. <div style="text-align: right;">(F-3)</div>		
<div style="text-align: right;">Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 12 January 2010 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</div> <div style="text-align: right;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</div>		
DISTRIBUTION 635		

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL BEST COPY AVAILABLEHEADQUARTERS REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 396 US ARMY

JUL 2 0 1955

VI-19694

SUBJECT: Czech Letter Drop (U)
(e)

File XE 137536

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAR-EUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division (Internal)

1. REFERENCE: TGA G-2134, this region, dated 14 June 1955.
2. FORWARDED: Agent Reports, subject and file as above, dated 20 June 1955, and plastic bag containing the publications listed in the Agent Report.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: The information in the attached Agent Reports and the material discovered, was submitted for an evaluation of Inc b1

Evaluation is by paragraph. Case is closed.

4. REMARKS: In that the material discovered is over one year old, no further investigative action is contemplated by this region.
5. Regrading date cannot be predetermined.

b6Major, Artillery
Commanding

- 4 Incls
- 1 - AR dtd 20 June 55
 - 2 - AR dtd 20 June 55 w/exhibit
 - 3 - AR dtd 20 June 55
 - 4 - Plastic bag w/publications

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Hqs, 66th CIC Group
w/ Incls
- 1 - Region VI File
w/Incls

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

636

CONFIDENTIAL27 JUL 1955
CIC REG VI
LOG 4955

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT <small>(SR 580-220-10)</small>		BEST COPY AVAILABLE
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Czech Letter Drop		2. DATE SUBMITTED 20 June 1955
		3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER VI-19684
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 48px; margin-top: 100px;">b1 b6</div>		
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"><div><div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6</div><div style="margin-left: 10px;">657 S/A, 66th CIC Group</div></div><div>6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">b6</div></div></div>		

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

FORM
APR 52 **341**

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30003

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czech Letter Drop

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 JUN 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER
VI-19684

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b1

b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

632

b6

S/A 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AR, REGION VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army
SUBJECT: Czech Letter Drop
FILE NO: VI-19684

Dated 20 June 1955

EXHIBIT _____

639

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LLS/jef/W 93-3161

HEADQUARTERS, REGION VI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 696 US ARMY

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D-242063; VI-25499

12 JUL 1955

SUBJECT: Czech Recruiting Methods, Agents

(U)
(e)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division (Internal)

1. FORWARDING: Agent Reports, this region, subject
and file as above, dated 6 July 1955.

b1

3. Regarding date cannot be predetermined.

b6

2 Incls:
1-2 MIA dtd 6 Jul 55

for Lt Col, Infantry *may Andy*
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - HQ 66th CIC Gp w/1 cy et incl
1 - Region VI File w/1 cy et incl

13 JUL 1955

CIC REG VI
LOG 4785

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AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10)		BEST COPY AVAILABLE
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Czech Recruiting Methods, Agents		2. DATE SUBMITTED 6 July 1955
		3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER D-242063; VI-25499
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 48pt; font-weight: bold;">b1 b6</div>		
(continued)		
5. NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT 8/1, 66th CIG Group		6. b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341

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AGL (1) 9-53-10036-34894

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AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czech Recruiting Methods, Agents

2. DATE SUBMITTED
6 July 1955

3- CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
D-242063; VI-25499

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

b 1

b6

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6-22

5- TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

S/A, 66th CIC Group

b6

DA
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FORM

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AGL (1) 8-53-10036-34094

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☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 643-650

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 320-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czech Recruiting Methods, Agents

2. DATE SUBMITTED

6 July 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

B-242063; VI-25499

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The files of the Regional Registry, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army, were examined with reference to the personalities listed below on 15 June 1955 with negative results:

a.
b.
c.

b6

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

S/A, 66th CIC Group

b6

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czech Letter Drop

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 June 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER
VI-19684

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 17 June 1955, the files of the Regional Registry, Region VI, 66th CIC Group, USAREUR, APO 696, US Army were examined regarding the following persons, with results as shown:

- a. [b6] Not identifiable
- b. [b6] No record.
- c. [b6] No record.

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652
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6]

S/A, 66th CIC Gp.

[b6]

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 653-
657

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

20 July 54

D-567298-J

SUBJECT: CIS Use of Redefectees

(U)
(c)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. (SECRET) References:

a. Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, Operational Memorandum:

- (1) 13/55, Soviet Redefection Program (U)
(c)
- (2) 16/55, Czech Intelligence Collection Plan (Defensive) (U)
(c)
- (3) 17/55, Czech Intelligence Collection Plan (Offensive) (U)
(c)

b. Letter, Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, subject: b1
b1 dated 6 May 1954.

(U)
2. (SECRET) During the past several months information has reached this Headquarters which indicates that Czechoslovak Intelligence Services (CIS) are seizing the opportunity presented to them by the redefection of many persons of Czech origin long resident in the West, and are returning such persons to the Federal Republic with Intelligence missions.

(U)
3. (SECRET) The inclosed study presents a comprehensive compilation, comparison, and analysis of three cases which have been processed by this Group. It is felt that the study permits a closer insight into the workings of the CIS, with reference to types of people recruited, methods of recruitment and training, payment, and KFI. Although modus operandi and KFI revealed in all three cases tend to indicate StB inspiration, firm evidence is not available and, therefore, all agencies are referred to as CIS.

(U)
4. (SECRET) Source "A" was brought to the attention of this organization by a former source at which time he confessed his recruitment. Discrepancies appeared in Source "A"'s story during intense interrogation, and he was turned over to another agency for disposition. Source "B" requested employment from a region of this Group. Upon subsequent contact, he furnished information concerning his recruitment by CIS. He disappeared prior to clarification of certain doubtful points in his story. Source "C" reported his apprehension and attempted recruitment immediately upon his return to the Federal Republic.

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SECRETCIS Utilization of Re-defectors

In May 1955 the CSR government promulgated a general amnesty designed to encourage the redefection of those Czechs who were dissatisfied with the status quo in West Germany or other Western countries harboring former Czech citizens. In recent months three cases have come to light in which the subject, a re-defector to CSR, has been exploited by the Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) for Intelligence work in the Federal Republic. A comparison of the three cases reveals that the handling of these individuals by the CIS was almost identical in several areas, permitting a relatively accurate analysis of this recent development in CIS operations. From a study of this type, a valuable quantity of corroborated information can be compiled concerning CIS methods of operation, EKI, descriptions of personalities and installations as well as contacts and sources within the Federal Republic. Furthermore, a careful examination of the points of similarity and discrepancy in each instance provides a foundation for the future interrogation of persons professing to have been recruited by the CIS under similar circumstances and a guide upon which to base an evaluation of such individuals. Finally, an analysis of this sort permits scrutiny of the possibility of exploiting these persons in double agent operations.

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b1

ENTRY INTO CSR:

That the border point of FLOSSENBERG, Germany, was utilized by two of the re-defectees is interesting as Sources "A" and "B" were not acquainted, residing in the same area, or returnees at the same time; Source "A" living at Camp VALKA, MUERNBERG, and redefecting [b1] and Source "B", in KREZFELD, Germany, returning to the CSR on [b1]. In both instances, the redefectee waited at the border for the arrival of a Czech border patrol to which he expressed his desire to be accorded the protection of the amnesty. Thereafter, the returnee was subjected to a preliminary body search and removed to a PS (Pohranicni

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Stras - Border Guard) installation in the immediate vicinity. During this process Source "A" was restrained by handcuffs and blindfolded, whereas Source "B" was permitted to accompany the border guards without precautions. Once the outpost had been reached, a telephone call was placed by the commander of the unit to rear echelons from where an automobile was dispatched to the border area. Within a few hours after arrival in the CSR, the returnee had been evacuated from the frontier area to either PRAGUE or PILZEN. Source "A" was taken to the former city by two unidentified persons believed to be representatives of the StB. Source "B", on the other hand, was removed to PILZEN in the company of a single unidentified individual also assumed to be a member of the StB. During the time each redefectee remained in the custody of the Border Guard, he was not interrogated or mistreated, but, on the contrary, was extended every available courtesy. In considerably different fashion, Source "C" was apprehended [b1]

[b1] East BERLIN by the Sfs, and it was not until after he had been searched, interrogated, and had made a statement to the effect that he desired to be delivered to the Czechs in accordance with the terms of the amnesty that he was placed in contact with the CIS and escorted to PRAGUE. Because Source "C" convincingly explained to the Sfs [b1]

which he could put into effect his plan of returning to the CSR under amnesty, he was not arrested as an espionage agent but only detained in custody of the Sfs until he could be transferred to the control of the CIS.

CAMP SADZKA, CSR:

Camp Sadzka is a home for the aged, one building of which has been designated for the housing and processing of re-defectees from the West. The building is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and further secured by uniformed, although unarmed, guards. It is located some 48 kilometers east of PRAGUE and is the only known collection point of its kind within the CSR. The descriptions given by Sources "A" and "B" concerning the routine at the camp through which both passed are sufficiently corroborative with regard to general aspects and varied in detail to elicit substantial credibility. Because of Source "C"'s unique status, it apparently was not considered necessary or advisable that he be processed in the normal manner; consequently, he was never a resident of Sadzka and could not furnish information concerning it.

Source "A" was taken to the camp immediately upon evacuation from the border area. Upon arrival at Sadzka he was assigned to quarters, provided inmate clothing consisting of blue and white striped pajamas and a bathrobe, given a detailed medical examination, and interviewed by a camp official. Source "A" admitted to the interviewer that he actually had not returned to the CSR under the amnesty but was forced to leave West Germany because he lacked authentic documentation and could not locate suitable employment. The following day Source "A" was re-interviewed by the same person who forthrightly presented a proposition to return to West Germany on an Intelligence mission for the CIS.

662

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Source "A" made no commitments and the interview continued on the basis of the assumption that he had, or soon would agree, to work for the CIS. Source "A" was questioned in some detail concerning his background, but it was not until a later interview that he actually stated that he would carry out CIS operations in West Germany. Over the course of the next few days, Source "A" was briefed further concerning his EKI and other facets of his mission to the Federal Republic. He was instructed to feign illness and to notify his acquaintances at the Lager that he was to be transferred to a hospital outside as he could not be given the medical treatment he required at the camp. Source "A" was then removed from the camp by representatives of the CIS, having remained there about six days, always receiving excellent treatment.

Source "B", on the other hand, was interrogated at the PILZEN StB headquarters and committed to cooperation prior to being sent to the Sadska Refugee Camp, where he was placed for the purpose of obtaining refugee documentation in order to legitimize his stay in the CSR. He was registered with the camp authorities as b6 the cover name under which he later received refugee documentation. Having already been recruited by the StB, it was necessary that this fact remain a secret, and, in accordance with security, Source "B" was admonished not to reveal to anyone his true identity or affiliation with the CIS. Source "B" observed that the StB man who escorted him to Sadska spoke to the head of the Lager, and it is assumed by Source "B" that the StB representative was arranging for special attention for him. Thereafter, he was assigned to a dormitory type room and required to don the usual inmate attire. He was interviewed concerning his past on the following day when he was informed that he would receive his new identity documentation in a short time. Source "B" did not mention that he was given a physical examination during the time he stayed at Sadska, but he did state in contrast to Source "A" that he received Czech refugee identification from the camp authorities. After a week's residence at the camp, Source "B" was issued his identity papers and returned to PILZEN via auto. He asserted that he was treated in a friendly manner while at Sadska and that he had never heard of any instances where inmates were handled harshly.

RECRUITMENT:

The patterns of recruitment employed by the CIS in reference to the three cases under discussion reflect certain similar features as well as dissimilar ones. Basic CIS methods were in evidence in each instance and consisted of a detailed interview covering background, relatives in the CSR and West Germany, general conditions in West Germany, and the future plans of the interviewee; a proposal to actively cooperate with the CIS; the presentation of cogent reasons why it would be beneficial for the interviewee to agree to cooperate; and the signing of a prepared statement pledging allegiance to the government of the CSR.

Source "A" was formally approached at the time of his third interview at Camp Sadska, the ~~SECRET~~ being directed at determining

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his background and attitude concerning his CIS assignments in West Germany. During the interview which couched Subject's recruitment, he was questioned by an individual unfamiliar to him who showed Source "A" an identification card bearing markings which lead to the belief that he was from the Ministry of the Interior. The interviewer launched directly into the topic of Source "A"'s performance of espionage assignments in West Germany, approaching the matter of a formal agreement of cooperation in such a manner as to indicate that if Source "A" declined the offer, he would be faced with serious consequences. The mission which Source "A" was to perform was immediately outlined for him after he agreed to the CIS offer. He was then photographed and engaged in a conversation concerning his family residing in the CSR. He was informed that his parents were alive and well and that his younger sister was highly esteemed by the CIS because of her past accomplishments on its behalf. Source "A" was asked if he would enjoy visiting with his family, and, upon his affirmative reply, was informed that this could be arranged in six weeks' time provided that he proved loyal to the CIS. It was then required that Source "A" submit a written autobiography which he completed immediately prior to being removed from Camp Sadzka to PRAGUE. It was not until he was ready to cross into the Federal Republic that Source "A" was requested to sign a statement committing him to cooperation with the CIS. Aside from a daily allowance during the time he was in PRAGUE and a tenuous promise to be enabled to visit with his family, Source "A" was not extended any offer or promise of future remuneration for his work.

Source "B", in contra-distinction to Source "A", was offered considerable incentive for a consideration of cooperation with the StB. Upon arrival at the PILZEN StB headquarters, Source "B" was introduced to the person who later proved to be his CIS handling agent. He was queried concerning his background, time spent in West Germany, relatives in West Germany and the CSR, general conditions prevailing in the Federal Republic, and future plans entertained by him now that he was in the CSR. Source "B" followed his answers to these questions with statements to the effect that he was greatly dissatisfied with conditions in West Germany and that he had experienced only failure while a resident there. The interviewer was quick to press the matter further and presented the proposal that Source "B" work for the StB in return for a sizeable monthly payment plus a terminal bonus of 10,000 Czech kronen and a home in CSR. Source "B" then was required to sign a statement of loyalty as written proof of his acceptance of the offer. There followed an additional interview of Source "B" by an individual introduced as the "chief" during which the same topics were placed under discussion as were covered previously at interviews, the exception being Source "B"'s feelings toward returning to West Germany on an Intelligence mission. Agreement by Source "B" did not elicit a revelation as to what tasks would be expected of him, and the next morning he was removed to Camp Sadzka.

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Source "C"'s b1

b1

b1

The latter, however, did not alter the possibility of his being tried by the CSR judicial authorities for espionage, a situation which enabled the StB to be less tactful. Accordingly, Source "C" was candidly queried whether he would be amenable to employment by the StB to which he responded affirmatively. Source "C" had been conveyed by members of the StB from the DDR/CSR border to a hotel in PRAGUE, where he was required to explain in detail his association with US Intelligence. Source "C" related a cover story he had perfected while a prisoner in the DDR and apparently told a sufficient amount of the truth to capture the confidence of his interviewers, because the conversation soon directed itself toward the utilization of Source "C"

b1

The StB was not required by the circumstances of the situation to promise Source "C" anything in the way of remuneration, and they did not with the exception of mentioning that Source "C" could assure himself of a good future life in the CSR by cooperating earnestly and that all funds given him by the Americans would be deposited to his account in a PRAGUE bank. Inasmuch as Source "C"'s personal data and background had previously been noted, it was not necessary that an interview covering these topics be repeated. Source "C" was then photographed and required to sign a pledge of loyalty to the CIS.

BRIEFING, TRAINING, AND PREPARATION FOR MISSION:

Subsequent to the recruitment of the agent-elect, there evolves a rather distinct pattern in the development of the source for his return to West Germany in the capacity of an espionage agent. The pattern necessarily varies with the individual circumstances surrounding each case insofar as it must be determined whether the individual considered for the work possessed the potential intelligence and reliability which would render detailed training of him worth while. In the three cases at hand, Source "B" seemed to be the one who was considered to hold the most promise for the CIS as the lengths to which the StB went in order to train and in other ways prepare him for activity in West Germany were far more extensive than in the other two instances. Source "C", of course, was considered to have been previously trained in the basic procedures of Intelligence work, and, in addition, was held in suspicion because of his western affiliation. The reason for Source "A"'s not receiving a more detailed and embracing course of training is not known, but could be attributable to one or more of numerous considerations. Taking into account the variations previously mentioned, the following points appear to be relatively consistent features in the development of a CIS operative: Settlement in a hotel where the candidate receives instructions of varied intensity concerning the methods of performing the various tasks involved in the fulfillment of his assigned mission; development of rapport through a friendly relationship between the source and his controllers; granting of a generous expense account with considerable freedom of movement within the city; and the arranging of cover

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address and methods of contacting the CIS while operating in the Federal Republic. In regard to this last point, it is interesting to note that the PRAGUE telephone numbers furnished Sources "A" and "C" were identical. Another curious feature of these cases is that despite the fact that two of the agents were given considerable amounts of cash, neither was required to sign a receipt.

Source "A" was transferred from the collection point at Sadzka to the Hotel "Theatre Metro" in PRAGUE. He was informed that should he be required to produce identification during the course of a routine documents check, he was to request that the checking authorities call PRAGUE 60509 and ask for [b6] Source "A"'s status would then be explained to the satisfaction of the inquiring official, and he would be released. During his leisure moments while in PRAGUE, Source "A" was allowed the freedom of the city and was provided, upon request, expense money amounting to 500 or 700 kronen per payment. Frequently Source "A" was accompanied to various cultural, sport, or other recreational events by representatives of the StB who almost daily escorted him to dinner followed by a night of drinking which lasted until the early hours of the morning. He was also permitted to wander about the city at will utilizing what facilities of entertainment were available. Within a day or so after his arrival at the hotel, Source "A" was introduced to the initial phase of the instruction he was to labor with during the following days.

The subject most continuously stressed was that concerning the method of preparing secret ink and invisible messages. The procedure described consisted of dissolving in water a small quantity of alum from a styptic pencil, the solution from which was then to be applied to the conveyance by means of a glass pen or sharpened match stick. All such communications were to be written above advertisements appearing in an ordinary newspaper which would be forwarded to PRAGUE. In addition to this means of contact, Source "A" was informed that he would be approached in West Germany by a CIS representative who was to identify himself by showing Source "A" the corner of a photograph, the remainder of which was in Source "A"'s possession. The contact would furnish him material, funds, and information as required by Source "A" in the performance of his mission. For the next 20 odd days Source "A" was rehearsed by the CIS handling agent in his newly acquired knowledge until he had memorized the instructions perfectly and could use the secret writing method without error. When it was determined that Source "A" was adequately drilled and prepared for his assignment, he was furnished the cover address, [b6]

[b6] This designation was to be employed by Source "A" in all his correspondence with the CIS. Upon arrival in the Federal Republic, Source "A" was instructed to send to the cover address a post card which bore the greeting, "Herzlichen Gruss von [b6] He was then furnished 700 DMW for expenses and driven to the border area where he was guided into West Germany.

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Upon being escorted from Camp Sadska, Source "B" was taken to the Hotel "Slovak" in PILZEN where he was registered under the name to which his refugee identity papers had been issued. Source "B" was immediately advised that he was not to reveal to anyone his true identity, but in the event he was questioned, should state that he was employed by a constructor who had certain commitments in the PILZEN area. He was enjoined not to make many acquaintances, to be especially careful of his topic of conversation when drinking, and not to call at the PILZEN StB headquarters in PILZEN under any circumstances. Although he was not granted the freedom of time for entertainment that Source "A" was, Source "B" received 100 kronen per day in defrayment of such expenses. Daily he met his handling agent at a pre-arranged spot within the city and proceeded to familiarize himself with the knowledge imparted to him. The instruction techniques consisted of walking through the city discreetly discussing, demonstrating, and practicing the various points to be assimilated. Methods of surveillance and establishment of letter drops were the subjects emphasized during these meetings. It was explained that the most common method of surveillance involved the use of a three man team, each member alternately assuming the lead position in order to prevent the suspect from becoming aware of the surveillance. Source "B" was further informed that during his mission in the Federal Republic, he should be alert to the possibility that he is being followed. The handling agent then described several methods of evading a known surveillance or testing for it: Threading through a crowded department store; entering a cinema and leaving by way of a side exit as soon as the picture begins; and jumping on, or from, a streetcar as it leaves the stop. With regard to letter drops, Source "B" was informed that the important points to bear in mind were choice of location and accurateness of description, the latter facilitating servicing. Source "B" was also versed in two methods of secret writing which were effected by dissolving either a small quantity of blood or an ordinary aspirin tablet in a glass of water. The resultant solution was to be applied to untreated writing paper by means of a glass pen or sharpened piece of wood, writing between the lines of an overt letter. When a secret message was transmitted, Source "B" was to terminate the first paragraph of the visible message with a word ending in "L". He was told that it would be most advisable if he were to maintain regular contact with his handling agent, using normal postal channels, and addressing his correspondence to [redacted] b6 [redacted] Whenever Source "B" wished to communicate a simple message to his handler, he was to write a letter couched in terminology which would be intelligible only to the writer and the addressee. The secret writing system was only to be brought into use when the message to be conveyed was too complex for accurate transmission, through overt means. Source "B" was instructed to employ the overt method, using an ordinary postal card, to inform his handler of his safe arrival in the Federal Republic. This system was also to be used in the event that Source "B" could not comply with a set time for reporting to a border rendezvous, which was to be the sole means of receiving instructions, guidance, or making lengthy reports. Within the overt message was to appear some allusion to a date on which

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a party or wedding was to be given by friends or relatives of Source. This date plus ten days would mark the date of the alternate rendezvous at the CSR/German border. Should it happen that Source "B" was not met at the border by CIS representatives and was, instead, apprehended by the Czech Border Guard, he was to request that the PS commander call PILZEN 2821, extension 378 whereupon the matter would be explained to the PS, and a car would be dispatched for him. Immediately prior to Source "B"'s crossing into West Germany, he was furnished an expense fund of 500 DMW.

Source "C"'s case is somewhat different from the preceding two insofar as he was held in suspicion and not afforded the same training and insight into the methods of the CIS as his contemporaries because he was known to be an agent of American Intelligence. Another element enhancing this attitude on the part of the CIS was the fact that Source "C" [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 Nevertheless, certain similarities can be picked out as being consistent with the two cases discussed above. Upon his delivery to the StB, Source "C" was lodged at the Hotel "Praha" in PRAGUE, CSR. As in the instance of his counterparts, he was treated in a very cordial manner at all times, including his interrogation by the StB at the Hotel "Praha." Apparently Source "C" played his role as a redefectee in a convincing manner because the StB ceased their interrogation after a time and began preparations for utilizing him as a double agent. Source "C" related to the StB enough of the truth so as to seem authentic while at the same time he reserved exposing his true purpose for being in the DDR. For example, he gave information concerning his background which was truthful but sufficiently colored to support his cover story. [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 Source "C" became aware, through the general tone of his interrogators' conversation and careless remarks passed by them, that the StB had on file information which corroborated what he told them, thereby establishing a feeling of reserved confidence in their evaluation of Source. Once Source "C" had been thus entrenched in the good graces of the CIS, the friendly atmosphere surrounding the previous dealings flowered into an overt demonstration; he was wined and dined at the best restaurants and night clubs in the PRAGUE area. The great bulk of the time Source "C" spent in PRAGUE [redacted] b1

[redacted] b1 The StB, therefore, encouraged his following through with the original plan in this regard as well as in reference to other phases of his assignment. While Source "C" was engaged in the activity of arranging a suitably authentic cover story in order to account for his time, he was also instructed in a method of secret writing which entailed the use of a blood and water solution applied to ordinary paper with a glass pen. However, Source "C" was directed not to use this system when initially contacting his control

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agent via post. Rather he was to smear on the upper right corner of a common post card a strong mixture of sugar and water which would signify that all had gone well with him in crossing the border. The post card, which was to be mailed three weeks after Source "C"'s entry into West Germany would otherwise be completely innocuous, bearing a simple greeting. All such communications were to be directed to the cover address, [b6] In addition, Source "C" was informed that he would be contacted in the Federal Republic by a CIS representative who would query him concerning the location of a certain street, and follow this with a question about the time. Source "C" was provided the counter phrase with which he was to reply to the contact man who would then brief Source on matters of CIS interest. When Source "C" desired to effect a meeting with his Czech handler in CSR, it was agreed that he would notify the agent a week in advance by sending a secret message to the address provided. He would then proceed to the Czech/DDR border where he would be met by agents of the StB. If Source "C" was apprehended in the DDR or otherwise experiencing insurmountable difficulty while traveling in that area or crossing the Czech border, he was to have the arresting authority telephone PRAGUE 60509 and ask to speak to [b6] Source "C"'s CIS control agent. As will be recalled at this time, the PRAGUE number 60905 is identical in this instance and in the case of Source "A"; however, it has not been definitely established whether this number is that of the StB headquarters in PRAGUE or another branch of the Ministry of the Interior. The final gesture of fortifying the agent with sufficient money to cover the expenses of his operation in West Germany was absent in this case probably because the CIS was relying on payment to Source "C" [b1]

b1

KKI:

With regard to the actual missions to be performed by these newly ordained CIS agents, there is again apparent a definite similarity in two of the cases in the sense that the basic information to be garnered by each was identical. Source "C"'s situation must be suspended in this phase of the discussion as it fails to parallel the other two in a fashion suitable for comparison. Fundamentally, the StB seems to be attempting a penetration of defector and emigre circles with the view of determining who among them is working for Western Intelligence. Once this groundwork has been determined, its overtones are developed in an effort to secure more immediately critical information such as border crossing points used by US or Western Intelligence agencies and the employment, background, associates, weaknesses, and activities of these people. Through an adequate coverage of these areas and a development of this type of information, the modus operandi, personnel, installations, and possibly the KKI of the Western Intelligence agency under scrutiny could be determined to some extent. Because of the contacts he had developed in the KAISERSLAUTERN area through Labor Service employment, Source "A" was directed to re-establish his friendship with a former girl

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friend in that city with the intention of using this residence as his own, and eventually recruiting the girl, [b6] as an accomplice. He was also to obtain proper identity documentation and locate employment in the area. Once suitable cover had been set up in this manner, Source "A" was to ingratiate himself with the local emigre organizations as well as with individual expatriated Czechs, Poles, Bulgarians, and Hungarians. From the latter, he was instructed to develop sources who would furnish him the names of those among the refugees who were in the hire of Western Intelligence agencies. These sources were to determine the residences, employment, habits, associates, and activities of the individuals allegedly so affiliated, as well as to effect a surveillance of them in order to learn more detailed information concerning their personal and professional lives. If at all possible, Source "A" was under instructions to attempt a penetration of a Western agency through the exploitation of contacts he would cultivate during the course of his work. Finally, the abduction of [b6] a defected Czech Border Guardsman residing at Camp VALKA, was given to Source "A" as a secondary mission. These EELs were given Source "A" at the time of his third interrogation at Camp Sadska, subsequent to his formal recruitment. He was briefed by an individual unknown to him who was believed to be from the Ministry of Interior and in charge of the recruitment procedures at the camp. This individual was never again in contact with Source "A" who was transferred to the direct control of his handling agent.

Source "B" was handled in somewhat of a different manner insofar as the time and individual involved in his EEL briefings were concerned. He was interrogated, recruited, and processed at Camp Sadska, and returned to PILZEN where he underwent relatively extensive training period before being notified of the mission's nature. The assignment given him, however, was of such a similarity as to indicate a trend in the recent efforts of the Czech Intelligence Service. After reaching MUNICH, establishing a residence, and finding employment, Source "B" was directed to become acquainted with the various Czech refugee organizations and personnel throughout MUNICH with a view to determining which individuals or organizations were actively cooperating with Western Intelligence. He was to locate a defected PILZEN police official, (Fnu) [b6] and a suspected US Intelligence operative, [b6]. Finally, the residences, employment, associates, and activities of these two persons were then to be established by any discreet means available including surveillance.

Source "C" was held in some distrust by the StB, and, therefore, was not briefed on his assignment in the Federal Republic, but was informed that he would be contacted by CIS representatives in West Germany

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RETURN TO WEST GERMANY:

The manner in which the CIS dispatched the three agents is believed to hold some value as it provides an insight into the border conditions and points of crossing considered most free of obstacles and possible apprehension. Furthermore, this information can be put to use in future debriefings and interrogations of persons returning from the CSR relating similar stories of recruitment by the StB. Alike in almost every respect were the crossings of Sources "A" and "B", the exception being that Source "A" was dispatched at 0100 hours and Source "B" at 2000 hours. However, even in this difference there is the common feature of darkness. Although Source "C"'s crossing varied in other respects, he also was sent over under cover of darkness. The descriptions of the immediate border area as given by Source "A" and Source "B" present a fairly clear picture of what constitutes the physical security barriers in the FLOSSEMBERG area. On the other hand, Source "C"'s case reflects a unique method employed by the PS in the dispatching of CSR agents into West Germany at ASCH.

Source "A" was escorted to the border by his handling agent and passed to the control of the Czech Border Guard. He was then taken through a tunnel which passed under the electrified barbed wire fence located approximately one kilometer from the actual border. Source "A" noticed that a cleared space of about 10 meters width stretched parallel to the border fence which supported a series of flood lights spaced some 500 feet apart. Tunnels under the fence every 1500 feet were passageways similar to the one Source "A" and his guides had used. Source "A" was accompanied directly to the German border where he was directed to the nearest town. Source "B" experienced exactly the same handling in this matter as his fellow agent with the exception noted above, whereas Source "C" was driven to the border area at KARLOVI VARY, CSR, and dispatched with the aid of dogs. His handling agent placed him in contact with the PS whereupon two PS officers controlling one dog each escorted him through a gate in the border fence and across the cleared path to the actual frontier where the dogs were unleashed and allowed to circle the area in search of a German patrol. Upon the dogs' return without incident, the border was considered to be safe and Source "C" successfully entered West Germany.

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REDS RESHUFFLING EUROPEAN SPY NET

Soviet Purges Said to Disrupt
Espionage Set-Up, Which Is
Trying to Enlist Emigres

By G. L. SULZBERGER

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 20.—Communist espionage networks in Western Europe, weakened by the purges in the Soviet empire, are reorganizing, according to responsible sources.

It is said that special efforts are being made to induce political emigres either to return to their homelands or to undertake secret intelligence work abroad.

Both blackmail and promises of gain are understood to have been employed. Blackmail takes the form of threats against relatives still in satellite countries or of warnings that compromising past circumstances in the lives of emigres will be revealed.

Reports have been received that Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, all Eastern European satellites of the Soviet Union, are trying to gain favor among emigres. A Hungarian football team recently in France and Britain is understood to have tried hard to establish contact with Hungarian emigres in those countries and to have promised good treatment if they returned to their native land.

The Bulgarian penal code was altered two months ago to eliminate a law that had threatened refugees remaining abroad with the death penalty and their relatives with imprisonment.

Trials Confirm Transfer

Since last November the press of Czechoslovakia has sought to depict voluntary emigres as the deluded victims of certain "reactionary" politicians and has hinted that returning refugees would be exonerated.

It is believed that soon after the end of World War II Moscow established the headquarters of its main intelligence networks for the West in satellite countries, especially Czechoslovakia. Confirmation of this suspicion has appeared in recent Czech trials.

A professional spy named Rudolf Roessler, recently was convicted in Lucerne, Switzerland, of espionage on behalf of Czechoslovakia. He served in Switzerland during the war as one of Moscow's most important agents, operating under the code name Lucy. He and his Swiss contact man, Dr. Xavier Schnieper, admitted in court that between 1947 and 1953 they had sent to Czechoslovakia 160 reports on North Atlantic Treaty Organization secrets.

Joseph Kubal, a young Czechoslovak student, came to France in 1945. Last year he was arrested as a spy and confessed that he had photographed United States military installations on behalf of Prague.

It has been standard procedure for some years for Communist espionage services to seek to plant agents among bona fide refugee groups. A well-known Czechoslovak emigre political party was thus "penetrated" by agents, who then allegedly were able to plant their own representatives as "refugees" in international organizations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva, emigre political and propaganda groups, and the broadcasting services of foreign countries.

One known Communist agent, a woman in the guise of a refugee, is said to have been sent from Prague at the same time as Kubal. She is understood to have worked directly for the espionage network of Bedrich Ralcin, who has been charged with spying in France and Spain. She managed to become the personal secretary of one of the most distinguished Czechoslovak emigre leaders and as a result was able to betray many refugee secrets.

She is understood to have returned to Prague in 1951, only to be sent on a new mission in Tangier, where she was to organize an intelligence network covering Spain. En route she was arrested by the Swiss police and committed suicide in Bern last July.

Czechoslovakia, as a principal center of espionage in the West for Lavrenti P. Beria's spy system, was gravely weakened even before the executed Soviet leader and his security services were purged. The leading espionage officials established in Prague are said to have been arrested during and after the purge of Rudolf Slansky, Deputy Premier, executed on treason charges, and his colleagues.

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CZECH WHO DEFECTED RETURNS TO THE REDS

Special to The New York Times

VIENNA, May 15--A Czechoslovak Socialist, who fled to the West while Deputy Premier under the Communists, apparently has returned to Czechoslovakia.

Bohumil Lauermann, who defected in 1960 and disappeared in Salzburg late last year, announced in Prague today that he had voluntarily returned to the Communist satellite. According to a Prague broadcast, he said he had seen his mistakes and made up his mind to go back to help reconstruct Czechoslovakia under its present regime. He violently denounced the United States.

There had been two theories about Mr. Lauermann's disappearance—that he had been kidnaped or that he had been lured back to Czechoslovakia. His past warranted either conclusion.

Mr. Lauermann, who for a time had found protection in Yugoslavia, also denounced Marshal Tito and said the Yugoslavs had awakened to their President's real intentions.

The Prague radio also announced tonight that 1st Lt. James Davies, United States Army, who was born in Philadelphia in 1921, had crossed the border yesterday and asked for asylum from the Czech Government.

A. 137536
vol. 5

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☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 676-
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C10

5 March 1954

Czechoslovakian Espionage Activities

100-4454

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Attention is invited to Par 43 SR 380-5010 dated 21 June 1953, which prescribed that the G-2, in effect, is to have complete control of the contents of G-2 intelligence information to permit operations in G-2 in the field. It is to be noted that this information is not to be disclosed to any other person except as may be made only when directly authorized by the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, United States Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered a violation of AR 380-5.

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Section III

Ref "A" (Cont'd) 64th CTS Op

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Page(s) 688-
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HO-46383

SUBJECT: CIS Letter Drop "Lila", Vienna, Austria

TO: CO, Region "C" FROM: Hq 430th CIC Opns DATE: 28 Jan 64) COMMENT NO. 3
b6 /iws/Salt: 39/Ext 212

1. 55th CIC Group has been b1
b1

2. It is regretted that this Hqs failed to identify letter-drop "Lila" as being identical to a CIS letter drop reported in the b6 cases. Coverage of letter-drop "Lila" would not have been requested if drop had been properly identified in Hqs research.

3. No further action required. Case closed.

Incls:
w/d

b6 Colonel, SIGC
Commanding

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(8 Jan 54)

SUBJECT: CIS Letter Drop "Lila", Vienna, Austria

TO CO, Hq 430th
CIC Det

FROM CO, Region "C"

DATE 25 Jan 54 COMMENT NO. 2
b6 WSC/hk/Vienna A-11425

1. Reference is made to paragraph 4, Comment No. 1, above.

2. The CIS letter drop "Lila" is the letter drop which was supposed to be used by b1 in maintaining contact with the CIS courier b6. A photostatic copy of the original sketch of the location of the letter drop, which was furnished by b1 was forwarded to Headquarters Operations as Exhibit "I" of A/R V-30228, dated 18 July 1953, subject: Operation Bargain/Episode, Re: b1

b1

3. US CIC agents from this Office have located letter drop "Lila" and b1 b1 of the area. The letter drop was checked b1 and nothing was found in the drop other than an accumulation of dust and crumbled mortar. The letter drop is difficult and hazardous to check due to lack of cover, and the frequent presence of considerable pedestrian traffic. In addition, there is a frequent exodus of Soviets from a Soviet billet near the area of the letter drop.


4. Further checking of the letter drop "Lila" is not recommended due to the hazard and difficulties present, and since the possibility exists that US CIC agents checking the drop could be apprehended b1 in the course of their checks and observation of the drop. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the CIS would continue using the letter drop since it has been compromised b1 during her known incarceration by this Office, and further, during her interrogation b1 in their widely publicized b6 case.

5. It is requested that this case be closed. Further checks of the aforementioned letter drop will not be conducted by this Office unless otherwise instructed by Headquarters Operations.

b6 Lt Col, MPC
Commanding

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8 Jan 54

CIS, Letter-Drop "Lila"
Vienna, Austria

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EO-46383

b6 /ep/s39/ext 212

1 Hq 430th CO Region 8 Jan 54
CIC Opns "C"

1. Reference:
Letter, Hq 66th CIC Group, File D-354829, dated 30 December 53, Subject: "Czech Letter-Drop, Vienna, Austria", a copy of which is attached.
2. Background:
 - a. See reference letter.
 - b. 430th CIC Central Records contain no identifiable references to SUBJECT letter-drop.
3. Objectives:
 - a. To determine if SUBJECT letter-drop is being utilized by unidentified CIS operatives.
 - b. To copy any material found in SUBJECT letter drop.
4. Specific Instructions:
 - a. Locate SUBJECT Letter-drop by reconnaissance by US CIC Agents.
 - b. Check the letter drop b1
to determine if SUBJECT letter-drop is in current use. This requirement will remain in effect until 31 March 1954 unless rescinded or changed by this Hq at an earlier date.
 - c. If any material is found in SUBJECT letter-drop at any time, the

b1

b1

5. Reports:
 - a. This Hq will be notified by Priority TMI message if any CIS material is found in SUBJECT letter-drop.
 - b. Negative results will be reported in Agent Report form each month.

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DECLASSIFICATION

1 Incl
a/s

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b6
Commanding

Colonel, SIGC

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(30 Dec 53)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Czech Letter Drop, Vienna, Austria

SUBJECT
CARDED

WJO/lwa

Headquarters 430th CIC Detachment, United States Forces in Austria, APO 168,
US Army, 29 January 1954TO: Commanding Officer, Headquarters 66th CIC Group, United States Army
Europe, APO 154, US Army

1. Letter-drop "Lila" has been identified as a CIS letter-drop used in two recent CIS cases investigated by this organization. Both cases, as explained below, were publicized and there is good reason to believe that CIS is aware that this letter-drop's existence has been compromised. b1

b1

2. One b1 CSR national, born b1 in b1 was active as a CIS operative performing offensive counter-intelligence missions in Vienna during 1951-1953. In April 1953, b1 was arrested by this organization and confessed her CIS affiliation. During interrogation, b1 described the letter drop which has been identified to your organization as CIS letter-drop "Lila". b1 arrest and CIS activities were publicized in the US and Austrian press in late 1953. b1 CIS activities were controlled from Brno, CSR, throughout her CIS career.

MENTIONED
CARDED

3. One b6 born b6 in b6 was active as a courier for a CSR counter intelligence agency (probably DB) between Vienna and Brno, CSR, for an undetermined period prior to her arrest by Austrian police in Vienna in October 1953. Her activities had been under b1 and CIC investigation prior to her apprehension. During interrogation b6 described SUBJECT letter-drop and admitted having serviced the drop on various occasions. b6 case was widely publicized in the Austrian press and details regarding her CIS career were described in detail in several Austrian papers. b6 was deported to CSR upon completion of b1 b1 investigation in Vienna.

4. Letter-drop "Lila" was physically checked by US CIC agents three times during the third week of January 1954 and it appeared not to have been used in recent weeks.

b1

b1

5. In view of the above, no further action will be taken on this case unless specifically requested by your organization.

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE1 Incl:
n/cb6
Colonel, SIGC
Commanding~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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30 DEC. 1953

D-354829

SUBJECT: Czech Letter Drop, VIENNA, Austria

TO: Commanding Officer
430th CIC Detachment
United States Forces, Austria
APO 168, US Army

1. On 12 October 1953, a source of this organization, who is considered to be fairly reliable, reported that he had deposited information in a letter drop known as "LILA" located in the Soviet Sector of VIENNA. Source advised that, in order to locate this letter drop, he crossed the Danube Canal and proceeded along Taborstrasse until he reached the Karmeliter Church at Karmeliter Platz. In the old wall, to the rear of the Karmeliter Church, there is a bricked doorway wherein the letter drop "LILA" is located. (C-2) (See inclosure.)

2. The possibility exists that letter drop "LILA" is being used for other Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service operatives. It would be appreciated if your headquarters would periodically check letter drop "LILA" and furnish this headquarters with copies of any information found therein.

3. Your headquarters will be advised when source is again directed to service the above mentioned letter drop.

1 Incl: Photograph

MLR/jab/emcc/Stgt 9342-7244
OPS

b6

Colonel CHIC
Commanding

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Capt b6 /dr/779
20 June 1953

14256

D-137596

22 JUN 1953

SUBJECT: Alleged Cable Tap at EISENSTEIN by Czechs,
Re: SRI 191-53

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Collection Section, Major b6

1. Reference is made to your Specific Request for Information number 191-53, subject as above, dated 9 April 1953, and to letter to this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 1 May 1953 and 11 May 1953.

2. Forwarded for your information is Agent Report, file V-7260; C/R V-16142, subject: Czech Intelligence Activity, Re: Listening Device in Railroad Station at EISENSTEIN 330026943, Germany.

3. Central Registry contains no record of b1

4. Should additional reports be received concerning the reported listening device, copies will be forwarded.

5. No other dissemination has been made of this report by this headquarters.

1 Incl
AR, dtd 12 June 53, file
V-7260; C/R V-16142, subj
as stated (3 cys) w/Exhibit
I

b6

Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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3300151	
POSSIBLE	

ALV/dr/Sgt 9342-779
GFS

M/R: SRI 191-53 requests check on Czech cable tap in EISENSTEIN;
original lead from MA, PRAGUE. Investigation negative. Above
forwards chance information which may answer SRI. ALV/dr

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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Page(s) 702-703

Capt b6 dr/779
30 April 1953

GROUP
XXXXXXXXXXXX
UNITED STATES XXXXXXXXXXXXX ARMY, EUROPE

14110
1 MAY 1953

D-137536

SUBJECT: Alleged Cable Tap at EISENSTEIN by Czechs
Re: SRI 191-53

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Collection Section, Major b6

1. Reference is made to your Specific Request for Information number 191-53, subject as above, dated 9 April 1953.

2. A blueprint of the German railroad communication lines failed to show a telephone cable running to the old German customs building in EISENSTEIN. This old building is currently used by German Customs Police.

3. A blueprint of German postal communication lines in EISENSTEIN will become available to CIC Region V, REGENSBURG, on 4 May 1953. Report of additional investigation will be forwarded on or before 15 May 1953.

4. No other dissemination has been made of this information by this headquarters.

ALV/dr/Sgt 9342-779
CPS

b6
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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M/R: Above is initial answer to G-2's SRI-191-53. Next report to be forwarded by 15 May 1953.

ALV

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER NO.

15/1437Z EBR

5911/

(100) 15/4/53R8W

CONFIDENTIAL

SPACE ABOVE FOR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY

FROM: (Originator)

CO HQ 66TH CIC GROUP

TO:

CO CIC REGIONS V REGENSBURG
VI NURNBERG
VII BAYREUTH

INFO: CIC LIAISON OFFICER HEIDELBERG FOR
b6

DATE-TIME GROUP 151400 APR 53		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PRECEDENCE FOR:	ACTION ROUTINE	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS	CRYPTOPROTECTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
REFERS TO MESSAGE:		
IDENTIFICATION	CLASSIFICATION	

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Regraded CONFIDENTIAL on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

File in
D-137536

b6		PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES	
b6	Capt, Arty/alv/ 705	b6	
SYMBOL D-137536	TELEPHONE 779	OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Operations Section	

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173

REPLACES NME FORM 10, 1 MAY 48
WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

AGL (1) 8-51-506M-3785

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b2

SECURITY INFORMATION

Ref CI/864/53

Hq 430th CIC
Attn: Opns

G2, CIB/CSSB

9 Jul 53

Capt b6 WIX/39-164

Records

1. The following information was relayed to this office on 1 Jul 53 by the b1

b1

3. The records of this office reflect that pigeons were mentioned in the papers of b6 CIB sub-control agent. b6 is mentioned as the home of b6 one of the paramours of b6 convicted CIB operative.

4. Generally, homing pigeons are trained in four ways. Firstly, there are those that fly one way routes only, during daylight hours. Secondly, there are those that fly round trip journeys, during daylight hours. Thirdly and fourthly, the one-way-routers and round-trip-journeymen are taught to fly at night.

5. Whether or not the above-mentioned pigeon was to have flown to the CSR is unknown. The metallic bands may contain the ciphered name and address of a CIB operative, indicating that he is prepared to begin or to resume operations. The pigeon and metallic bands were, in that case, sent from the CSR.

6. Your office will be informed of any additional details concerning this case that come to light.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

Auth

A/C of S. G-2

Date

b6

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

b6

Lt Col, G3
Chief, Operations Branch

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Page(s) 707-
716

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

Czech Letter Drop, REGULATIONS (33UT 8733),
 Germany

16 February 1953

V-15611; V-15625

D-325005

b1

reported that he had received a communication from the Czech Intelligence Service, asking him to begin working for them again (photocopy of envelope and message, with translation, is appended as EXHIBIT I). b1 stated that he had discovered the message in an unstamped envelope in his mailbox


b1

wife observed the envelope, but is not aware of the contents, and b1 stated that he had revealed the message to no one. b1 again

b1

ADDITIONAL NOTE: b1 was the original contact who reported on his attempted recruitment by the CI, and who cooperated in actions resulting in the uncovering of a courier system operated in Reg V, 66th CIC Group, REGULATIONS (33UT 8733), Germany. b1

b1



Hqs 66th SECDEF LCP No
 A 4686

717

b6

CIC Group

S/A, Reg V, 66th

/s/

b6

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P. Regensburg

Bahnhof: 11/1

718

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Page(s) 219-720

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
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Czech Letter Drop, REGINSBURG (33UT.0723),
Germany

16 February 1953

V-15611; V-15825

b1



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SECURITY INFORMATION

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b6
CIC Group

S/A, Reg V, 66th
72i

/s/ b6

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

SECURITY INFORMATION

V-15611; C/R V-15825

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT
8733, Germany

12 September 1952

13555

b1 P-102-V(T) was contacted in FURTH IM WALD
(UTM)33UU4644, Germany and stated that he had traveled to KISENSTEIN
(UTM)33UU6943, Germany and back by bus b1 in an
effort to fulfill the EKI's given him by the CIS b1
P-102-V(T) stated that he had prepared a handwritten report which he
would deliver to his Czech handling agent b1 (A trans-
lation of the report is appended as EXHIBIT 1.) (F-2)

325005



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b6

Reg V, 66th CIC Det

/s/

722
b6

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Page(s) 723

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT,
8733, Germany

12 September 1952

V-15611; C/R V-15825

[b1] submitted a letter in reply to
EEI's given him previously by the CIS. (A photocopy of the letter
with translation is appended as EXHIBIT II.) (V-2)

AGENT'S NOTES: The above mentioned letter was prepared by [b1] in
conjunction [b1]

744

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[b6]

Reg V, 66th CIC Det

/s/

[b6]

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FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 725-
726

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SECURITY INFORMATION

de

12 September 1952

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)SSUT, 8733, Germany

V-15611; C/R V-15825

[b1] P-102-V(T) was contacted in FURTH IM WALD (UTM)SSUT, 4364, Germany and stated that he had contacted his Czech handling agent, [b1] P-102-V(T) stated that he gave [b6] the handwritten report which he had prepared. [b6] did not express dissatisfaction with the report but had questioned P-102-V(T) further regarding the KEI's given P-102-V(T) previously. [b6] then instructed P-102-V(T) to travel to REGENSBURG (UTM)SSUT, 8733, Germany [b1] and pick up a packet which would be contained in letterdrop [b6] He was then given 60 DM to cover the expenses of the trip and told to return with the packet [b1] (F-2)

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[b6]

Reg V, 66th CIC Det /s/ [b6]

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12 September 1952

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT,
8723, Germany

V-15611; C/R V-15825

[b1] P-102-V(T) was contacted near FURTH IM WALD (UTM)35UU4364, Germany and made the following detailed report: According to previous instructions, P-102-V(T) met with his Czech handling agent, [b6] at their usual meeting place (map of the area showing pertinent details mentioned in the following report is appended as EXHIBIT III) on the evening [b1] [b6] was accompanied by his usual chauffeur and another man, introduced as [b6]. As is customary, a uniformed member of the Czech border guard was stationed a short distance from the automobile at the point of meeting. P-102-V(T) gave the following descriptions:

[b6] P-102-V(T)'s handling agent is described as being 35 to 38 years of age; height: 5'7"; weight: about 175 pounds; dark blond hair; blue eyes; wears wrist watch on the left arm; smokes cigarettes continuously; always dressed in civilian clothing, usually wears brown shoes and a cap (rather than the customary hat worn in Europe); sometimes wears a full length leather overcoat; always armed with holstered pistol and a machine pistol; speaks almost perfect German with little accent noticeable.

[b6] Czech agent introduced to P-102-V(T) is described as being about 28 years of age; height: 5'5" to 5'6"; weight: 155 pounds; thin build; black straight hair; dark colored eyes; dark complexion; flat, Slavic face described by P-102-V(T) as "aussian"; turned up, short nose; dressed in civilian clothing with a tan raincoat and no hat; speaks poor German; was also armed with a holstered pistol and a machine pistol.

Chauffeur who usually accompanies [b6] is described as being about 25 years of age; height: 6'; weight: about 170 pounds; slim build; black hair; dark colored eyes; dark complexion with thin face; wears wrist watch on left arm; dressed in civilian clothing; wears a beret usually; sometimes wears full length leather overcoat; armed with a machine pistol and occasionally a holstered pistol; P-102-V(T) has never heard this man speak German, and stated that the chauffeur usually stays outside the car during meetings.

Automobiles used for meetings are described as follows: Gray or light tan Skoda four (4) door hard top sedan, license believed to be number 612. Also used is a black Skoda four (4) door sedan, hard top, license number 923. P-102-V(T) stated that the latter was used at the meeting [b1]

[b1]

Continuing his report on the meeting [b1] P-102-V(T) stated that he had accompanied the three (3) men, [b6] and the

[b6]

Reg V, 66th CIC/28 /s/ [b6]

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12 September 1952

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT,
8732, Germany

V-15611; C/R V-15825

chauffeur, in the auto to a lone house located about one (1) kilometer east of RALT FRA-NET (UTM)33UT, 4768, CSR on the road leading to R.A.-BING (UTM)33UT, 4959, CSR. The house was not occupied, partially furnished, and lighted by oil lamps only. P-102-V(T) delivered the packet containing b6 reply, along with a book of railroad timetables for Bavaria, previously requested by the CIS. b6 did not open the packet at that time. P-102-V(T) was then photographed from the front, then both left and right profile by b6 who used a miniature type camera with a flash attachment. b6 then told P-102-V(T) that in the future he would probably be met by b6 since there was much work to be done and he b6 might not have time. b6 intimated further that he had many persons to meet in the border area. P-102-V(T) commented that b6 carried a briefcase containing numerous papers, about seven (7) sketches of various places that P-102-V(T) was unable to identify, and one (1) very detailed sketch of the location of the letter drop b6 located in REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT, 8732, Germany which he went over with P-102-V(T) and Paul. b6 cautioned P-102-V(T) to be very careful in approaching letter drop b6 at all times. b6 also carried a notebook containing many paragraphs evidently consisting of notes on meetings, since b6 always writes a paragraph relative to the details of his meetings with P-102-V(T) in the notebook. P-102-V(T) was then told to watch a tree located on the CSR side of the border near Gasthaus SINGER (see RALIFP for location) during the next few days. When a handkerchief was seen hanging from a limb between the hours of 1200 and 1400, P-102-V(T) was to meet his handling agent, b6 at the border that evening. P-102-V(T) was then driven to a point near the border where the meeting ended. During the ensuing days, P-102-V(T) watched the tree as instructed and observed the signal at about b1. That evening, P-102-V(T) again met with his handling agent b6 who was again accompanied by the same driver and b6. P-102-V(T) was given a packet securely wrapped in red cellulose tape (photocopy of contents with English translation is appended as RALIFP (V)) and instructed to deliver it to the letter drop b6 in REGENSBURG no later than 1200 hours on Saturday, 6 September 1952. P-102-V(T) stated that he believed that b6 was rather disturbed for some unknown reason, and was more insistent than usual on the point of caution. b6 also mentioned that it was possible that P-102-V(T) might find something in letter drop b6 and told P-102-V(T) to bring whatever he might find there to the next meeting. b6 then gave P-102-V(T) 50 RM, despite P-102-V(T)'s protests that it was not sufficient, commenting that he b6 had several persons to meet, and could not give more. P-102-V(T) stated that b6 had a considerable amount of money with him, as is usual. P-102-V(T) was then instructed to meet with his handling agent b1 to report on his trip

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b6

Reg V, 66th CIC Det

b6

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12 September 1952

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)33UT,
8733, Germany

V-15611; C/R V-15825

to REGENSBURG and to deliver anything he might have found in letter drop [b6]. Moreover, [b6] told P-102-V(T) that he could expect to make another trip to REGENSBURG [b1] [b1] but gave no further instructions or assignments at that time. The meeting then ended. When questioned about the possible meaning of the red wrapping of the packet, used for the first time, P-102-V(T) replied that he personally purchased the tape used in wrapping the packets in the past, and that red tape had been used this time simply because none other had been available in FURTH IM MAIN. P-102-V(T) stated that he had taken the tape with him to the meeting [b1] [b1] and that Josef had wrapped the packet in his presence, apparently using no particular method. P-102-V(T) concluded by stating that the Czechs had made no threats against him for over a month, being apparently content that he was following instructions as ordered. (P-2)

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
[b6]

Reg V, 66th CIC

/s/ [b6]

Det

SECURITY INFORMATION



SUBJECT: Czech Better Drop
REGENSBURG
File: V-15611

731

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Page(s) 732-733

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12 September 1952

Czech Letter Drop, REGENSBURG (UTM)8733,
Germany

V-15611; C/A V-15825

[b1] P-102-V(T) was contacted near FURTH
IM WALD (UTM)330044364, Germany and made the following report:
P-102-V(T) met with the new Czech handling agent, [b1] [b6]
[b1] and received instructions to go to
REGENSBURG (UTM)330044364, Germany [b1] to
letter drop [b6] P-102-V(T) was told that there either may,
or may not, be something in the letter drop. P-102-V(T) was told to
report to [b6] on the outcome of the trip [b1]
[b1] P-102-V(T) was given 80 DM expense money for the trip for
which he signed a receipt. P-102-V(T) added the following details
concerning his meetings with Czech personnel: Approximately 500
meters inside the Czech border is a plowed strip of ground about ten
(10) meters wide. This strip extends in either direction parallel
to the border as far as the eye can see. It goes through all roads
and paths and is carefully watched by watch towers spaced along the
plowed strip so that each tower is visible from the ones to its left
and right. P-102-V(T) observed what he believes to be telephone
lines apparently connecting the towers. P-102-V(T) stated that the
automobiles used for the meetings are never driven across the plowed
strip; rather, P-102-V(T) is met by the handling agent who then walks
back across the plowed strip. P-102-V(T) must walk in the same foot-
prints as the handling agent, and return by the same manner. The
automobile used for the meeting [b1] was a very dark
blue Skoda four (4) door sedan, and P-102-V(T) stated positively
that it had no license plates whatsoever. (F-2)

734

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[b6]

Reg V, 66th CIC Det /s/ [b6]

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Activities
V-7260 Crossing and/or Agent Contact/
Czech Intelligence Activities Re: Border/

MEH
3 October 1952

00-1791

D-1371

1 CO SSK 3 Oct
Reg DIST 1952
V

1. Forwarded are eight (8) Agent
Reports, subject, file and date as above.

b1

b6

4. Region VII, BAYREUTH (UTW)32UFA8536, Germany is being serviced
with copies of the attached reports.

b1

EXCLUDED FROM
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Attention is invited to per 42, EO 330-223-27 which prohibits
disclosure of the nature, sources, or even the existence of such
counterintelligence information to persons not entitled to such information
or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may
be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority.
Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered to
be a violation of AR 360-5.

b6

Lt Col Inf
Commanding

Incl: 3 A/R's; a/s w/EXHIBITS I thru VI
DIST: 5 - Hq 66th CIC Det (Attn: Capt SCOTT)
→ 1 - Region VII (Info) (Attn: CE Team)
1 - Region V File

LOG NO 1443

Lt b6 do/REGENSBURG 9-304



Card + file
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735
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Page(s) 736 - 744

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Page(s) 748-749

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Page(s) 150

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Page(s) 751-
753

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Page(s) 154

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Page(s) 755-
257

H. Beyer

1. 10. 52

b6

Ag - 2660 -

Br. 1

b6

Ein festgenommener technischer Agent will in Besitz
einer Kennkarte auf den Namen b6 Pers. in Betreff,
ausgestellt von Polizeipräsident Augsburg, gewesen sein.

Es wird gebeten festzustellen, ob in Augsburg auf den
genannten Namen eine Kennkarte ausgestellt, bzw. nachgefordert
wurde. Sollte in Augsburg, wie H. mit obigen Personalien festge-
stellt werden, wird um Führung gebeten.

§

758

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Page(s) 759

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Page(s) *160*

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Translation

Form A

To: The Allied Directors
of Intelligence

b1

Date: 21 February 1952

Serial No.: 135/52

Copies: _____

A. Subject: Czech Intelligence Service

Tschechischer Nachrichtendienst

1. Date on which source received the information: _____

January 1952

2. Date of the reported event: January 1952

3. Office which exercises direct control over source:

b1

4. Details on source and his access to the information:

--

5. Details on sub-source and his access to the information:

--

B. Detailed comment by Evaluation Section:

The attached report is considered important for the following reasons:

The information, although obtained from an unknown source, is considered of importance for reasons of our own security.

C. Evaluation by Section III:

F/6

761

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING 14 F-3792	MESSAGE FORM Hq. 66th CIC Detachment 181033Z	COMCENTER NUMBER 11322PT 18/1/52
SPACE ABOVE RESERVED FOR COMCENTER ONLY		
FROM: (Originator) HQ 66TH CIC DET KUOM	DATE/TIME GRP 181045 JAN 52	SECY CLASS SECRET
	PRECEDENCE FOR	ACTION P
	BOOK MSG <input type="checkbox"/>	ORIGINAL MSG <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
TO: CIC LO ID HEID FOR DID ATTN COLLECTION SEC	MULTIPLE ADD CRYPTO/RECAUTION <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
INFO:	REFERS TO MESSAGE: IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION	

REF UR SPECIFIC EQST FOR INFO TWO DASH FIVE TWO DTD THREE JAN CURR PD
PERUSUAL CENTRAL REGISTRY REVEALS NO INFO RELATIVE YOUR QUERY IN PARA FOUR
PD NO CONFIRMING DATA AVAL CONFIRM ORGN CZECH INTEL OR ZONES OPERATION PD

b1 b6

Attention is invited to par 43, SR 330-370-10, which prescribes that disclosures of the nature, sources, or even the existence of such counterintelligence information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other persons not normally entitled to such information, may be made only when specifically authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited.

M/R: ID submitted information **b1** for confirmation. Check of Central Registry did not reveal any information which would confirm or refute it except recruitment methods and EKIs. GEF

GEF/

DRAFTERS NAME (and signature when rec) b6 CAPT, ARTY	SECY CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PAGE OF PAGES 1 1
SYMBOL b-137536	TELEPHONE 576	OFFICIAL TITLE CHIEF, OPNS SEC

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b6

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D-182829

CZECH StB (Statni Bezpecnost) State Security Service. Re: StB Intelligence Net of International Czechoslovakian Air Line.

26 December 1950

VII-1645

1. [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
[b1] illegal border crosser, was apprehended by [b1]
[b1]

2. Source was interrogated by the undersigned Agents on 11 and 13 December 1950 in the offices of CIC HOF (M51/099) and volunteered the following information:

a. The Air Section Intelligence Net of the StB plants its agents in the International Czechoslovakian Air Line. (See Personality Annex). These agents have the special mission of penetrating embassies of non-Communist powers in all the countries touched by the air line. Countries specifically mentioned by Source were Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, France and Italy. The net is also endeavoring to penetrate Catholic circles in France and Rome, Italy.

b. Hostesses of the air line are to gain the confidence of foreign diplomatic couriers traveling via the Czech air line. Thereby liaison should develop that will produce information of value to CSM Intelligence. United States diplomatic personnel are considered the most important target of hostess agents of the air line net.

c. The agent personnel of the air line also contact CSR agents abroad during flight layovers and transmit directives to those agents and bring back information from them. (P-6).

AGENT'S NOTES:

a. A Region VII Registry check revealed no information regarding personalities mentioned above.

b. Source first began to work for the air line in September 1947, but was not processed by the StB until September 1949. This recruitment of Source was accomplished by [b6] (See No. 1, Personality Annex). Source (who is of Jewish descent) was instructed to win the confidence of diplomatic personnel of Jewish descent traveling on the air line. Source stated that she is anti-Communist and that for this reason she never produced anything of any value for the StB. She did become friendly with a [b6] of the Israeli Legation in PRAGUE in December 1949. As he also was anti-Communist, she confessed to him her connection with the StB. She implied to the undersigned Agents that information she passed on to [b6] was eventually transmitted by him to American [b1] channels. Source was apparently reluctant to discuss this phase of her past activities.

770

[b6]

66th CIC Det, Region VII

[b6]

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VII-1645, Region VII, 26 December 1950, SUBJECT: OZACH St. (Statni Bezpečnost)
State Security Service.

c. Source was returned to German channels for transmittal to
Camp VALKA in NURNBERG.

APPROVED:

b6

Special Agent CIC
CE Team Commander.

PERSONALITY ANNEX

DISTRIBUTION:

1-Hq 66th CIC Det
1-Region VII files.

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12 January 2010

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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PERSONALITY ANNEA; V-1-1645, 26 December 1950.

Czechoslovakian StB Members:

1. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Height: 5'5", Weight: 176 lbs, Age: 35 or 37, Build: Heavy, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Officer in charge of StB, Air Force section. Office is located in PRAGUE, C&R. Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
2. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Height: 5'11", Weight: 176 lbs, Age: 35, Build: Slender, Hair: Dark Brown, Eyes: Brown, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Second in command of StB Section in charge of Air Base. Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.

Czechoslovakian Air Force Members:

Czech Pilots:

1. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 37, Height: 5'7", Weight: 149 lbs, Build: Small, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot. Political Attitude: Is known as ardent Communist. Remarks: Is presently serving with the rank of captain, in charge of pilots assigned to Czech airlines. wears only civilian clothing.
2. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 37, Height: 5'7", Weight: 170 lbs, Hair: Blond, Rank: Captain of Czech Commercial Airlines. Marital Status: Single, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
3. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 40, Height: 6' Weight: 165 lbs, Hair: Black, Build: Slender, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist, Is used for indoctrination of other pilots at the air field.
4. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 32 or 33, Height: 5'7", Weight: 143 lbs, Build: Medium, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
5. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Height: 5'5", Weight: 143 lbs, Build: Slight, Hair: Bald, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Flight Lt Czech International Air Lines. Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.

712

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PERSONALITY ANNEK; VII-1645, 26 December 1950.

6. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 40 to 45, Height: 5'7", Weight: 176 lbs, Hair: Bald, Marital Status: Single, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Flight Captain Czech International Air Lines. Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
7. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 37 to 38, Height: 5'7", Weight: 160 lbs, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Flight Lt, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
8. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 37, Height: 5'7", Weight: 154 lbs, Hair: Black, Marital Status: Single, Occupation: Pilot, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
9. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 37, Height: 5'7", Weight: 165 lbs, Build: Medium, Marital Status: Married, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist. It is rumored that he was finally bribed by the StB section to remain in the air service of Czechoslovakia.
10. Name: [b6] Age: 38, Sex: Male, Height: 5'9", Weight: 198 lbs, Build: Heavy, Marital Status: Single, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Pilot, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist. It is noticed that shortly after a person has had contact with the above, he is generally put under surveillance by the StB.
11. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 35, Height: 5'10", Weight: 160 lbs, Build: Slender, Hair: Black, Marital Status: Single, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist. Supposedly a former member of the Czech Intelligence system in Switzerland, and presently awaiting assignment to Sweden.

Hostesses:

1. [b6] Sex: Female, Age: 24, Height: 5'6", Weight: 138 lbs, Hair: Dark Brown, Build: Medium, Marital Status: Single, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Hostess, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist. Had attended a political school in MOSCOW/Soviet Union for four months.
2. Name: [b6] Sex: Female, Age: 26 or 27, Height: 5'7", Weight: 138 lbs, Hair: Brown, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Hostess, Political Attitude: Ardent Communist. Is supposedly assigned to try and obtain information from American couriers attached to American embassy. Supposedly speaks fluent English. Is in constant contact with StB Headquarters in PRAGUE/CSR.

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PERSONALITY ANNEX; vol-1645, 26 December 1950.

3. [b6] Sex: Female, Age: 20 or 22, Height: 5'6",
Weight: 145 lbs, Hair: Blond, Nationality: Czech,
Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Czech Air Line Hostess,
Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
Is in constant company of the members of the StB in PRAGUE. After
each completed flight is supposedly in contact with the StB upon
arrival.
4. Name: [b6] Sex: Female, Age: 22, Height: 5'2",
Weight: 95 lbs, Hair: Brown, Nationality: Czech,
Citizenship: Czech, Occupation: Hostess,
Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
5. Name: [b6] Sex: Female, Age: 28, Height: 5'6",
Weight: 127 lbs, Hair: Dark Brown, Marital Status: Married,
Build: Medium, Nationality: Czech, Citizenship: Czech,
Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
The above is very friendly with the members of the Air force StB
section in PRAGUE/CSR.

Soviet Pilots serving with Czech Air Lines:

1. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 40, Height: 5'7",
Weight: 143 lbs, Hair: Black, Marital Status: Married,
Nationality: Russian, Citizenship: Soviet Union,
Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
The above makes trips to RUSSIA/Soviet Union, three times a week if
weather permitting.
2. Name: [b6] Sex: Male, Age: 32 or 36, Height: 5'11",
Weight: 180 lbs, Hair: Blond, Marital Status: Single,
Nationality: Russian, Citizenship: Soviet Union,
Political Attitude: Ardent Communist.
The above accompanies [b6] on most of the flights to and
from RUSSIA.

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file D-259578

27 September 1950

INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLING GIVEN LOW LEVEL CZECH
AGENTS

Re: b1

VI-15176

1. Information contained in this report received from b1 a Czech Resident of Camp Valka, b1 was arrested by the StB in BOR, CSR and imprisoned in StB Headquarters, PILSEN, CSR. On or about b1 agreed to work for Czech Intelligence in Western Germany and was schooled in intelligence methods and procedures b1 b1 crossed the CSR/German border near Waidhaus (NSO/P42) and reported to the German Grenzpolizei. b1 was tried by a HICOG court in AMBERG (NSO/070) b1 and was sentenced to 60 days in prison on charge of multiple border crossing. b1 arrived in Camp Valka b1 from Strafanstalt AMBERG and has remained in Camp Valka to the present time. Reference is made to Paragraph 10, sub-paragraph "J" of Personality Report, Region VI, dated 25 September 1950, File: VI-15177, Subj: b1

2. SYNOPSIS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION: None

3. PRESENT INVESTIGATION:

a. Background information on b1 submitted in Personality Report referenced in Paragraph 1, above.

4. b1 stated that when he agreed to work for Czech Intelligence and had signed a statement to that effect, he was turned over to two men from the StB who had schooled him b1 for approximately 5-6 hours a day for seven days in various phases of intelligence gathering. This schooling took place b1 b1 and was conducted in StB Headquarters, PILSEN, CSR by two StB officials. The first instructor (name unknown) was described by b1 as approximately 35 years old, 5'11" tall, approximately 195 lbs in weight, heavy build, black hair, dark brown eyes, dark skinned, round face, wore glasses. The second instructor was described by b1 as approximately 30 years old, 5'10" tall, 165 lbs in weight, medium build, dark blond hair, brown eyes, square face with a straight, pointed nose.

5. b1 stated that his schooling was very informal in nature and consisted of:

a. Considerable time spent on methods and procedures of obtaining information from persons without arousing their suspicions.

b. Methods and care to be used in recruiting sources.

c. Instructions as to methods of condensing information for transmission to Czech intelligence.

Page 1 of 2 Pages
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b6

66th CIC Det, Reg VI, APO 696, US Army

S/A

775

b6

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10-35

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AR, Region VI, 66th CIC Detachment. Subject: INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLING GIVEN TO LOW
LEVEL CZECH AGENTS. Re: [b1] dated 27 Sep 50. File No. VI-15176

- d. Instruction on map and sketch making.
- e. A discussion of the various types of secret inks (milk, lemon juice, aspirin).
- f. Safeguarding of information to prevent detection. (Never keep compromising material on person or in dwelling place.)
- g. A discussion of the personality, methods and work performed by well known agents [b6] a former German movie actress and Soviet GPU agent during Second World War.)
- h. A discussion of various methods of coding messages for emergency transmission.

6. UNDEVELOPED LEADS AND FUTURE ACTION:

- a. [b1] source of information contained in this report, will be kept under close observation by this region during his stay in this area.

7. AGENT'S NOTES:

- a. [b1] stated that he no longer remembered details of the schooling given him by the StB because, at the time he was being schooled, he had no intentions of working for Czech Intelligence and the schooling itself was so informal in nature, that it defeated its purpose. [b1] stated that he sat in an office (any vacant office) and listened to his two instructors talk.
- b. Due to the fact that [b1] speaks very halting German, it was necessary to interrogate him through an interpreter. The necessity of using an interpreter reduced the effectiveness of the interrogation of [b1].
- c. It is recommended that the phase of investigation dealing with the schooling of [b1] be considered closed. However, [b1] will be kept under observation to determine if, at any future time, he is contacted by Czech Intelligence.

b6

Special Agent, CIC
Counter Espionage
Team Commander

EXHIBITS:

None

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1-Region VI file

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

CSR INTERNAL CONDITIONS
Re: Communist Plot to Discredit Clerical
Institutions

2. DATE SUBMITTED

25 August 1950

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

VII-1415

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. [b1] born [b1] at [b1]
[b1] illegal border crosser, was apprehended by [b1]

2. Source was interrogated by the undersigned Agent on 21 August 1950 at the WEIDEN (M50/Pl2) CIC office, and volunteered the following information:

a. Early in May 1950, the Communist element in OSEK (near DUCHCOV (N51/F23)) surreptitiously brought a large load of sub-machine guns, rifles, and pistols into the inclosure of the Salesian Monastery in OSEK and hid them. The following day, without warning, the StB demanded to be allowed to search the monastery premises. The weapons were discovered, and shortly afterwards, court proceedings were directed against the ten leading members of the monastery. Jail sentences of two years or more were adjudged against each of these ten victims. The charge was that the monastery had procured and hidden the weapons for use in a future revolt against the government. At present, the monastery and its inmates are receiving the most rigorous supervision by the local government authorities. (F-3)

3. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. Region VII Registry was checked concerning [b1] with negative results.

b. The allegation against the Communists was explained by Source as being the only possible explanation of the presence of the weapons.

c. Source's position in the [b1]
[b1] He was interrogated at the time of the incident described above and was accused of possessing an illegal radio transmitter. Fearing imprisonment, Source ran away and hid with sympathetic persons until 17 August 1950, when a forester helped him across the border.

d. The undersigned Agent gained the impression that Source may have been aided by a semi-underground organization for religious persecutees, but Source refused to give names or details of those who aided him. He stated that so far 3,000 priests have been arrested in the CSR.

e. Source was returned to German channels on 21 August 1950 for evacuation to Camp Valka, NURNBERG.

APPROVED:

b6

CE Team Cmdr

S/A CIC

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3-Hqs 66th CIC Det
1-Region VII file

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

66th CIC Det, Region VII

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

/Pfw

WD-460 FORM 341
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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
US ARMY EUROPE

I-9231

D-137536

APC 154, US Army
21 July 1950

SUBJECT: Modus Operandi of OZ Agents

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TO : See Distribution

1. The following extract is quoted from the report of interrogation of [b6] born [b6] deserter from the CSR Army and former Operations Officer in Department V (OZ-Obrana Bezbecnosti - Defensive Intelligence) of the 11th Infantry Division in PILSEN, CSR: "Contact is mostly on a personal basis since agents of OZ, Department II, and StB all cross the border. Army Area I mails letters to its agents in Germany, their mission being stated in the letter. The letters are of a regular type, but invisible ink is used between the lines. The message appears when the letter is held over a stove. Letters stating a mission are always mailed in duplicate. One is registered and one goes by regular mail."

2. Since Czech Intelligence uses this method of assigning missions to its agents in Germany, it is highly possible that agents also transmit information to CSR using the same method.

3. Should letters of this type come to your attention, it is desired that they be scientifically analyzed to determine if they contain any hidden messages.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL

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b6

Capt [b6] /akw/Stgt 97683/OPS

Major, Infantry
S-2/S-3

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932F

CZECH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (GENERAL)
Re: Recruiting of Agents

3 July 1950

H6 Crc file 0 242063 / Argentina
G VII-96

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08585

1. On 19 June 1950, the undersigned Agent was informed by b1

b1

2. SYNOPSIS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION: None.

3. PRESENT INVESTIGATION: Personal data on personalities mentioned in this report is listed in Personality Annex to this report.

b1

713

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66th CIC Det., Region VII

b6

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AR, VII-94, Region VII, dated 3 July 1950, Subject: CZECH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (GENERAL). Re: Recruiting of Agents. Page 2

b1

7. UNDEVELOPED LEADS AND FUTURE ACTION: None.

8. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. Background Information: A check of the Regional Registry regarding the personalities mentioned in this report was negative. A check made with the [b1] revealed no information regarding the two Czechs mentioned in paragraph 5 i. above. In reference to paragraph 5. above. [b1]

b1

b. Comments and opinion: It is the opinion of the undersigned Agent that the soldiers mentioned in paragraph 2, above, are either members of the Czech Army or the StB using SNB uniforms as a cover for their activities.

c. Recommendations: No further action is contemplated in this case due to the instructions which were received by [b1]

[b1]

d. Case closed by this office.

b6

Special Agent CIO
Operations Officer

Incl: Personality Annex

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1-Region VII file

RECEIVED FROM [b1]
DECLASSIFIED BY [b1]

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71

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Personality Annex to AR, VII-94, Region VII, dated 3 July 1950, Subject: CZECH
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (GENERAL), Re: Recruiting of Agents.

1.

b1

2. Name: Unknown (Czech Officer) Sex: Male
Birthdate: 25-30 years old (est) Birthplace: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Occupation: Officer
Present Address: Unknown
Height: 5'7" Weight: 140-150 lbs Build: Medium
Hair: Dark-blond Eyes: Unknown
Distinguishing Characteristics: Teeth, two gold teeth set in upper jaw
on each side in front.
3. Name: Unknown (Czech Sergeant) Sex: Male
Birthdate: 25-30 years old (est) Birthplace: Unknown
Nationality: Unknown
Occupation: Sergeant
Present Address: Unknown
Height: 5'10" (est) Weight: 160-165 lbs Build: Medium
Hair: Unknown Eyes: Unknown
Distinguishing Characteristics: None

7c1

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
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Page(s) 782-783

CONFIDENTIAL**INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP**
HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: VII-228.34

SUBJECT: StB Interrogation MethodsDATE: 1 February 1950(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly
draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	CO Reg VII	Hqs 66th CIC Det Attn: Capt b6	1 Feb 1950	<p>1. Attached Agent Report (short form), subject and file as above, dated 1 February 1950, is forwarded for your information.</p> <p>2. Region IV has been serviced with an informational copy of the attached report.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: 150px;">b6</div> <p style="text-align: center;">Maj Inf Commanding</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">  </div>
<p>WDJG b6 CB Team Cdr/kd/ BAYREUTH 3091/5</p> <p>1 Incl: AR (short form), Reg VII, subj & file as above, dtd 1 Feb 50</p> <p>DISTRIBUTION: 2-Hqs 66th CIC Det 1-Region IV (info copy) 1-Region VII file</p>				

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

StB Interrogation Methods

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 February 1950

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

VII-222,34

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. [b1] an illegal border crosser, born [b1] in [b1] automobile mechanic, was apprehended by [b1] near KARLSSEN (N51/P26) on 26 January 1950. KEXSPIN was subsequently interviewed by the undersigned Agent and willingly volunteered the following information.

a. [b1] and other workers incited by him shot down 18 electric motors used to run machinery in the [b1]. They were inspired to this action by discontent with working conditions in the factory. Shortly after this incident, [b1] fled to Bavaria because of fear that he was under suspicion. He voluntarily returned to the CSR with the hope that he could escape a second time with his wife and children. He was arrested [b1] and confined in EGEL (N51/P37) jail [b1] when he was transferred to the district jail in KARLSBAD (N51/P69).

b. During the approximate [b1] [b1] was interrogated by the StB approximately 15 times. He was kept blindfolded during these interrogations, except for brief intervals when he was required to look at maps and charts. The StB men present addressed each other by number instead of by name. The two voices that represented his most persistent interrogators had the numbers 33 and 35. When [b1] answers were unsatisfactory, he was beaten severely about the head. (P-6)

c. The StB men accused him of having returned to CSR to perform espionage for the CIC. [b1] stated to the StB that he had been arrested by the German police and brought to TIRSCHERBUTH (N50/P25) for interrogation as an illegal border crosser. They produced a map of TIRSCHERBUTH and pointed out two locations, questioning him as to which of the CIC offices was where he had received his espionage instructions. They asked also if he were working with a Mr. [b6] whom they referred to as a CIC agent at present in RUICH (N49/Y85). (P-6)

2. AGENT'S NOTES:

- a. Registry files of Region VII were checked with negative results.
- b. [b1] is being held in the TIRSCHERBUTH jail pending trial by HEDIG, ABERG (N50/O90), for illegally crossing the CSR-Bavarian border for the second time.
- c. [b1] escaped from a hospital in KARLSBAD, where he was being treated for head injuries referred to in paragraph 1b, this report. [b1] was wearing a bloody bandage when he was brought into the TIRSCHERBUTH CIC office and looked as if he had been severely handled.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[b6] Special Agent CIC
56th CIC Let, Region VII

6. SIGNATURE

b6

WD-100 FORM 341
1 JUN 47

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INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

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HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: I-5196

SUBJECT: Czech Tourists Potential Agents

DATE: 18 January 1950

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	CO Reg I	Hqs 66th CIC Det Attn: Capt b6	18 Jan 1950	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The attached short form Agent Report, Subject and file as above, is forwarded for your information.2. Source: b13. Source is a member of the Czech National Democratic Party, and he obtained his information from other members of this party who have contacts inside the CSR.4. Date of information: December 1949.5. Date agent received information: 21 December 1949.6. It is realized that the information contained in the attached Agent Report contains the same information that was submitted as bi-weekly material, and the report is being submitted in accordance with current instructions concerning follow-up of bi-weekly items.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl
AR dtd 16 Jan 50 subj & file a/a (in trip)

Stuttgart 93483/70
OPS

b6

Log No. 1729

b6

b6

Major
S-2/S-3

Jr.
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Page 1 of 1 Pages
Copy 1 of 4 Copies

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(over)

(Classification)

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AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Czech Tourists Potential Agents

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 January 1950

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

I-5196

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1. As of 30 November 1949, all Visas and Travel Permits for persons going outside the CSR are to be issued only by the StB (State Security). After a person's return to the CSR, he is compelled to write a statement for the StB within fourteen (14) days, about everything he saw and everybody he met. Information about convoys, movements of troops of the American, b1 economic and political situations, etc., are some of the EEI's. These EEI's are given to the potential traveler when he applies for his Travel Permit or Visa. He is required to read and sign them. According to the present situation, these Permits and Visas are not issued in great numbers, and it can be assumed that whoever does have a Traveling Permit, automatically falls into the category of a Czechoslovak Agent. (F-3)
2. UNDEVELOPED LEADS AND FUTURE ACTION:
None.
3. AGENT'S NOTES:

A check of the Regional Files disclosed no further information to add to this report.

APPROVED:

b6

Special Agent, CIC
Cmdr, CE Team

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789

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

Special Agent, CIC
66th CIC Det., Region I

6. SIGNATURE

b6

Page / of / Pages

WD-480 FORM 1 JUN 47 341

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50527-2

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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 790

AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 July 1949

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

I-16681

RE: Department StB and "Z"(ZU) of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Source informed this office that on approximately the end of April and the first part of May, 1949, the Departments StB and "Z" of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior conducted a large scale round-up of prostitutes in the larger cities of the CSR.

5. The arrested women were not taken to police stations as is customary in round-ups of this nature, but to the offices of the StB and "Z" units. The arrested women were interrogated by Agents of the StB and Department "Z", and those who possessed what the StB and Department "Z" Agents judged proper qualifications for espionage service, were given one of two choices: to work for the StB or the Department "Z" as agents in the CSR or abroad, or to be sent immediately to the labor camps. It is alleged that a considerable number of these women accepted, and that some already are in Germany. (F-3)
6. Another Source, unknown to Source (1) reported that an unnamed waiter on the Orient Express stated that he (the waiter) knows definitely, that during the past six weeks a number of young women were sent to the US Zone of Germany as agents of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior. (F-3)
7. On 9 July 1949, Source (3) stated to this agent during conversation pertaining to subject unrelated to Subject of this report, that he has definite information that a number of young single women are being sent to the US Zone of Germany during the past two (2) or three (3) weeks by the Czech Ministry of the Interior. (F-3)

8. UNDEVELOPED LEADS AND FUTURE ACTION:

a. b1

9. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. The information in paragraphs 4 and 5 was obtained from

b1

Source (1) stated that to his knowledge b1 is presently in the Czech DP Camp in MURNAU(M48/Y50) Germany. Information received on 28 June 1949.

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b. Information contained in paragraph (6) of this report was

10. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

Reg I 7970th CIC Grp

11. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

791

b6

WD 341

~~SECRET~~

AR, File No. I-16631 Hqs, Region I, 7970th CIC Grp, Dated 13 July 1949
Subject: CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE

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obtained from [b1] who overheard this conversation from an unnamed waiter on the Orient Express dining car. This information was received on 5 July 1949.

- c. Information contained in paragraph (7) of this report was obtained from Ing. [b1]
the Czechoslovak underground group known as TRUE PATRIOTS or GROUP OF PATRIOTS from Abroad. The information given to this Agent by [b1] on 9 July 1949 was during a conversation unrelated to Subject of this report.

SOURCE:

[b1]

EVALUATION: F-3

APPROVED:

[b6]

Special Agent CIC
Agent-in-Charge

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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~~SECRET~~

792

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b6

HEADQUARTERS
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
EUROPEAN COMMAND

APC 757

12 June 1947

D-16772 (CIC/S-3/OPS)

SUBJECT: WVF and ORT Credentials

TO : Commanding Officer
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Region III,
APO 757, U.S. ARMY

1. The following listed documents that were previously classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ are now down-graded to ~~SECRET~~.
FOIC, Sub-Region WIERBACH, dated 14 May 1947, subject: Operation CASEY, re: Information Concerning WVF and ORT Credentials from Illegal Border Crosser.
Cover letter, Sub-Region WIERBACH, dated 15 May 1947, subject as above, files III-W-1076/2.
1st Indorsement, CIC Reg. III to Hqs. 970th CIC Det., dated 22 May 1947, files III-1902

2. It is requested that your records be changed accordingly.

3. This letter will be considered authority for the down-grading of the above listed documents.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOLPA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

b6

Major Inf.
S-3

Telephone: ~~FORN~~ 6201
Mr. b6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

793

26914

HEADQUARTERS
SUB-REGION WIESBADEN
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION III
APO 633

19 May 1947

III-W-1076/2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Operation CANDY

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Re: Information Concerning NKVD and OBZ Credentials
from Illegal Border Crosser.

1. Reference MOIC this office, dated 24 April 1947,
Subject: "Operation CANDY," file 1076/2, regarding activities
of b1 an illegal border crosser. Further
questioning of b1 by this agent brought out the following
information concerning OBZ and NKVD credentials.

2. a. About a year ago there were two (2) types of
credentials issued to NKVD agents:

(1) One type of credentials was issued to
agents working within the Soviet Union.

(2) Another type of credentials was issued to
agents on assignment outside of the Soviet Union.

b. The credentials seen by b1 were of the
second type. These credentials were in the form of a small
booklet with a red cover approximately 10 cm by 6 cm. A dark
blue stripe about 1 cm wide runs diagonally across the front
of the cover, from the upper right-hand corner to the lower
left-hand corner. The letters "NKVD" are printed in Russian
(НКВД), in gold print on this stripe. In the upper left-hand
corner of the cover is the Russian emblem, a hammer and sickle
in a five-pointed star. On the inside of the cover is an auto-
graphed photograph of Josef STALIN. On the first page is a
picture of the agent and below the picture is a statement to the
effect that the bearer of these credentials is an agent of the
USSR and that all possible support should be given him at all
times by other agencies. There are about ten (10) additional
pages written in Russian and contents of which is unknown. No
other languages are employed in the credentials.

c. Credentials issued to agents performing duties
within the borders of the Soviet Union were not seen by ILAVSKY
but from his previous knowledge of them he states that they are
slightly larger than the ones issued to those agents working in
foreign countries. The cover is also red, however the "NKVD" is
printed in black print instead of gold across the blue diagonal
stripe. In addition there are more pages in these credentials
which, among other things, contain the agent's qualifications
and efficiency ratings.

~~SECRET~~

794

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification Canceled (or changed) by Authority of b6 Date 7 May 1947

Has Been
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- 22-22-22

III-W-1440

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

d. The OBZ credentials are also in the form of a booklet with a red cover, the size of which is approximately 8 cm by 12 cm. On the cover is the Czech Lion (national emblem of Czechoslovakia) and the letters "CBZ" are printed beneath it. If the agent has attended school in Russian there is an autographed photograph of Josef STALIN on the inside of the cover. On the first page there is a picture and the signature of the agent and on the second page is his complete description. The credentials contain twelve (12) or fourteen (14) pages written in Czech and in Russian, exact contents unknown.

3. Material in this report is evaluated as C-6, and it must be borne in mind that b1 saw the credentials approximately one (1) year ago. At that time more details were not noted by him because of lack of time and also due to his lack of knowledge of the Russian language.

b6

APPROVED:

b6Special Agent, ~~CSO~~b6Special Agent, CIO
Operations Officer~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

0-169772

Classification downgraded to ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by
authority of [b6] Maj., Inf., by
[b6] A, 12 June 1947.

[b1]

III-1902

1st Ind.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2

Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Region III, 970th CIC Detachment,
APO 757, U. S. Army, 22 May 1947

To: Commanding Officer, 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Det., European
Command, APO 757, U. S. Army. (Attn: Capt. [b6])

Attention is invited to inclosed Sub-Region Wiesbaden report dated 16 May
1947. subject: Operation CANDY.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

[b6]

Special Agent, CIC
Operations Officer

Incl: as stated (4)

Tel : FRAGBBERG 2183
Mr. [b6] hg

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EUC-1440

HEADQUARTERS

SUB-REGION WIESBADEN

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION III

APO 633

16 May 1947

III-W-1076/2

SUBJECT: NKVD and OBZ Credentials

TO : Commanding Officer, Counter Intelligence Corps Region III,
970th CIC Det., APO 807, US Army.

1. Forwarded:

XX For your information.

☐ For appropriate action.☐ For investigation.

☐ For transmittal to:

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b6

SPECIAL AGENT, CTC
COMMANDING

Tel: 26-7058

Incl: 5 cop MOIC dtd 16 May 47,
re: subj as above

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
12 January 2010
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

754

CIC T-1440